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On 24 November 2016, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a peace accord to end a six-decade war. One of the 
items included in the accord was the Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR), an 
agreement laying out substantive measures on rural development aimed at improving 
land access, public goods provision and peasant’s agricultural supports. This thesis 
explores whether negotiated transitions can serve to enact distributive rural change 
through an in-depth examination of the relationship between Colombia’s rural 
development policy and the peace accord. It traces the antecedents, negotiation and 
early implementation of the CRR. 
The thesis draws from my direct involvement in the peace process as a government 
advisor and three years of fieldwork in Bogotá. In order to explain both the CRR’s 
emergence and the reasons for its ambivalent effect on policy, the thesis develops a 
framework that weaves together insights from three strands of literature – agrarian 
political economy, peace implementation and institutional change. By connecting 
global economic trends, emerging norms, and domestic political dynamics, this 
framework enables an analysis that captures how the exceptional circumstances of the 
transition in Colombia influenced policy outcomes. 
The thesis argues, on one hand, that the peace agreement did open policy space for 
a distributive rural agenda. This policy space gained leverage due to two factors: first, 
favorable global and domestic norms appropriated by key decision makers during the 
negotiation phase; and second, the drafting of robust provisions in the peace agreement 
translatable into policy actions. On the other hand, the thesis shows that once the 
negotiation ended, the reform’s scope for change was severely constrained by internal 
and external obstacles faced by the government. Internally, policy capture by 
agribusiness elites, coupled with a lack of bureaucratic coordination in the 
implementation and political pressures exerted by the government’s coalition to move 
away from the CRR, effectively undermined the government’s distributive agenda. 
Externally, a strong right-wing opposition heavily affected the legitimacy of both the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research Problem and Question 
 
On 24 November 2016, at the Colón Theatre in Bogotá, the Colombian government 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) announced the Agreement 
for the Termination of the Conflict putting an end to a sixty-year old war and setting 
forth an agenda of substantive transformations in various issue areas (rural 
development, transitional justice, political participation, illegal drugs). The thesis 
explores whether there is an opportunity for actual rural change in the context of this 
historic deal and the post-accord phase it gave place to. Through the case study of 
Colombia, the thesis addresses the broader question of whether peace agreements 
geared towards terminating internal armed conflicts may trigger rural development 
policy change. This question may be framed as part of a broader literature on agrarian 
political economy that, in exploring the interaction between politics and economics in 
rural change, has looked at questions like why, how and under which circumstances 
may pro-poor rural policy change occur? In other words, what makes support to 
peasants and vulnerable rural populations work? Are these shifts driven by 
macropolitical changes derived from pressures from below (e.g. peasant mobilization 
or a democratic opening), reformist policy elites making the right decisions with a 
strong administrative and organizational capacity, or both? 
In exploring these questions, students of rural politics have recently made clear that 
developing democracies with high levels of pre-existing power imbalances face 
enormous institutional constraints and elite opposition when adopting rural 
redistributive policies, no matter how strong the pressures are from below. Albertus 
(2015), applying the veto players’ framework to land reform politics in Latin America, 
has shown how redistributive land reform occurs only when a given political context 
meets two conditions: a split between ruling political elites and landed elites, and low 
institutional constraints to rule. His evidence is conclusive: significant land 
redistribution has taken place exclusively in autocratic regimes with concentrated 
power and incentives to tackle landed elites. Democracies, he argues, provide too 
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many veto points for landed elites to leverage their influence and obstruct reform. 
Despite his democratic gridlock argument, Albertus states nonetheless that democratic 
regimes may have the capacity to carry out less redistributive types of land reform, 
such as negotiated land reform and allocation of state lands. Furthermore, his 
argument also leaves room to explore whether, under exceptional circumstances, 
democratic regimes may be able to advance significant distributive rural reform. 
Recent literature on agrarian political economy finds, however, that even in 
favorable national environments, rural policy reform is hard to attain (Vergara-Camus 
and Kay 2017a). Distributive policy change is increasingly unlikely in a globalized 
context that features structural restrictions derived from the concentration of agrifood 
systems and the “market imperative” (E. M. Wood 2002). Since 1998, various Latin 
American countries had left-wing governments supported by peasant movements that 
strived for reversing neoliberal policies and improving land access and agricultural 
supports to low-income producers. By establishing land reform programs, accessible 
credit schemes, value-chain linkages and institutions geared towards assisting family 
agriculture, among others, these governments sought to distinguish themselves from 
previous governments’ right-wing policies. Overall, however, the measures had a 
limited impact in “altering the model of rural development inherited from the process 
of neoliberal globalization” (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a). They did not 
significantly reduce inequality or strengthen the organization and political capacity of 
peasant producers. Despite these policy efforts, the lack of change had to do with (i) 
the absence of a developmental state able to renew its previously weakened 
institutional capacities, (ii) the loss of peasant mobilization capacity, and (iii) the 
power of agribusiness and landed elites resilience (p. 417). 
Such analyses focused on recent left-wing Latin American governments offer 
theoretical insights useful for examining other, less studied cases in the literature, 
which are relevant to fully grasp the conditions (political, economic, institutional) 
conducive to rural policy change. Of interest are developing countries that have 
experienced – as a kind of “democratic exceptional circumstance,” following Albertus’ 
notion – a negotiated transition from civil war to peace with an agrarian component 
built into it. To avoid a return to war, peace agreements often establish, at least 
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temporarily, a set of extraordinary binding legal and political mechanisms and 
procedures that may include provisions aimed at tackling pre-existing political and 
economic inequalities. Peace agreements, as the result of a negotiation process between 
state and nonstate actors, may be seen as producing what Christine Bell (2016) calls a 
lex pacificatoria or “law of the peacemakers” (lex pax for short). While not entirely 
constituting a new distinctive legal regime, this lex pax adjusts the behavior of the 
parties involved to the expectations of international norms and establishes a new 
playing field for political stakeholders. For Kaplan and Freeman (2015), transitions 
may “make possible that which would have been previously unimaginable,” as these 
are “rare but critical junctures in history during which – against the odds – [conflict-
ridden] states can transform their social and political dynamics,” tackling key crucial 
issues and counteracting exclusionary tendencies (p. 5). Even if few negotiated 
transitions meet expectations (due to the enormous challenges these countries face to 
move forward) peace agreements nonetheless do create a kind of endogenous shock to 
the political system, thus opening an exceptional window of opportunity for 
distributive rural policy change. In this sense, paying attention to countries that have 
dealt with agrarian issues under a transitional context – and the related post-conflict 
dynamics – may be useful to broaden the political economy analyses on the factors and 
circumstances shaping rural policy change. 
Within the field of civil wars and peace studies, there is a bourgeoning literature on 
the agrarian legacies of war and its impact on peacemaking and peacebuilding (e.g., 
Cramer and Richards 2011; Cederman, Skrede Gledistsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cramer 
and Wood 2017). For the most part, however, studies have focused on the origins, 
evolution and effects of armed conflict in relation to agrarian issues and have paid less 
attention to the way in which agrarian issues are included in peace agreements and, 
more importantly so, to the extent these agreements have modified or not rural 
development policy. A notable exception is Elisabeth Wood’s (2001) study of the 
negotiated transitions of El Salvador and South Africa, which provides key insights for 
developing an understanding of the political and economic reasons leading up to 
settlements and their distributive implications. She argues that in both countries, a 
context of deep political and economic exclusion and brutal repression gave place to an 
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“insurgent pathway to democracy.” That is, a sustained counter-elite insurgency with a 
strong sociopolitical support (based on peasant insurrection in El Salvador and on 
urban labor mobilization in South Africa) forced the economic elites to make a case for 
political compromise within the regime. These elites had historically resisted 
democratization, in great part because the distribution of income and the perpetuation 
of economic privilege were determined by access to state institutions. Yet, propelled by 
the “accumulating costs of insurgency”, economic elites came to realize that a scenario 
of prolonged conflict posed a higher threat to their interests than peace. Thus, they 
pressed state elites to negotiate, “changing the balance of power between regime soft-
liners and hard-liners” (p. 864). In the end, the global context of the fall of Communist 
regimes and the rise of neoliberalism facilitated compromise as economic elites were 
reassured that their assets would be secured in the post-conflict scenario. 
For the case of El Salvador, Wood observes in another work, the agreement 
included narrow provisions on land transfers only to former combatants and supporters 
of the guerrilla fighters in conflict zones. Despite these timid measures, land 
distribution slightly improved in the aftermath of the war. However, overall, the 
implementation process was riddled with difficulties and had a limited impact on 
socioeconomic policy. This had to do mainly with the country’s lack of fiscal capacity 
to finance peacebuilding amidst the neoliberal reform program it had begun in the late 
1980s and the government’s lack of political commitment at crucial stages of the peace 
process (Wood and Segovia 1995). Interestingly, Wood’s work aptly combines 
historical analysis on the factors triggering the peace agreement with assessment of the 
ways the agreement, and the transitional context more generally, affected El Salvador’s 
post-war political and economic dynamics. Nonetheless, her analysis does not provide 
a theoretical perspective on the conditions under which a peace agreement may or may 
not influence rural development policy outcomes. 
A recent literature more concerned with conceptualizing the effect of peace 
agreements is that of peace accord implementation research, which has provided a 
solid empirical and theoretical basis to comprehend post-conflict dynamics (e.g., Bekoe 
2008; DeRouen et al. 2010; Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). Based on qualitative and 
increasingly quantitative analyses, this literature has focused on exploring the 
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relationship between implementation and the durability of peace. Among the factors 
influencing the quality of implementation processes, it has identified the robustness of 
the content of the agreements themselves (Fortna 2004), state capacity (DeRouen et al. 
2010), power-sharing arrangements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), factions’ perception of 
mutual vulnerability (Bekoe 2008), third party intervention (Doyle and Sambanis 2000) 
and verification mechanisms (Mattes and Savun 2010). Besides analyzing these factors, 
this literature has also developed a comparative understanding of how specific 
agreement provisions take different implementation paths over time, distinguishing 
between ceasefire, security, rights, institutions, and social and economic development 
issues. So far, however, it has centered its theorization efforts on issues directly linked 
to the end of conflict, such as the interaction between parties involved in the 
negotiation (e.g., credible commitment theory, mutual vulnerability theory). Although 
recent research in this literature has increasingly paid attention to the specific dynamics 
surrounding the implementation of social and economic policy reform, a more 
systematic approach on the course of substantive agreement issues, such as agrarian 
and rural development, is still needed. Therefore, bringing a political economy 
perspective into these analyses helps to better understand the trajectory of sectoral 
policy as well as the institutional and market restrictions faced by the implementation 
process in the post-conflict scenario. 
Building on the existing literature, my thesis aims to weave together these two 
strands of inquiry – agrarian political economy and peace accord implementation 
research – drawing as well insights from policy and institutional change literature, in 
order to explain better the circumstances and factors shaping rural development policy 
in contexts of negotiated transitions. Specifically, my research seeks to answer the 
following question: what factors explain the contours of rural development policy in Colombia 
in the wake of the agreement that emerged out of the peace talks (2012-2016)? This main 
research question is in turn informed by the answers to three interrelated yet distinct 
sub-questions: (1) What were the features of rural development policy prior to Santos’ 
government and to what extent did Santos’ rural agenda represent a departure from 
this past policy? (2) What explains the emergence of the Comprehensive Rural Reform  
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(CRR) as part of the Havana peace talks? (3) What impact did the CRR have in 
shifting Santos’ rural development policy orientation?  
Focusing empirically on Colombia offers a great opportunity to further knowledge 
on the political and economic dynamics surrounding the negotiation and 
implementation of substantive provisions of peace agreements addressing rural 
inequality. I develop a conceptual framework that accounts for the key factors that 
have so far shaped the effect of the Havana peace process on Colombia’s rural 
development policy which may be useful to understand potential outcomes elsewhere. 
 
The Puzzling Outcome: Recent Ambiguous Rural Development Policy Change in 
Colombia 
As it will be described in Chapter 3, rural development policy in Colombia has been 
historically biased against the peasantry and in favor of large-scale agribusiness and 
traditional landed elites. Even though attempts to improve land distribution and 
peasant livelihoods were made by liberal governments during the 1930s and 1960s, the 
overall policy outlook remained skewed. In the 1991 Constitution, land access and 
support to peasants became a constitutional mandate and successive governments took 
steps to improve the progressive character of resources allocated to small farmers. 
However, the ongoing economic liberalization, coupled with the reduction of public 
expenditure and the weakening of state institutions throughout the 1990s, counteracted 
the efforts to support the peasantry. 
During Álvaro Uribe’s administrations (2002-2006, 2006-2010) this policy 
trajectory maintained its status quo, as key initiatives, such as the ambitious 
agricultural subsidies scheme designed to increase producers’ competitiveness in 
response to the free trade agreement signed with the U.S. in 2007, were geared towards 
large agribusiness firms. In 2010, when Juan Manuel Santos became president as 
Uribe’s candidate, the expectation was that his administration would not only continue 
but also strengthen this policy orientation, due to Santos’ commitments with neoliberal 
ideas and the political backing he received from large economic groups, including 
agribusiness firms. Indeed, during his administration, Santos maintained his support to 
large domestic and foreign investment in the countryside, especially linked to the oil 
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and mining sector. However, at the same time, since the early beginnings of his 
government, Santos also showed an interest in a pro-poor rural development policy 
agenda. This progressive orientation of policy was furthered as the public phase of the 
peace talks with FARC began in Havana at the end of 2012, as one of the key agenda 
items was a “comprehensive agrarian policy”. In the agreement on this item (the 
Comprehensive Rural Reform), reached in May 2013, the government committed to a 
major policy shift on agrarian issues. The Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR) 
included significant goals and measures in land distribution, agricultural supports to 
the peasantry and public goods provisions in rural areas, prioritizing those most 
affected by the armed conflict. 
From this moment on, a significant institutional reorganization of the agricultural 
sector was carried out and various policy instruments and bills were developed in line 
with the CRR’s commitments. In 2014, Santos was reelected with the mandate of 
giving continuity to the peace negotiations and the substantive policy agenda included 
in them. In August 2016, the government and FARC reached a historical agreement 
ending a sixty-year-old war. Only one year later, by September 2017, FARC’s 11,345 
members had demobilized and the organization had transitioned from being the oldest 
armed group in the western hemisphere into a legal political party.1 The agreement’s 
implementation, which began formally in December 2016, however, began with a 
serious political deficit after the plebiscite carried out in October 2nd, 2016, asking the 
citizens’ approval of the agreement turned out to be negative by 50,000 votes (0.5 
percent). Although a new agreement including concerns from the opposition was 
signed and then ratified in congress in November 2016, the government never 
recovered from the plebiscite’s blow and was not able to effectively advance with the 
agreement’s commitments, including those associated with the CRR By mid-2018, two 
years and a half after the agreement was reached, most of the implementation items 
lagged behind, not least those linked with structural rural change. 
                                                 
1 Of FARC’s 11,345 members that by September 25, 2016 had demobilized, 8,322 were armed 
combatants and militia members and 2,971 were members in jail. In total, according to the UN Mission 
that monitored the ceasefire process, FARC turned in 8,112 weapons. See Oficina del Alto 
Comisionado para la Paz (2017) 
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From the standpoint of Santos’ expected policy orientation in 2010, there has been 
an unusual and unexpected shift in rural development policy whereby issues like land 
distribution, agricultural supports to the peasantry and rural public goods have to come 
to the forefront of the agenda. Nonetheless, if measured against the parameters of the 
peace agreement and the significant expected changes within a transitional context, 
this policy shift has been rather gradual and limited. It has indeed achieved the 
insertion of previously neglected issues into the agenda and designed significant 
institutions and instruments with a distributive orientation. Yet this change is not 
either paradigmatic or irreversible, as its effective results in its implementation stage 
have been discontinuous, limited and weakened by other policy agendas not 
necessarily aligned with the peace agreement. To be sure, many of the policy changes 
carried out by the government in this period resulted either as a preparation for the 
post-agreement context or as a direct outgrowth of the agreement. Other changes, 
however, did not have anything to do with the peace talks’ juncture and responded 
instead to sectoral demands. This puzzling picture is what I aim to explain in this 
thesis. 
 
1.2 Thesis Contributions 
 
The thesis makes one theoretical and three empirical contributions. Its main theoretical 
contribution is to provide an analytical framework that helps to explain the extent to 
which a peace process with an agrarian component may succeed (or not) in making 
rural development policy more progressive (pro-poor and pro-distribution). A value-
added of this framework is to connect agrarian political economy literature with peace 
accord implementation scholarship and institutional and policy change research. As 
described in Chapter 2, these literatures are not well-equipped by themselves to 
advance the understanding of the relationship between the international political 
economy, negotiated transitions, rural development policy and domestic political 
dynamics. By bringing them together in a single conversation, I argue that scholars of 
these fields will gain a richer understanding of these relationships, paying attention to 
long-term structural processes as well as to the exceptional circumstances taking place 
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during a post-conflict transition, and to micro policy processes. In this way, I propose a 
fruitful cross-referencing between these three strands of literatures that enables drawing 
the best insights of each of them to account for the interplay of the various forces at 
work surrounding the politics of rural development policy in a context of negotiated 
transitions. 
More concretely, this framework introduces a set of causal factors that contain 
different analytical levels to provide a robust explanation for the policy outcome 
observed in Colombia, which may serve as a conceptual basis for examining other 
relevant cases. As outlined in the case selection section below, Colombia’s case relates 
to a broader small-N universe of cases that have experienced negotiated transitions 
with an agrarian component built into it. The framework integrates structural-oriented 
with agency-oriented factors into a multi-causal explanation that accounts for global 
forces, the exceptional circumstances of peace processes and institutional and political 
constraints in enacting policy change.  
Regarding global forces, the framework identifies the concrete mechanisms through 
which these tend to either enhance or hinder distributive policy change. By showing 
how global economic pressures and normative frames influence Colombian rural 
development policymaking in instances such as institutional arrangements, bills or 
budgeting, the thesis provides insights to critical and constructivist approaches within 
the International Political Economy literature 
The framework also serves to highlight the exceptional context of peace 
negotiations. It does so, first by showing how they offer windows of opportunities to 
introduce issues in the negotiating agenda like rural development that could hardly be 
possible in other contexts. This is an important insight for the peacemaking literature, 
as I adapt Hall’s (1989) framework of how ideas make their way through policy 
decisions to study the way in which the linkage between rural development and lasting 
peace was crucial for introducing the rural development item into Havana’s 
negotiating agenda. The argument that a norm-based mechanism – namely 
securitization – triggered the inscription of substantive provisions in the agreement by 
the peace negotiators, rather than a mobilization from below, represents a new way of 
understanding how transitional contexts may enact policy change. I argue that key 
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carriers of these ideas in both government and FARC’s delegations were instrumental 
for making them persuasive and institutionally viable during the negotiation. These 
carriers, who are concrete actors, serve to view the link between ideas on rural 
development and political decisions in specific historical circumstances.  
The other point the thesis makes regarding the exceptional circumstances offered by 
peace settlements draws on Virginia Fortna’s (2004) idea that agreements are not mere 
scraps of paper. While she argues that the “robustness” of an agreement’s text may 
help ensure the durability of ceasefires and avoiding a return to war, I use this term to 
establish how substantive provisions like the ones included in the CRR may also have 
better chances of having an effective implementation if robustly drafted. I develop an 
analysis of the CRR’s robustness disaggregating this concept into what I define as 
“comprehensiveness” and “specificity”. These conceptual tools may be used in the 
peacemaking literature to examine substantive provisions found in other agreements.         
Regarding institutional and political constraints, the framework makes an 
important contribution to the peace implementation literature unpacking the concept 
of “state capacity” to examine the various restrictions faced by the CRR in the 
implementation phase. It does so by exploring three key categories (bureaucracy, 
political arrangement and interest groups’ access points) that help examining the state 
capacity at different analytical levels. Therefore, the framework enriches the theoretical 
understanding of the problems states face internally when implementing substantive 
peace provisions. The thesis highlights the role that competing agendas within central 
governments have in influencing a peace agreement’s implementation, building on the 
literature that disaggregates the state into its component parts. Moreover, drawing on 
the literature of coalition rule, the thesis shows how a government’s political 
arrangement may not be completely aligned with the president’s peace policy. It also 
illuminates the conceptual understanding of how agribusiness lobbying worked in this 
transitional context, providing an analysis of how this sector had direct access points 
that influenced government decisions on the agreement’s implementation. In addition, 
the framework also analyzes how the external political opposition further undermined 
the government’s capacity by delegitimizing its mandate to advance on the peace 
process. Drawing on constructivist literature on negative framings, the thesis provides 
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analytical insights on the political dynamics surrounding contentious issues like a 
peace process during its early implementation period.   
Empirically, the thesis makes three contributions related to the in-depth case study 
of Colombia’s rural development policy change amid the peace talks. First, the thesis 
contributes to the empirical knowledge on Colombia’s peace process, which is of 
current relevance for peacemaking around the world. It describes the political context 
that gave place to the peace negotiations, providing an analysis of the immediate 
domestic and international antecedents that favored the initiation of the peace 
dialogue. It reconstructs the way in which the agrarian item was included in the 
agenda, tracing in detail the FARC and government’s conceptions on the issue, the 
domestic context that favored them and how both parties addressed it in the 
exploratory meeting in Havana. The thesis analyzes the content of the Comprehensive 
Rural Reform and it traces how the central government prepared itself institutionally 
for the implementation of the CRR.  
A second empirical contribution of the thesis is advancing knowledge of 
Colombia’s rural development policy. Its traces its trajectory before, during and after 
the peace talks through a typology that helps understand its conceptual orientation, 
institutional processes and concrete results. As part of this analysis, the thesis identifies 
how global economic trends in the agricultural sector as well as global alternative 
norms have influenced the course of Colombia’s rural development in the period 1990-
2010, thus connecting global processes with domestic policymaking. Furthermore, it 
develops a methodology to analyze rural development policy change and highlights the 
policy variations between Uribe and Santos’ administrations, comparing their 
emphasis and priorities thus helping to understand the continuities and discontinuities 
between both governments. The thesis’ provides ample empirical data, in terms of 
budget allocation, institutional arrangements, policy instruments and programming 
that is useful to examine rural development policy in both governments. 
Third, the thesis provides an empirical analysis of the difficulties that the 
Colombian government has had in enforcing the substantive provisions on rural 
development agreed as part of the peace negotiation. This is an important contribution 
to the peace implementation research as it traces the various kinds of obstacles and 
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contradictions encountered by Santos’ administration in the post-agreement period. 
Based on my direct experience working as a government advisor, the thesis 
reconstructs the different phases of the agreement implementation’s institutional 
preparatory process led by the President Executive’s Office between 2013 and 2016. 
This reconstruction allows viewing how problems of coordination between responsible 
politicians, loss of presidential agency and insufficient resources, among other aspects, 
affected the CRR’s implementation. Beyond the bureaucracy, the thesis provides an 
empirical analysis of Santos’ coalition rule, its evolution over time and its negative 
influence on the CRR’s implementation. Similarly, it also describes the concrete forms 
through which the agribusiness sector lobbied for their economic interests undermining 
the CRR’s transformative provisions on land distribution. Finally, the thesis describes 
Uribe’s opposition to the peace process and its effects on the government’s legitimacy 
and on the CRR’s implementation. 
 
1.3 Case Selection, Methodology and Positionality 
 
Case Selection 
My own personal and professional experience has affected the way I think about social 
phenomena in general and about this research in particular. For almost seven years, I 
worked for the government of Colombia. Between 2011 and 2012 as policy advisor to 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and then as advisor at the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Peace in two periods, between October 2012 and 
August 2013, and then again, on a part-time basis, between March 2015 and August 
2017. Between August 2013 and March 2015, I went to Canada to undertake my PhD 
studies at the University of Waterloo. Given my role in government, I became heavily 
involved in the peace negotiations. First, by doing research on relevant national and 
international experiences and drafting policy briefs in support of the proposals the 
government presented at the negotiating table to FARC concerning the rural 
development item; later, by coordinating the institutional preparation process that the 
government followed to make the adjustments necessary for the agreement’s 
implementation; finally, by being part of the joint commission in charge of the 
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implementation oversight during the first year of the post-agreement period. Due to 
this first-hand experience, which gave me insights into the policy process, I decided to 
choose Colombia as my case study for the analysis. This selection, however, is not free 
of epistemological and ethical questions as a researcher. I have tried to be as aware as 
possible of my own biases in carrying out this research, especially in terms of coming 
up with verifiable evidence for the arguments I present. Yet, the work is undoubtedly 
influenced by my own perception of the peace process. Still, this dissertation is by no 
means an autobiographical account of the process, but rather a political science study 
on rural development policy change and it should be judged in this way.  
Leaving these personal considerations aside, there are methodological reasons to 
select Colombia for the single-case research, out of the small-N universe of developing 
countries that recently underwent negotiated transitions with an agrarian component 
as part of a peace agreement. An obvious setback for selecting Colombia has to do with 
the fact that the agreement’s implementation process is at an early stage. Whereas by 
June 2018 Colombia was in its second year of implementation, all the other cases had 
already gone through an implementation period of at least ten years. This time frame 
allows making longitudinal analysis of the implementation’s trajectory and having a 
holistic view of the various inflection points, periods of stagnation and reversals (Joshi, 
Quinn, and Regan 2015). I am fully aware of the limitations of analyzing a process in 
media res that does not offer the possibility of attaining retrospectively an overall picture 
of the course of events. Two methodological steps may help counteracting this 
limitation. One is drawing key insights from the trajectory of the other cases that might 
be useful in identifying ongoing trends and factors that help explain the still unfolding 
of events in Colombia. The other is making better use of the material available for my 
analysis. I do this by broadening the scope of the period analyzed so as to not focus 
only on the implementation period, which began in strict sense in December 2016, but 
also to account for the period previous to the negotiations (before 2012), as well as of 
the negotiation and institutional preparation periods themselves (2012 to 2016). 
Moreover, as the most recent peace agreement reached, almost one decade after the 
last one was struck, Colombia’s case sheds new light into the role global economic 
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trends and norms play in transitional contexts and the difficulties of implementing a 
peace agreement in the current context of globalization. 
Beyond its novelty, at least four features of the Colombian case make it relevant, as 
it will be explained below: it has the most comprehensive agreement of all, an adverse 
political environment for change to succeed, the most developed state at the moment 
of the agreement’s signing, and an ambivalent policy outcome. Thus, it presents a 
combination of contradictory circumstances that turn it into a relevant case to identify 
the factors shaping rural development policy in transitional contexts. 
 
Colombia’s Peace Agreement Comprehensiveness 
The Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM) is a time-series data 
developed by the Kroc Institute that comprises information on 34 peace agreements 
signed between 1989 and 2012 that allows a comparison of 51 distinct agreement 
“provisions” across countries and issue areas, and that recently developed a specific 
project on Colombia’s 2016 agreement. The PAM defines a provision as a “goal-
oriented reform or stipulation that is costly to one or both conflict actors and that falls 
under a relatively discrete policy domain (e.g. executive branch reform, police reform)” 
(Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015, pp. 554). The 724 coded provisions fall into six 
categories (ceasefire, institutions, security, rights, external arrangements and other 
arrangements). In the category of “other arrangements”, there are provisions related to 
“economic and social development” and to “natural resource usage”, both broadly 
associated with rural development policy reform. Based on this data, I drew a universe 
of five comprehensive peace agreements carried out in developing countries and 
containing provisions on rural development policy (see Table 1.1 below). To preserve 
unit homogeneity, the peace agreements selected are geared towards resolving 
“centralist” civil wars, in which the insurgents’ goal is “to increase political 
participation or access the means by which to influence policy”, as opposed to 
“regional” ones, wherein parties seek to achieve secession or self-governance (Bekoe 
2008, pp. 6-7). Similarly, I also excluded peace agreements that included other states as 
signatory parties (e.g., Cambodia; United Kingdom) or fundamentally related with 
ethnic divisions. The claims made on rural development policy change in Colombia 
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may serve to examine these other type of cases. Nonetheless, to the extent that ethnic-
based conflicts entail provisions aimed at solving identity divides and claims to 
territory, I consider that there are other factors at work in these cases different from the 
ones identified for Colombia.2 
 
Table 1.1. Relevant Universe of Peace Agreements with Rural Development Provisions 
Country Peace Agreement Date 
Colombia Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build 
a Stable and Lasting Peace 
30 Nov 2016 
El Salvador Chapultepec Peace Agreement 16 Jan 1992 
Guatemala Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace 29 Dec 1996 
Nepal Comprehensive Peace Agreement 21 Nov 2006 
South Africa Interim Constitution 17 Nov 1993 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the PAM data. 
 
Of these five agreements, Colombia’s stands out as the most comprehensive of all 
and as the most robust on the specific issue area of rural development. Nearly three-
hundred pages long, Colombia’s agreement is the longest peace agreement produced in 
intrastate conflict (Bell 2016, p. 116). This has to do with the level of detail achieved in 
the specific agreements of the six issues addressed, which included significant “positive 
peace” measures that go beyond cease fire and disarmament and seek to tackle 
structural political, social and economic exclusion. Only in the issue area of rural 
development, the agreement contains 17 provisions and 93 specific stipulations or 
measures that further detail the content of these measures, as Table 1.2 shows (Kroc 
Institute 2017, pp. 73-74).  
 
                                                 
2 I am not considering as part of my universe of cases Bangladesh’s 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace 
Accord, Burundi’s 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Cambodia’s 1991 
Framework for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict; Djibouti’s 1994 Accord de 
paix et de la reconciliation nationale, India’s 1993 Bodo Accord, Indonesia’s 2005 MoU between 
Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement; Lebanon’s 1989 Taif Accord; Liberia’s 2003 Accra 
Peace Agreement; Mali’s 1992 National Pact; Niger’s 1995 Agreement between the Republic Niger 
Government and the ORA; Papua New Guinea’s 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement; Philippines’ 
1996 Mindanao Final Agreement; Senegal’s 2004 General Peace Agreement between the Republic of 
Senegal and MFDC; United Kingdom’s 1998 Good Friday Agreement.   
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Table 1.2. Provisions in Colombia’s Peace Agreement Rural Development Issue Area 


















1 Land Fund for Comprehensive Rural Reform 3 
2 
Other measures for land access (subsidy, special 
purchase credit, beneficiaries, rights of use) 
4 
3 Land titling of small and medium property 3 
4 
Mechanisms to resolve land ownership and use 
disputes, new agrarian jurisdiction 
4 
5 Multipurpose Land Cadaster System 5 
6 
Closure of the agricultural frontier, land use, 
territorial planning, and environmental protection 
3 
7 Campesino Reserve Zones (ZRC)  1 
2 Territorial 
Development 
Programs (PDET)  














National Plans for 
Comprehensive 
Rural Reform  
9 Road Infrastructure (Tertiary Roads) 2 
10 Irrigation Infrastructure 5 
11 Electricity and Internet Infrastructure 4 
12 Social Development: rural health 4 
13 Social Development: rural education 11 
14 Social Development: housing and potable water 4 
15 Agricultural supports: Promotion of the solidarity 
and cooperative economy. Technical assistance. 
Credit. Marketing 
17 
16 Rural labor formalization and social security 12 
17 System to progressively guarantee the right to food 6 
 Total   93 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the PAM Colombia data. 
 
In the other cases, as Table 1.3 indicates, peace agreements had fewer provisions on 
this issue area and were less specific. If combined, the other agreements’ total number 
of provisions associated with rural development is 56. Colombia’s high value on one of 
the research’s key dimensions of interest – the robustness of peace agreements – makes 
it an “extreme” case (Gerring 2006, pp. 101-105) from which it is possible to learn a 
great deal about the causal links and contextual factors involved in the relationship 




Table 1.3.Provisions and Stipulations on Rural Development  




1 The agrarian problem 
Lands in excess of  constitutional limit of  
245 ha  
1 
State-owned lands not currently in forestry 
reserve 
1 
Lands offered for sale to the state 1 
Payments for land 1 
New legislation 1 
2 Lands within conflict zones 
The land-tenure system in conflict zones 1 
Inventory of  cases covered by the 
Agreement 
1 
Establishment of  a Special Commission 3 
Legalization of  land tenure 1 
Payment for lands 1 
3 
Agreement on occupied lands 
(July 3, 1991) 
Respect for the agreement on occupied 
lands   
1 
4 
Loans to the agricultural sector 
and to micro- and small-scale 
enterprise 
Loans to the sector as a whole 1 
Active involvement of  target sectors 1 
Technical assistance 1 
International cooperation for the 
agricultural sector 
1 
Total  17 
Nepal 
1 
Political - Economic - Social 
Transformation and Conflict 
Management 
Common minimum program for socio-
economic transformation to end all forms of  
feudalism 
1 
Scientific land reform program by doing 
away with the feudal land ownership 
practice 
1 
Land and socio-economic security 1 
2 Economic and Social Rights 
Commitment to respect and guarantee the 
right to food security of  all the people 
1 




Measures to facilitate socio-
economic reconstruction and 
development 
Land, its accessibility and use; 
1 
2 
The Public Protector, Human 
Rights Commission, 
Commission on Gender 
Equality and Restitution of  
Land Rights 
Restitution of  Land Rights 6 
Commission on restitution of  land Rights 2 
Court Orders 
4 
Total  13 
Guatemala 
1 








Agrarian situation and rural 
development 
Participation 1 
Access to land and productive resources 4 
Support structure 5 
Organization of  the rural population for 
production 
2 
Legal framework and juridicial security 3 
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Country  Theme Provision # of Stipulations 
Land register 1 
Labor protection 1 
Environmental protection 1 
Resources 2 
 Total  22 
Total    56 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the PAM Colombia data. 
 
Colombia’s Highly Adverse Political Environment to Rural Change 
Of all the comparable cases, Colombia is the country that at the moment of the peace 
talks’ beginning presented one of the most adverse political environment for rural 
policy change to succeed. Thus, it is a “hard” case methodologically relevant to assess 
whether there is any causal linkage between an exceptional transitional context and 
distinct rural policy outcomes.3 This adverse environment in Colombia has to do, on 
one hand, with historical-long stability of the status quo outlook of rural policy. On the 
other hand, it also reflects a relatively low peasant mobilization prior to the peace talks. 
Although the other countries comparable to Colombia also featured uncompromising 
rural elites hostile to any distributive change, in Colombia these elites have proven to 
be highly effective in systematically blocking any attempt of substantial reform even 
within an existing democratic framework (Uribe López 2013). During Uribe’s 
government between 2002 and 2010, rural elites were able to gain significant advantage 
in influencing policy outcomes. Santos’ land restitution policy served to weaken the 
power and influence of landed elites linked to violent dispossession. Yet, this sector 
continued to have political power and policy influence over the course of the peace 
negotiations and the early implementation process, constraining the scope and nature 
of reform. 
                                                 
3 Referring to Colombia as a “hard” case does not mean I am adopting a “crucial-case” (or “most 
difficult case”) research design, as defined by Gerring (2006, pp. 118-122). My thesis is not aimed at 
confirming or disconfirming a particular theory, but rather at teasing out the interaction between the 
various factors identified. Nonetheless, by indicating that Colombia is a “hard” case to observe policy 
change, I am partially drawing on Levy’s notion of the “Sinatra inference”: “if it can make it here, it can 
make it anywhere” (quoted in Gerring, p. 119). Yet, as already explained, my case falls more into the 
“extreme-case” method, which even with its purely exploratory purpose is a productive way to identify 
possible causal linkages and additional factors affecting the outcome (Gerring 109).  
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Moreover, whereas in countries like El Salvador and South Africa there was a 
strong social mobilization that challenged the power of the elite and persuaded it to 
negotiate, in the case of Colombia the Havana peace talks did not result from pressures 
from below and, in fact, rural elites, especially agribusiness, remained strong when 
negotiations started. In other words, the Colombian case is also a hard case insofar the 
“mobilization from below” argument does not explain the inclusion of rural 
development provisions into the peace agreement nor any ensuing policy changes. 
There was indeed a growing rural social mobilization across the country that expressed 
itself especially in the 2013 agrarian strike, as explained in Chapter 5. Yet, unlike the 
other cases, the elites did not feel threatened by this social unrest. The “insurgent 
pathway” to reform that took place in other cases was not feasible in Colombia 
because these mobilizations did not have a strong link with FARC. At the time of the 
negotiations, the guerrilla group did not have the support of civil society and did not 
have either a favorable military balance of forces to pressure elites in making 
significant concessions.  
 
Colombia’s “Most Developed” State 
Another reason why Colombia is analytically relevant is that its long-standing 
institutions rule out simplistic accounts that attribute poor implementation of 
substantive agreement provisions to a general lack of state capacity (e.g., DeRouen et 
al. 2010). At the time the agreement was reached, Colombia was, compared to the 
other cases of the universe defined, the country with the highest state capacity 
displaying indicators of a middle-income country (Table 1.4). In most of all the proxies 
commonly used to show state capacity (economic development, the central 
government’s economic capacity and political stability and rule of law), Colombia was 
above all of the other cases. In countries like El Salvador, Nepal or Guatemala, the 
simple absence of the state leaves no room for a more complex analysis of the political 
and economic dynamics surrounding policy change. In Colombia, meanwhile, state 
institutions (central government agencies, congress, courts) are, at least at the national 
level, relatively consolidated. Interestingly, they operate with multiple and 
contradictory goals, interests and stakeholders, and therefore the landscape becomes 
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richer for the analysis and lends itself to teasing out the enabling and hindering factors 
that influence rural development policy change in the transitional context of the 
Havana peace agreement. 




Government’s economic capacity Political stability and rule of law 








(% of GDP) 
Central 
government 









El Salvador 1992 2,336 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Guatemala 1996 2,371 8,53 8,00 11,24 -0,45 -1,13 -0,86 
Nepal 2006 513 8,78 NA 49,69 -0,91 -0,62 -0,69 
South Africa 1993 5,424 21,78 31,95 43,78 NA NA NA 
Colombia 2016 7,526 13,21 29,96 57,48 0,02 -0,32 -0,34 
Source: Author’s construction based on World Bank Open and World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
Colombia’s Ambivalent Outcome in Achieving Rural Development Policy Change 
None of Guatemala, El Salvador, South Africa nor Nepal succeeded in fully enforcing 
during the implementation period the rural development provisions included in their 
respective agreements. In the best-case scenario, some measures were adopted to 
introduce certain changes in specific policies, like land acquisition or credit. However, 
all of these countries experienced various types of internal difficulties and external 
pressures that impeded making any substantial reform. Colombia’s lack of significant 
advance in its early implementation stage of the Comprehensive Rural Reform does 
not seem to be an exception, but rather is following a normal pattern of a “negative” 
outcome in achieving effective rural development policy change as a result of a 
negotiated transition. However, and while it may be too early to have a better 
assessment of the overall results of the implementation process, in these first years 
progress has also been made in key areas where other countries failed to do so, as 
described in Chapter 4. For instance, it is not trivial that there has been the creation of 
three large rural development agencies geared towards the implementation of the 
agreement provisions on land titling and distribution, agricultural supports to small-
farmers and the rural development programs with a territorial approach. There have 
been of course numerous obstacles and limitations as well (see Chapter 6). The 
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outcome thus far is more “negative” than “positive”, but overall it is still 
indeterminate. Methodologically, this “gray zone” outcome of the Colombian case is 
useful to move beyond the success/failure binary and to encompass the spectrum of 
potential outcomes with varying degrees and levels of distributive policy change, which 
in turn depend on multiple causal and contextual factors. 
For all of these reasons, it is relevant to focus on Colombia’s peace agreement to 
examine the relationship between a negotiated transition and rural development policy 
change. In what follows, the methodology adopted for this analysis is described.  
 
Methodology and Data 
My research lays within the qualitative tradition in social sciences aimed at reaching an 
explanation of a phenomenon by means of using a single case that serves to illustrate 
causal mechanisms at work in a wider number of small-N cases. My research does not 
attempt to draw universal conclusions, but rather to make an effort to produce 
historically-based and contingent knowledge. Still, I think it is possible to generate 
theory at a meso-level, which could be relevant beyond my case. Considering that the 
problem analyzed features a number of unknown variables and causal connections 
among these (Homer-Dixon 1999, pp. 169–170), the purpose of the research is to 
develop hypothesized causal relationships. In other words, it aims at contributing to 
developing a theory of a negotiated transition pathway towards rural development 
policy change (George and Bennett 2005). I draw the explanatory factors identified in 
my conceptual framework from the existing secondary literature and especially from a 
careful observation of the Colombian case in comparison to the other cases. My 
observation is based on the methods of “process tracing” (Gerring 2006) and “eventful 
analysis”, which serve to specify in detail the chain of events leading to each of the 
factors identified (Mahoney 1999, p. 1165).  
The material used for my analysis draws from my in-depth knowledge of Colombia, 
the peace process and rural development policy. The primary data collection methods 
and sources used received ethics clearance by the Office of Research Ethics in January 
2016.Specifically for this research, I carried out 21 formal semi-structured interviews 
(with government officials, rural development policy experts, FARC leadership’s 
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members, agribusiness entrepreneurs), and went over 110 institutional documents and 
200 relevant press releases. The interviews provided information on the negotiation 
process of the CRR and on the process of translating this agreement into policy. They 
revealed in a very specific way the complexities, contradictions and ambivalences of 
government action, as well as the different existing perceptions and perspectives on 
how the CRR was understood. The documents and press releases were also important 
in providing background information on the historical context of rural development 
and the current debates on the peace process and rural development policy.   
These primary sources were complemented with background information drawn 
from my five-year professional experience working as a government official as part of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, a role that allowed me gain an inside 
perspective of the peace talks and an everyday insight of the policy decision-making 
processes. Although I am still bound to the confidentiality clause I signed as a 
government official regarding, I believe the information I provide in this research does 
not violate this clause as it does not disclose confidential information and it is mainly 
geared towards understanding policy dynamics. Moreover, the secondary literature I 
gathered on Colombia, the politics of rural development elsewhere, peacemaking and 
institutional change was fundamental in helping me frame the argument on the 
Colombian case through a wider historical and comparative lens. 
The conceptual framework I put forward in the dissertation was the result of a 
three-year process in which the information gathered led me to refine the initial 
questions and intuitions and these adjusted notions opened in turn new empirical 
directions and took me to inquire additional material. This constant back and forth 
between theory and empirics helped me viewing Colombia’s rural development policy 
in the juncture of the peace talks in a much more complex way and to understand that 
I needed to come up with an explanation that did not fit easily within conventional 
perspectives of rural change. I had a puzzling outcome in front of me that was hard to 
describe theoretically. It was not clear to me for a long time how to reconcile 
analytically the development of an ambitious rural reform agreed as part of the peace 
talks – by a government that was at the outset simply termed as neoliberal – with the 
adoption of policy measures that were not in line with this reform but actually against 
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it. This contradictory evidence represented a significant challenge and was what I 
sought to explain by combining different strands of literature focused at different 
analytical levels.  
An additional methodological difficulty I faced in building my argument was that 
the peace talks and the agreement’s implementation were still underway during my 
research process. My arguments therefore evolved significantly in time between the 
start of 2015 and the middle of 2018, once I was able to gain a fuller view of the 
negotiation and early implementation processes, and more data became available on 
these. In 2015, although I was already aware of the internal and external constraints 
the government encountered to implement the CRR, I still considered there was 
potential for a major breakthrough in policy and for broad support of its 
implementation. By 2018, after the major political events surrounding the peace talks 
had taken place, especially the plebiscite and the presidential elections, the forces and 
factors hindering the CRR’s implementation, had become much clearer and it was 
possible to build a stronger analysis on what had happened.   
 
Positionality 
I have the conviction that Colombia urgently needs a structural rural reform. My direct 
encounter with the dire situation of rural dwellers has led me to strongly believe that 
such a reform carried out with the active involvement of peasants is the only real path 
towards sustainable peace. At the same time, their resilience, solidarity and hope for a 
better life is what guides my political and intellectual journey up to this date. The 
unsettling questions I had (and still have) on whether it will be possible to take 
advantage of this transitional context to enact this kind of reform led me to embark on 
this research project. In the seven-year period working in government, I ended up 
being in a unique viewpoint to observe, be part of and reflect on government dynamics 
and policy decision-making processes. Actively involved in the unfolding of events, 
during all that time I kept thinking how to translate into a theoretically informed 
research the ongoing developments related with the peace process.  
I cannot abstract myself from what I lived through and experienced. There may be 
various taken-for-granted claims that derive from that context and background. Being 
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part of the state, as Bourdieu (2014) acutely explains, shapes the everyday “habitus”. 
The government official label I carried for so long, no doubt, limited my own 
perspective of things. My interaction with FARC and with civil society organizations 
was, for many years, filtered and bounded by my own position as a government 
official. My understanding of nature, of development, of political change was, as well, 
for many years, given by that bureaucratic worldview. The story I am telling is more a 
story of hallways and office rooms in Bogotá, than a story of on-the-ground action in 
rural territories where peasant communities actually create and develop their own 
destinies. I apologize for leaving out so many groups of people and ways of thinking. It 
is by no means my intention, although I am aware of the limitations of this research. 
Even if it is located within a very specific epistemological paradigm and focus 
(qualitative explanation in political science), this story is worth telling. It is my hope 
that it will contribute to a better understanding of rural reform politics amid peace 
processes and that it may be complemented and enriched by others working on and 
living in rural Colombia and elsewhere in the developing world.  
 
1.4 Research Boundaries 
 
Due to the theoretical questions explored, the gaps in the literature I seek to fill in and 
the empirical strategy followed, my research focused primarily on the institutional level 
of analysis, particularly that of the decision-making processes at the central level 
government in Havana and Bogotá. This decision of the research boundaries 
necessarily leaves out other types of analyses that are also relevant for discussing the 
rural policy implications of the peace agreement. I point out here five caveats that 
might be viewed as opportunities to complement the argument of the thesis in future 
research, as indicated in the conclusions in Chapter 8.  
A first important caveat is that the research does not deal with local or regional 
variations of rural development policy and the implementation of the agreement 
provisions on the ground. In a country with a vast geographic area, with highly 
heterogeneous patterns of land tenure, agricultural forms of production, ethnic groups, 
state authority, presence of illegal armed actors, and social mobilization, among other 
crucial factors, any issue involving rural policies will necessarily have varying 
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outcomes across localities. In an early stage of the research project, I considered 
carrying out two regional case studies to complement the focus on the central level of 
government with a sub-national analysis. However, once the fieldwork began I decided 
to exclude the case studies because I became theoretically and methodologically 
inclined to take advantage of my unique vantage point to uncover the complex political 
dynamics at the national level during the negotiating and early stage of the 
implementation of the rural development item agreed in Havana.  
A second caveat is that my research focuses only on the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR). Hence, besides brief mentions it does not 
provide a carefully analysis of the other items included in the peace agreement, 
including those inextricably linked to the CRR, such as the coca crop substitution 
policy and the measures to promote citizenship participation in decision-making 
processes. Although I do point out the systemic nature of the peace agreement and the 
key issue linkages, I preferred to concentrate on the CRR only given that each item has 
its own specific trajectory, policy actors and rationale. In order to see a broader follow-
up of the implementation, it is important to refer to the research that academic 
institutes and think tanks like the Fundación Ideas para la paz, the Kroc Institute and 
the Fundación Paz y Reconciliación are currently carrying out, monitoring the 
implementation of all of the agreement’s items (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación 2018; 
Kroc Institute 2017; Garzón and Suárez 2018). In this same regard, the research does 
not focus either on the ways in which the CRR and the peace agreement on the whole 
were influenced by and affected ethnic minorities and gender issues, which are 
substantive and in of themselves deserve a specific research design and fieldwork.  
 Thirdly, even if it is geared towards examining the relationship between the CRR’s 
provisions and rural development policy, the thesis does not develop an exhaustive 
analysis of agricultural or rural development policy and its connections with 
Colombia’s broader economy. Chapter 4 focuses on three broad categories to study 
rural development policy change during Santos’ administration. Yet, I do not carry out 
a deeper assessment, especially because recent reports and studies already covered that 
ground (Misión para la Transformación del Campo 2015; UNDP 2011; OECD 2015; 
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016; Berry 2017). Moreover, a fourth 
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limitation of the research is that while the Colombian case is framed in comparative 
perspective, it does not develop an in-depth comparative analysis of the other relevant 
transitional contexts identified (Philippines, South Africa, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nepal). 
A final issue that goes beyond my research’s scope is doing an in-depth account of 
what happened during the negotiating phase. This historiographical kind of research is 
yet to be developed. While my experience inevitably influences my analysis, I 
prioritized developing an explanation over narrating all the circumstances and events 
that surrounded the peace talks. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the 
government official memoirs will be available soon. In addition, the Colombian Brain 
Trust of the Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) will publish in 2018 a book 
describing the debates that took place in each of the items of the negotiation based on 
the accounts of the government officials that attended to Havana (Bermúdez 
Forthcoming book). Alejandro Reyes, a government advisor on the rural development 
item, published two years ago a book in which he provides a well-informed account of 
the specific debates that took place on the item of rural development (Reyes 2013). 
Having made clear the issues that the research does not include, it is relevant to 
briefly overview the argument and the thesis’ structure.    
 
1.5 Overview of the Argument and Thesis Structure 
 
Through a detailed analysis of three distinct moments of the Havana peace talks 
(before, during and after), the thesis examines the complex connections between the 
agreement on Comprehensive Rural Reform and Colombia’s rural development policy. 
I explore whether the agreement fostered a distributive orientation in this policy in 
order to test the potential for a negotiated transition pathway to policy change. My 
overarching argument – developed in more detail in the next chapter – is that in 
Colombia the peace agreement did open a window of opportunity to enact rural 
development policy change, that furthered the already reformist agenda set forth by 
Santos early in his government. The CRR took to another level the reforms Santos had 
set forth early on in his government crystallizing a vision and specifying commitments 
that had a direct effect on policy. Yet, once the CRR was agreed, even though it 
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pushed forward distributive measures that moved policy away from the status quo, its 
implementation faced severe internal and external obstacles that limited its scope of 
change. This limited and ambivalent policy outcome was influenced by three broad 
factors. First, by a pre-existing regressive policy orientation, characterized by elite 
capture and a weak institutional sector, which was further reinforced by global 
economic trends that fostered the strengthening of the agribusiness sector in Colombia 
and undermined the peasantry’s political and economic capacity. Secondly, by the 
exceptional context offered by the peace talks’ juncture, which, despite these pre-
existing forces, opened space for a distributive agenda, aided primarily by the 
government’s reformist agenda promoted by Santos and global alternative norms 
promoting land access and supports to family agriculture. Thirdly, this ambivalent 
policy outcome was determined by the low government capacity to enforce the agreed 
measures that had to do with internal and external constraints. Internally, these were 
associated with bureaucratic lack of coordination, political pressures exerted by the 
government’s coalition and ongoing agribusiness lobbying. Externally, these were 
related with the right-wing opposition that effectively undermined the governments 
and the peace process’s legitimacy.  
The thesis is structured in eight (8) chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 
outlines my theoretical framework. First, the chapter surveys three strands of literature 
that are relevant to address the question of rural development policy change within 
negotiated transitions: critical agrarian explanations to rural reform, institutionalist 
theories on policy change, and peace settlement and implementation research. Despite 
each of these literatures’ relevant contributions, I argue that each literature on its own 
fails to provide sufficient insights into the outcome in Colombia. Therefore, I propose a 
new framework that draws from various theoretical perspectives seeks to capture the 
complex political dynamics of rural policy reform under scenarios of peace 
negotiations. While this framework aims explicitly at explaining the outcome in 
Colombia, it may be useful to study outcomes in other relevant cases. In short, the 
framework considers three relevant factors that when taken together account for both 
short-term and long-term processes, and their interaction effects. 
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Chapter 3 provides a historical background for the overall argument. It does so, 
first, by providing a brief context of Colombia’s rural inequality, a crucial feature of the 
country’s political economy, and of its relationship with the FARC’s origins and the 
armed conflict. Secondly, the chapter develops a detailed analysis of the immediate 
political antecedents leading up to the Havana peace talks. Here, I identify that the 
changes that took place between the end of the 1990s up until the late 2000s in the 
dynamics of the military confrontation between the government and FARC, especially 
the armed forces’ surpassing FARC’s capacity, played a key role in creating favorable 
conditions for the negotiations in Havana. I note that Juan Manuel Santos’ arrival to 
power in 2010 and the shifts in FARC’s leadership were also important factors leading 
up to the exploratory meetings in 2012. Furthermore, I describe relevant international 
factors that contributed positively in making the peace talks feasible. Particularly, I 
refer to the arrival of left-wing governments in Latin America and Obama’s election in 
2009, both of which opened space for a negotiated solution in the government’s and 
FARC’s sides. 
After the historical background given in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 begins the analysis of 
rural development policy change in the context of the peace talks in Colombia based 
on the conceptual framework proposed. In order to do so, it first traces the global and 
regional forces (both material and ideational) that play a structural role in constraining 
and at the same time enabling the emergence of an alternative rural development 
policy agenda in Colombia as part of the peace talks. I argue that in an increasingly 
globalized agrifood system, the rising interest for land and primary commodities has 
exerted strong market pressure in developing countries like Colombia, which end up 
reinforcing the large-scale agricultural development model that goes against 
distributive efforts. Similarly, the growing importance of agribusiness, not only in land 
investments but also in downstream and upstream activities, further increases their 
lobbying power in policy-making, as governments tend to pay more attention to these 
giant firms’ demands, undermining the already weak family agriculture sector both 
economically and politically. Agricultural trade liberalization and state reduction have 
been the two other structural factors that since the 1990s have defeated the efforts 
made by states to come up with more distributive, peasant-oriented policies. In the 
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chapter, I describe how these broader trends affected Colombia’s agricultural policy in 
the period prior to the peace talks, 1990-2010. I argue, nonetheless, that at the same 
time and in reaction to these economic trends, global alternative norms promoting land 
access, family agriculture and food sovereignty have emerged in this period, creating 
policy space in Colombia to introduce marginalized issues or conceptions on rural 
development.  
After doing the analysis of these broad trends, the chapter moves on towards a 
more specific comparison of Santos and Uribe’s rural development policies. By 
examining three policy issues (land access, agricultural supports and public goods 
provision), I argue that whereas Uribe’s administration reinforced the status quo 
trajectory of the policy, Santos’ government, despite its political commitment to 
powerful economic groups and its liberal views, did alter the policy’s trajectory 
introducing pro-peasant reformist measures. As it is observed in its discourse 
statements, policy outputs (legislative and budgetary) and concrete outcomes, Santos’ 
government made a break from previous regressive measures and set forth a reformist 
rural agenda early on in his administration. The land restitution policy, the creation of 
new rural development central agencies and a renewed attention to invest in technical 
assistance to support family agriculture, illustrated this unexpected policy path. This 
policy shift towards a distributive orientation facilitated the onset of the peace 
negotiations and the discussion with FARC regarding how to include in the 
negotiating agenda a rural development item.  
Chapter 5 moves the attention away from the pre-negotiation period and towards 
the context of the peace talks. It explains how, based on the favorable political context 
that led to the emergence of the peace negotiations described in Chapter 3, and the 
progressive policy initiatives advanced by Santos’ since 2010 described in Chapter 4, 
the negotiating parties took advantage of this window of opportunity to include the 
item on comprehensive agrarian development as part of the negotiating agenda and to 
develop a robust agreement on it. 
Regarding the exploratory meeting that took place before the formal talks in order 
to set the rules and agenda of the negotiations, I argue that its design, in terms of 
structure and procedure, allowed for effective decision-making in a very difficult 
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scenario in which parties lacked trust. Moreover, regarding specifically the rural 
development agenda item, I explore the way in which the normative frames and ideas 
that each of the negotiating parties developed on the issue were instrumental in making 
possible its inclusion as part of the agenda. Here, I draw on Hall’s (1989) insights on 
the role of ideas in policymaking, to examine the persuasiveness as well as the political 
and institutional viability of the notion linking rural development with sustainable 
peace. This framing enabled key actors in each of the delegations to build a consensus 
on the need of incorporating the item into the agenda. In the case of the government’s 
delegation, I point out the importance of the previous progressive rural agenda that 
was already set forth by Santos in informing and facilitating the inclusion of 
substantive rural development measures into the agenda.    
In this chapter, I also analyze the CRR’s robustness to explain how its 
comprehensiveness and specificity were definitive in strengthening this agreement’s 
influence over policy decisions. In this sense, in line with what the peace accord 
implementation scholar Virginia Fortna (2004) has argued, I sustain that the text of the 
agreement itself is not merely “scraps of paper”, but rather has a concrete effect in 
policy. First, through its discursive power, the CRR brought together previously 
separated issues pushed by rural organizations into a comprehensive agreement. Thus, 
condensing long-held progressive aspirations in a politically weighty document. 
Secondly, through its policy-oriented measures, it produced a distinct set of policy 
priorities that were due to the exceptional context of peacebuilding at least partially 
institutionalized by the government. These insights help to explain the CRR’s capacity 
to modify the policymaking process of Santos’ government, although it had its 
limitations and constraints. 
Chapter 6, focused on the post-agreement period, shows how the CRR’s 
implementation has been much more limited than what the negotiators in Havana 
expected, as the translation of the provision agreed into policy measures have 
experienced a range of internal difficulties within the government. The chapter 
unpacks the concept of state capacity by identifying three variables that allow viewing 
it more closely. First, it examines the lack of institutional coordination at the 
bureaucratic level, characterized by government agencies’ competing agendas or non-
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alignment with the peace mandate. Second, it explores the political pressures imposed 
on president Santos by the coalition parties, which undermined the CRR’s distributive 
orientation at the level of the political regime. Third, it considers the continued 
lobbying by agribusiness sector that had direct meaningful access to policymaking.  
Chapter 7 examines the external pressures that the CRR received. It traces the right-
wing opposition that former president Álvaro Uribe mounted against Santos and the 
peace process. In order to protect the economic interests of landowners and consolidate 
his political power, Uribe effectively undermining the government and the peace 
process’s legitimacy. The chapter analyzes the framings used by Uribe to mobilize 
public opinion against the peace process in its different moments, analyzing the 
political opportunities Uribe took advantage of as well as the organizational structure 
and tactics used to diffuse these framings amid a new global context of “post-truth” 
politics and social media. Taken together, the internal difficulties and external attacks 
deteriorated the government’s capacity to implement the CRR. The prospects of the 
CRR’s long-term implementation remain highly uncertain by mid-2018 in the face of a 
new government led by Uribe’s candidate that won the elections in May. 
Chapter 8 draws general conclusions of the thesis, reiterating the overall argument 
and pointing out the theoretical implications of the framework constructed based on 
the Colombian case for other cases. It also indicates relevant new research avenues 
opened by the current project.  
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Chapter 2. Building a Theory of a Negotiated Transition 





Ambiguous political change is not easy to grapple with. Students of politics, often 
dealing with cases of either dramatic change (e.g. revolutions) or enduring stability 
(e.g. long-term authoritarian regimes), have come up with robust theories to explain a 
wide range of political and economic outcomes of change and non-change.4 Puzzling 
cases like the one of Colombia, however, wherein a critical juncture such as the peace 
talks opens up an opportunity for rural distributive change but at the same time this 
change does not really comes about as expected, are harder to account for  (see for 
example Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This theoretical chapter introduces a framework 
that may be able do so. As described in the introduction, the limited rural development 
policy change in the context of the peace talks is a puzzling political outcome requiring 
a satisfactory explanation. That is why here, first, I review key existing theories that 
may illuminate the understanding of this process, recognizing their value-added but 
also their limitations in fully making sense of the events. Secondly, drawing on the 
insights that these theories have already put forward, I lay out my own conceptual 
framework, which brings together structural, ideational and institutional factors that by 
themselves are insufficient to explain rural development policy dynamics in the 
transitional context of Colombia. Accounting for the drivers that have hindered and 
enabled policy change amid the peace accords in a comprehensive way, this 
framework may be useful to understand potential outcomes elsewhere and to further 
the knowledge on whether there may be a negotiated transition pathway toward 
structural rural reform.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Amongst the best classical examples of studies dealing with political change are Moore (1974), Skocpol 
(1979), Paige (1975). For examples of research dealing with non-change, refer to Mahoney (2001) and 
Helleiner (2014).   
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2.2 What Existing Theories Tell Us and Do Not Tell Us about the 
Puzzling Outcome in Colombia 
 
What would be the trajectory of rural development policy in Colombia if the Havana 
peace talks had not taken place? Would it be very different from the actual policy 
developments between 2010 and 2018? Without the peace process such a policy most 
probably would not have displayed the reformist bent it showed during the Santos 
administration. Although there were some indications of these reforms prior to the 
peace talks, the Havana’s dialogue and the CRR helped deepen the policy space 
created for distributional concerns (e.g., land, public goods in marginal areas and 
agricultural supports to small-farmers). At the end of the day, however, even in the 
middle of this transitional context political restrictions have impeded any significant 
progress or moving away from the previously established policy parameters at the 
current juncture. How can these institutional and policy developments be theoretically 
understood? Existing theories on rural reform, peace agreement implementation and 
policy and institutional change, based respectively on critical agrarian political 
economy, peace research, and public policy and historical institutionalism literatures, 
provide important analytical insights to explain events in Colombia. Yet, all of them 
have limitations and drawbacks that impede attaining a full picture of the recent 
outcome. In what follows, I review their contributions and caveats before advancing 
the conceptual framework proposed that draws from them in a new way. 
 
Critical Agrarian Explanations to Rural Reform  
Following Marxist scholars like Ellen Meiskins Wood (2002), it is possible to argue 
that the long-term expansion of capitalist social relations – especially what they entail 
in terms of the formal separation of the economic sphere from the political one – 
throughout the developing world constitutes the key driver of agrarian change. The 
processes of land commodification and labor market dependence determine the 
establishment of a property rights regime, which in turn crystallizes power relations 
between laborers and capitalists as the latter appropriate surplus labor from the former 
via making property the means of production. As capitalism expands globally, through 
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its uneven and combined development, extending its logic to all spheres of life, 
capitalists, increasingly linked to transnational accumulation processes, trigger a 
variety of domestic strategies to secure a legal and policy framework that is conducive 
to a further appropriation of wealth. Landed elites and agribusiness sectors thus seek to 
influence national regimes of property rights to accrue a larger control of and access to 
land and natural resources (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017b). In this historical process, 
the peasantry is subject to class differentiation but also achieves in certain 
circumstances collective organization aimed at changing this power imbalance and 
thus challenging the formal separation of the economic and the political (Akram-Lodhi 
2007). 
Based on this understanding of capitalist expansion and class conflict, Marxists 
conceive the state as the “manager of the long-term interests of capital”, a locus of 
power that is never completely stabilized as it is constantly challenged by subordinated 
classes that seek to modify the hegemonic order (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a, p. 
243). Regardless of the internal debates over the nature and relative autonomy of the 
state vis-à-vis social classes  (e.g. Jessop 1990; Morton 2007a), scholars within this 
critical theoretical tradition allude to a shift in the balance of forces between competing 
classes to explain policy outcomes. Having social classes as their main unit of analysis, 
many critical agrarian political economy scholars attribute rural development 
distributive policy change to a broader alteration of the macropolitical structures 
(namely, state power) that is favorable of and politically dependent on the peasantry 
(De Janvry 1981; Paige 1975; Veltmeyer and Petras 2008; Petras and Veltmeyer 2002; 
Morton 2007b). 
In this view, agrarian reforms in Latin America, past and recent, have occurred 
primarily where peasants have become an important political player such as in Bolivia 
in 1954 or Nicaragua in 1979. Although there is an important debate on the land 
reforms literature regarding the political sources of reforms, which as Albertus (2015) 
pointed out, have often resulted out of political changes from above, it is relevant to 
note that this critical perspective locating the source of rural policy change outside the 
state apparatus. In this sense, they conceptualize state action as a consequence of social 
forces from the ground up (Fox 1992:14). Insofar as state actors only react to external 
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pressures, due to the structural power of capital, dominant social classes are privileged 
over other classes in competition for command over policy. Therefore, as Borras (2007) 
observes, the activities of the state and policy elites are understood to be “dependent 
variables” that can be “predicted on the basis of an analysis of class and group 
formations in society or in the international arena” (p. 66). Following this kind of 
analysis, the causal mechanisms that need to be examined to empirically account for 
either policy change or non-change are social mobilization from below or elite policy 
capture (Sanderson 1984). Ultimately, though, this approach places a “premium” on 
the influence of pre-existing structures and institutions in the outcome of policy (Borras 
2007, p. 66). 
If the prospect for the emergence of a distributive policy is, according to Marxist-
oriented theories, primarily dependent on macropolitical change, then it is not clear 
from their point of view how and why an alternative rural development agenda 
emerged in Colombia recently. No major sociopolitical change occurred. On the 
contrary, landed elites and agribusiness remained politically influential while the 
peasant movement stayed weak and fragmented. Marxist-oriented scholars in 
Colombia have argued that the attention the Santos government gave to rural 
development policy is not at all contradictory with neoliberal agricultural 
globalization, but rather well in line with it (Herrera-Jaramillo et al. 2016). According 
to these interpretations, the ultimate goal of his policy was improving land property 
rights to secure large-scale agricultural and energy investments and facilitate the 
development of an efficient and transparent land market. This goal was framed in a 
political discourse that – following Gramsci’s notion of universalizing via hegemony 
the particular capitalist interests (Morton 2007c) – emphasized in its narrative 
benefiting landless peasants and poor rural dwellers. In practice, these authors sustain, 
this policy coopted progressive discourses on land dispossession and family agriculture, 
partly motivated by the need of elites to disarm FARC. However, far from achieving a 
robust distribution of assets, this discourse served to further the elites’ concentration 
and accumulation of wealth in rural areas. The law drafted and approved by congress 
in 2016 to concede vast territories of state land to large agribusiness is the best example 
of this alignment of interests. These claims are highly persuasive. Especially in light of 
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the lack of significant progress shown by the rural development policy since the signing 
of the peace agreement. Nonetheless, due to their focus on class conflict, they remain 
analytically blind to key developments that occurred during the peace talks’ juncture. 
For instance, they neglect the widespread consensus that emerged both in government 
and public opinion in 2013 on the desirability of carrying out an ambitious rural 
reform, and do not pay attention either to the structural commitments on land 
distribution included in the peace agreement nor to the various measures and bills that 
were passed in that period to strengthen the rural development institutional 
framework. These counterintuitive events require thus a different theoretical handling, 
one that allows accounting for the role of norms, administrative and legal 
arrangements and policy processes in enacting policy change.  
To be sure, Marxist approaches provide essential insights for understanding the 
factors shaping recent rural development policy change in Colombia. First, by linking 
global economic trends – such as land-grabbing, trade liberalization, state deregulation, 
financialization or the concentration of the agrifood system, among others – to 
domestic processes of capital accumulation in the countryside, these approaches make 
clear that recent policy choices in Colombia have to be examined in the light of global 
economic structures that constrain and put a limit on state’s measures and decisions. In 
this regard, it is not adequate to study domestic rural development policy isolated from 
these broader trends that have specific developments in the agrifood sector and general 
ones in the overall economy.  
Secondly, critical approaches have advanced relevant conceptual and empirical 
contributions on the relationship between armed conflict and rural inequality 
(Gutiérrez Sanín 2015; Machado 2009). These have been useful to understand the 
power imbalances present in the Colombian rural landscape prior to the peace 
negotiation. Like in El Salvador, powerful interest groups actively continue to shape 
the outcome of the peace implementation. Without this kind of analyses, it is not 
possible to grasp how Colombia’s political economy led to the emergence of large 
pockets of coca crops in rural peripheral areas, characterized by the lack of basic state 
services, alternative livelihoods and territorial control of illegal armed groups (Torres 
Bustamante 2011; Ramírez 2001). Moreover, a recent literature exploring the complex 
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linkages between violent land dispossession and neoliberal agricultural development 
policies has pointed out how peasants’ livelihoods have been undermined not only 
through violent extra-economic mechanisms, but also through neoliberal measures 
favoring large-scale agribusiness (Ross 2003; Thomson 2011; Grajales 2011; Maher 
2014; Nelson 2014; Uribe Kaffure 2014). 
Thirdly, critical perspectives have also been very useful in making evident the way 
in which agribusiness elites pressure the state (e.g., government, congress) and develop 
their own strategies and discourse to justify their own actions and goals (Martínez 
2016; Fuerte and Tacha 2016; Mojica 2015). These insights are crucial to trace 
empirically how the state, even in the context of a peace agreement, is not exempt from 
the capitalist pressures to enact policy in their favor and how it produces political 
decisions with skewed distributive consequences.    
However, as mentioned, these approaches also have limitations in explaining the 
puzzling recent outcome in Colombia. I identify three major ones. First, critical 
analyses are usually not well equipped to deal with the role norms played during the 
juncture of the peace talks. Whereas in El Salvador, as Wood (2001) notes, there was a 
change in the balance of forces that led elites to negotiate with the guerrillas and to 
include rural reforms in the agreement, in Colombia there was not such a change in the 
context leading up to the Havana dialogue. In fact, as Chapter 3 illustrates, FARC had 
lost military strength and did not have wide popular support. Alternative explanations 
must be sought beyond the balance of forces story, at least to understand how the 
agrarian item became a central part of the negotiations. The class bias of policy still 
matters, especially to understand the restrictions faced by the implementation of the 
agreement’s rural provisions. Yet, to account for this prior moment, attention must be 
placed to the way in which emerging global and domestic norms were useful in linking 
rural development to security and lasting peace. These norms and their carriers, as I 
describe in detail in Chapter 5, were definitive in the Santos administration’s efforts to 
give back peasants’ land rights and drafting an ambitious policy roadmap as part of the 
peace negotiations.  
Secondly, critical approaches have yet to develop a more nuanced understanding of 
the political dynamics that surround peace negotiations and transitional contexts. 
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Peace settlements open windows for policy change without a shift in the balance of 
forces thus giving place to exceptional legal, political and economic mechanisms that 
need to be properly examined (Kaplan and Freeman 2015; Bell 2006). 
Thirdly, there is a disregard by these approaches for micro policy and political 
processes, as well as for institutional arrangements. Neglecting what happens inside the 
state may obscure, for example, why Chávez’ agrarian reform in Venezuela failed so 
dramatically after being endorsed enthusiastically by the rural poor (Purcell 2017). 
Similarly, not paying enough attention to issues of institutional coordination, agencies’ 
and officials’ motivations and intra-bloc political coalition dynamics reduces the 
understanding of Santos’ policy. Without focusing on these issues, it is not possible to 
explain why Santos’ land restitution policy was relatively successful, while measures 
related to family agriculture supports were not fully developed. As Albertus notes 
(2015), it is relevant to account for veto points constraining policy decisions in 
democratic governments. Still, albeit these limitations, critical agrarian political 
economy constitutes a fundamental part of my theoretical framework as it is described 
further on. 
 
Institutionalist Theories Fill in Gap on Policy Change 
Institutionalist accounts of policy change which take seriously the role of norms and 
institutions are definitely strong candidates to fill in this gap. Heavily influenced by the 
Weberian-oriented scholarship that “brought the state back in” the social sciences in 
the 1980s (Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985), institutionalists emphasize that 
“states do not simply blend into an array of elite-run institutions but stand out as 
autonomous, highly powerful organizations in their own right” (Migdal 2001, p.8). 
They see the state no longer as the “neutral broker among competing interests”, but 
rather as an apparatus “capable of structuring the character and outcomes of group 
conflict” (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 938). A state that, as Migdal (2001) acutely claims, 
is far from being monolithic as it is composed by a complex “ensemble of institutions” 
motivated by varying combinations of material and ideological goals that cooperate or 
compete with each other in their exercise of public authority (Fox 1992, p. 29). Despite 
the internal variations between the different kinds of institutionalist theories (historical, 
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sociological, rationalist), all of them share the concern of moving beyond class 
dynamics to explain national trajectories and policy outcomes. In order to do so, they 
study the impact of political institutions and relationships in places such as legislatures, 
civil society organizations, the bureaucracy, the electorate and the judiciary, among 
others (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 938).  
By assuming that the state is an independent actor, which possesses the autonomy 
and capacity to take decisions that may run counter to the interests of the dominant 
classes or groups in society, institutionalist perspectives study in detail the context and 
process of policy decision-making. Whether it is using a rationalist approach, a 
constructivist one or both, institutionalists trace the specific political circumstances, 
institutional settings, actors involved and their worldviews to identify how and why 
policies persist over time or change in a determined moment. For these theories, state 
agencies – that are not seen as a direct outgrowth of elite interests even though they are 
embedded in power relations (Mahoney 2001, p. 18) – may create political openings 
from above and shape under certain circumstances the direction and scope of policy. In 
studying agrarian reform and rural development policy they pay attention, for 
example, to the administrative and technical organization of central governments (Tai 
1974) and to “policy elites” (Grindle and Thomas 1989; Thomas and Grindle 1990; 
Warriner 1969). State officials and agencies, in this view, may foster distributive 
reform based on their own values, strategies, procedures and interests regardless of the 
pressure that landed elites may impose on them. This does not mean that they do not 
recognize the constraints (political, economic, institutional) under which policy actors 
operate. Yet, as Sell and Prakash (2004:147) spell out, these approaches argue that 
“structures alone do not determine political outcomes” and emphasize the need to 
examine how key individuals, ideas or networks may change the power equation to 
influence policy outcomes through normative frames and strategies. In Larsson’s 
words  (2012) “institutional change does not derive from massive exogenous shocks 
but rather from constant and frequently creative interactions between state elites and 
the social environments within which they operate” (pp. 148-149). 
Two key insights of institutionalist theories have a direct bearing on my analysis of 
rural development policy change in Colombia. First, the role these theories give to 
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global and domestic norms and ideas in changing the course of policy action. Second, 
the focus on institutional constraints and veto points in contexts of democratic 
policymaking. 
Influenced by the “ideational turn” in sociology, institutionalists have adopted to 
different degrees a constructivist approach to policy change whereby norms are seen to 
influence taken-for-granted cognitive templates for interpreting the world as well as 
patterns of behavior, affecting in turn modes of political action and policy choices (Hall 
and Taylor 1996, p. 940). As global governance scholars have shown, global norms 
shape domestic policy through various mechanisms, such as social learning (Hall 1993; 
Coleman, Skogstad, and Atkinson 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Best 2012; Abdelal 
2009; Babb 2013). Clapp (2017), for example, has shown how against the backdrop of 
the international norms around agricultural trade liberalization – which shaped 
domestic agricultural policies in the post-war period – have emerged recently 
alternative international norms on environmental sustainability and food sovereignty 
contesting the free trade paradigm in agrifood governance. These alternative global 
norms help to understand why in Latin America and Colombia, after a period of long-
standing neoliberal agricultural policies, alternative policies emerged. The adoption of 
supports to family agriculture or legal measures to protect rural dwellers from land 
grabbing, which were unthinkable a few years ago, became in various countries of the 
region not only part of the political agenda but also institutionalized in government 
discourse, procedures and budgeting (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a). Global norms 
have the power thus to determine what is considered to be a “right” or “normal” 
policy. The process is far from being linear, as there are always multiple norms 
competing in becoming a “policy paradigm”. In this rivalry, ideas are relevant, but 
always in relation to  the political support they receive in policy networks, institutions 
and organizations (Babb 2013). Without this analytical insight, it is not possible to 
understand properly the decisions that the Santos government took to push forward the 
land restitution measures. Documents like the UNDP’s 2011 Human Development 
Report focusing on rural development became crucial carriers of these global 
alternative norms into the national arena, opening the policy space for such reforms to 
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take place. If only class dynamics were considered, then this norm-based causal 
mechanism of policy change would be omitted.    
Moreover, it is relevant not only to examine how emerging alternative global norms 
on the environment and food influenced the adoption of distributive rural development 
measures, but also how norms that emerged domestically shaped policy outcomes. In 
particular, it is worth noting how during the juncture of the peace negotiations, top 
officials involved in the government negotiation strategy made a discursive link 
between rural development and lasting peace, thus producing a common 
understanding within the decision-makers and then with FARC regarding the 
importance of this issue for the overall success of the dialogues. Using a constructivist 
approach to study Thailand’s massive rural land titling, Larsson (2012) argues that this 
policy outcome was the result of Thai government officials’ decisions to improve rural 
property rights in reaction to their perception of a national security threat. Similarly, it 
is essential to see the distributive turn of Santos’ rural development policy as the result 
of the government negotiators’ perception that rural reform was essential for lasting 
peace. This outcome, as it is described in Chapter 5, has to do more with the political 
narrative crafted by policy actors located in privileged decision-making positions 
during that juncture than with a change in the balance of forces. Securitization, 
understood as the norm-based mechanism that enabled through the construction of a 
discursive linkage between peace and rural development including substantive rural 
reforms into the peace negotiations, needs to be studied on its own right. This 
mechanism has enormous explanatory power, as it allows understanding why and how 
the government, in an unexpected way from a structuralist perspective, proposed to 
introduce such reforms as part of the peace talks with FARC. 
This norm-based perspective is also helpful for understanding what happened after 
the signing of the accord. The internal adoption and translation of the rural 
development agreement into concrete policy measures encountered several difficulties 
and resistance within the government itself and, once FARC laid down its weapons in 
June 2017, it even lost policy relevance. Explaining the disconnection between the 
negotiation and the implementation phases within the government itself requires thus 
accounting not only for the organizational and operational difficulties that the 
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government’s agencies faced in applying the measures agreed on the ground, which is 
of course relevant. It also demands paying attention to the ideational contradictions 
and misunderstandings of the various state actors involved in the implementation 
concerning what was agreed and how to put it in practice. A small team instructed by 
the President himself led the negotiation phase, maintaining throughout it a high level 
of command and control. By contrast, the implementation phase depended on a wide 
array of institutions (sectoral agencies, the national planning office, the finance 
ministry, among others) that filtered and interpreted the agreement’s provisions 
according to their own views and procedures. Outside of the government, the political 
opposition effectively developed narratives and normative frames that undermined the 
government’s legitimacy and the peace process, which are relevant to examine. Thus it 
is important to draw from institutional constructivist theory to conduct an adequate 
analysis of the difficulties of the post-agreement period. Material interests and 
pressures exerted by landed elites and the political opposition matter in constraining 
policy, but scripts, norms and ideas played a crucial role as well in shaping policy 
outcomes in this period.   
A second insight of institutionalists that is key for understanding the political 
dynamics surrounding rural development policy change in Colombia comes from the 
rationalist institutionalist contribution on institutional constraints to policy reform. 
Albertus (2015), based on Tsebelis’ veto players theory, explains why in democracies 
land reform hardly occurs. He argues that even in contexts where the executive power 
is willing to carry out such a reform, landed elites are often able to obstruct it either 
through the legislative and judiciary systems, or at the local level. The checks and 
balances of democratic regimes offer a great number of instances and mechanisms to 
resist legally the administrative measures put in place by a reformist central 
government (not to mention the violent resistance that is also often used by landed 
elites, as observed by Gutiérrez Sanín and  Vargas (2017) in the case of Colombia).  
This kind of institutionalist analysis emphasizes the need for paying attention to the 
organizational structure of the state and the way it affects the policy process during a 
specific historical juncture. From this point of view, the institutions and actors directly 
involved in this policy process make a difference. Studying their motivations, 
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decisions, procedures and discourse is crucial for answering how policy outcomes are 
produced. As mentioned before, critical approaches are not well equipped for this type 
of assessment, which is essential for recognizing the obstacles, limitations and 
contradictions of rural development policy change in Colombia. Within Santos’ 
political regime, as it is described in Chapter 6, internal constraints emerged out of the 
president’s coalition. Scholars on Colombia’s political system (Ocampo, 2014; Hartlyn 
1988) have studied how clientelistic politics between the executive and Congress 
determines policy decisions across issue areas. In the agricultural sector, for example, it 
is important to analyze in detail Santos’ decision throughout his administration to 
maintain the Ministry of Agriculture as a stronghold of his key political allies, first the 
Conservative Party and then the U Party, to understand how this decision had an 
impact on the implementation of the distributive measures agreed upon in Havana. 
Despite their significant contributions to understand the puzzling policy outcome in 
Colombia, institutionalist theories are insufficient in by themselves to account for the 
specific dynamics of policy decisions under the circumstances of the transitional 
context in Colombia to which I turn now.   
 
Explaining Peace Settlements and Negotiated Transitions 
Social and economic commitments that result out of peace settlements are not well 
understood if they are simply treated as sectoral ordinary policies because they emerge 
out of a political negotiation to end civil war that comes with what are hoped to be 
binding legal mechanisms tied to specific political procedures of fulfillment. Therefore, 
studying policy shifts associated with provisions included in a peace agreement – such 
as those comprised in the Comprehensive Rural Reform agreed in Havana – must bear 
in mind that these are part of an overall exceptional transitional context, and not just 
sectoral reform. Properly accounting for policy outcomes in this context requires thus 
engaging with the theories and analytical concepts that best describe the specificity of 
peace agreement’s dynamics. Peacemaking theories cover a wide spectrum of scholarly 
fields, ranging from international law to political anthropology. These theories have a 
different set of questions and starting points from the critical or institutionalist theories 
of rural development policy change described previously. They focus broadly on three 
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kinds of research: explaining what peace agreements are legally; why warring parties in 
a civil conflict are able to reach an agreement; and how this agreement is enforced 
during its implementation phase (Stedman, Rothschild, and Cousens 2002; Hampson 
1996; Fortna 2004; Kriesberg 1998; Bekoe 2008). Precisely due to their specialized 
reflections on the nature and effects of peace settlements, these theories provide an 
analytical perspective that fills the others’ gaps on the exceptional legal mechanisms 
and political window that peace processes and the resulting agreements activate. 
According to international law scholar Christine Bell (2006, p. 373), since 1990 
there has been a proliferation of peace agreements. Half of the civil wars in this period 
ended in peace agreements, whereas in the previous two centuries only one in five 
resulted in a negotiated settlement. These agreements amount to over three hundred 
peace settlements in more than 40 jurisdictions. With this increase of peace 
agreements, international multilateral bodies have developed standards to regulate 
these processes. The United Nations has drafted a wide variety of resolutions, 
guidelines and recommendations addressing both the procedural aspect of peace 
agreements as well as their substance, for example, in issues such as human rights 
abuses (Ratner 1995). The rising practice of peace agreements between state and 
nonstate actors (e.g. guerrilla groups) has led recently to a rich discussion about their 
definition and legal status in international law. Providing an exhaustive review of this 
legal discussion is beyond my scope here. Yet, it is relevant to point out, first, what that 
the term “peace agreement” refers to, and, secondly, to describe how the Havana peace 
agreement became constitutionally adopted in Colombia, in order to indicate its 
implications for the implementation of the social and economic provisions on rural 
development embedded in it. 
Following Bell (2006), the term “peace agreement” is in practice associated with 
three types of legal-like documents resulting out of different stages of intrastate conflict 
negotiations. The first type are pre-negotiation agreements. Often termed “talk about 
talks”, these agreements – usually following a period of secret talks in which each party 
assesses to the other’s willingness to negotiate – cement the parties’ joint commitment 
to carry out future conversations. Either written or oral, such initial political pacts set 
out the conditions for and parameters of formal negotiations, establishing the 
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objectives, agenda and general procedures and rules of the negotiation.5 The second 
type of agreements, known as Framework or substantive agreements, are of the three 
the ones that most clearly deserve the term “peace agreement”. Just like the Final 
Agreement signed by the Colombian government and FARC in November 2016, these 
documents encompass not only provisions for putting an end to military violence 
(disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of ex combatants). They also include 
other provisions aimed at addressing holistically root causes of the conflict and setting 
forth transitional institutions dealing with legacies of human rights violations or 
political exclusion. Although they vary in form and content, these comprehensive 
agreements, as Joshi et al. (2015, p. 552) define them,6 often reflect two kinds of 
negotiation processes. One that works its way towards having one single framework 
agreement with lengthy provisions, such as the Belfast Agreement or the South African 
Interim Constitution. In the other, negotiating parties seek to reach consensus issue by 
issue through a set of separate agreements that are brought together at the end into a 
single comprehensive final agreement, like those of Guatemala, El Salvador, Burundi 
and Colombia (Bell 2006:378).  
The third type of agreement is associated with “implementation or renegotiation 
agreements, which may be in turn classified into two. One that develops in detail 
aspects of previous documents not sufficiently specific, like the Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement (Oslo II) that filled out and partially implemented the framework in 
                                                 
5 Examples of these pre-negotiation agreements include the Downing Street Declaration, issued in 1993 
at an early state of the Northern Ireland peace process by the British and Irish governments in response 
to secret negotiations; the Harare Declaration, promulgated by the Organization of African Unity in 
1989, which set out the conditions for multiparty talks in South Africa and formed the basis of the secret 
talks between Nelson Mandela and President F.W de Klerk; the Tashkent Declaration on Afghanistan 
made public in 1999 by the “six plus two” group (four bordering states, the Russian Federation, and the 
United States) aimed at building a context for talks  (Bell 2006, pp. 376–377). In the case of the recent 
Colombian peace process, this pre-negotiation agreement was translated into the “General Agreement” 
signed by the Colombian government and FARC in August 26, 2012 as the result of the exploratory 
meetings held in Havana during the first half of 2012. I will refer in detail to this initial phase of the 
negotiation in Chapter 5.  
6 These researchers define “comprehensive peace agreement” considering two dimensions: the 
involvement of major parties to the conflict in the negotiations and the inclusion in the negotiations of 
substantive issues underlying the dispute. A “major party” is understood as an actor with “sufficient 
mobilizational capacity and influence to alter the outcome of a peace process”. The authors define 
“substantive issues” as the “issues underlying the dispute and representing the main areas of contention 
between the warring parties”. Based on this definition, the authors identify 34 comprehensive peace 
agreements between 1989 and 2012 (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015:552–553).    
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Oslo I. The other that involves a new round of negotiations to include previously 
excluded parties, like the St Andrews Agreement reached in October 2006 between the 
British and Irish governments and Northern Ireland’s political parties including the 
Democratic Unionist Party, which in 1998 opposed to being part of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Although accounting for these three types of “peace agreements” is 
relevant, drawing on Bell’s argument (2006) I focus my analysis on the legal and 
political exceptional nature of peace agreements based only on the second type, the 
framework or comprehensive peace agreements.   
Framework agreements, according to Bell, are law-like texts that have both a 
substantive and a procedural component built into them. Their legal-looking structure 
and legal-type language reflects the parties’ need for reassurance of the other’s 
obligations to be compelled to make commitments of their own. However, as Bell 
(2006, p. 378) also observes, they do not fit easily within either national or 
international legal categories – whether that is treaty, international agreement or 
constitution – due to the presence of nonstate actors as signatories. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, for example, defines in Article 2 a treaty as an 
“international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by 
international law […]”(United Nations 1969 Art. 2). In some peace agreements – like 
the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina – this article may serve 
as a legal basis to constitute a treaty between intrastate parties that, while not initially 
defined as separate states, attained that status during the time the accord was reached. 
However, this is not often the case. Most intrastate peace agreements seem to fall 
outside this strict definition of treaty, which excludes nonstate parties from 
international law. Still, aware of this omission, the Convention itself partially resolved 
it in Article 3 indicating that agreements between states and “other subjects of 
international law” could also be legally binding (United Nations 1969 Art. 3). The 
problem, nonetheless, is the gray area left by the Convention regarding who can claim 
the status of being a “subject of international law” (Rosenne 1989). In recent decades, 
though, armed opposition groups have justified their inclusion in peace agreements 
drawing from existing provisions in humanitarian law that, based on the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, recognize them as conflict actors that may be subject of 
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international law (Moir 2002; Cassese 1981; Zegveld 2002).7 Now, even when nonstate 
parties are recognized as signatories in peace agreements, it is not clear whether these 
documents are legally binding, both at the national and international levels (Cassese 
2004; cf. Kooijmans 1998; Higgins 1994). This ambiguity has serious implications for 
an agreement’s enforcement in law, as compliance –at least in the international sphere 
– is usually associated with the extent to which the obligation is legally binding 
(Shelton 2000). Still, internal peace agreements may be examined in a different light, as 
they do not have the same purport as an international agreement. 
Drawing on Abbott et al. et al. (2000), Bell adapts and applies the notion of 
“legalization” to peace agreements, exploring the legal form, nature and delegation of 
enforcement to third parties to reveal their distinct features. Formalized agreements 
raise the reputation costs of noncompliance. In the context of peace agreements, Bell 
recognizes that “parties take their obligations more seriously when they believe them to 
be legal” (Bell 2006, p. 373; see also Watson 2000). A binding legal agreement is 
meaningful to nonstate actors who achieved by it a new status and legitimacy. States, 
for their part, although they often resist conceding formal legal status to peace 
agreements, may also have reasons to do so as it strengthens their interest in making 
nonstate actors abide by the obligations to which they have committed themselves 
(Wedgenwood 1999). Moreover, the positive law status of peace agreements, in which 
international or domestic courts become examiners of the agreement’s enforcement 
through constitutional and legislative adjudication, is important for securing its 
implementation. This judicial oversight may raise even further the costs of 
noncompliance for state actors. 
Three direct consequences derive from viewing peace agreements as constituting a 
new distinctive legal regime (lex pacificatoria) for my empirical and theoretical 
understanding of rural development policy change in Colombia amid the peace talks. 
One is that the unique legal status of the agreement also applies to the sectoral 
                                                 
7 Agreements such as those in Angola (between the government and UNITA), Burundi (between the 
government, armed opposition groups, and political parties), Guatemala (between the governments and 
the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca), El Salvador (between the government and the 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional), and Colombia (between the government and the 
FARC) fulfill these criteria. 
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provisions on rural reform agreed in Havana. In Colombia, the peace agreement – not 
legally binding by itself – was legally adopted through a constitutional amendment 
approved in Congress in 2017 and then declared acceptable by the Constitutional 
Court. It has thereafter become a state commitment that goes beyond the current 
administration’s agenda. This of course does not shield the agreement from political 
dissent or the lack of state’s compliance. Yet it raises the reputation costs in a country 
where legal forms and procedures are highly valued, and establishes long-term 
commitments that must go beyond the current administration’s willingness. Long-term 
developmental goals like land distribution and investment in family agriculture are 
hard to achieve. Yet, the fact that these became part of a binding agreement makes it 
relevant to study carefully what these substantial commitments were and how they 
were drafted.  
The second consequence is that the agreement produces its own implementation 
mechanisms that are of exceptional nature, like extraordinary law-making, planning 
and budgeting faculties. These procedures and mechanisms need to be studied in their 
own right and in relationship to the ordinary institutional structure. 
Third, the agreement is part of a larger peace process that triggers a political 
dynamic that is different from ordinary politics. This context is fertile to the emergence 
of alternative voices and norms in specific issue areas like rural development, although 
it is also subject to broader political contention regarding the agreement’s legitimacy. 
In this regard, rural development policy change must be seen as part of a transition, 
something that neither critical nor institutionalist approaches deal with in detail. For 
Kaplan and Freeman (2015), transitions may “make possible that which would have 
been previously unimaginable,” as they tackle key root causes crucial issues and create 
an exceptional window of opportunity for change. At the same time, though, this 
policy area should be seen as tied up to the wider political discussions regarding the 
agreement’s developments and mechanisms. The growing opposition against the 
agreement in issues like the sanctions regime established for perpetrators or political 
participation of guerrilla commanders investigated for committing grave human rights 
violations became linked, in a systemic way, to specific policy issues in rural 
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development. These dynamics and interactions need to be historically studied in 
concrete moments like the political campaign of 2014 and the plebiscite of 2016. 
Still, this literature on peace agreements requires a political economy and 
institutionalist lens to understand the broader trends that affect the agreement’s 
implementation. Although the peace implementation literature has developed a 
comparative understanding of how specific agreement provisions take different 
implementation paths over time, so far it has centered its theorization efforts on issues 
directly linked to the end of conflict and less on the implementation of social and 
economic reforms. Analyzing in a more systematic way the implementation of 
substantive agreement issues, such as agrarian and rural development, requires 
bringing structuralist and institutionalist accounts into the analysis that help better 
understand the trajectory of sectoral policy as well as the institutional and market 
restrictions faced by the implementation process in the post-conflict scenario. Having 
in mind the insights and limitations of each of these literatures, I move on now to 
provide my own conceptual framework.  
 
2.3 A Comprehensive Explanation of Rural Development Policy 
Change 
Considering the existing theories’ limitations to deal with the puzzling developments in 
Colombia, I propose that an explanation that draws elements from each of them 
heightens the understanding of the political and economic circumstances surrounding 
rural development policy reform under scenarios of negotiated transitions. Broadly, the 
contributions of these literatures to my framework may be divided in three aspects.  
The norms literature is useful to help understand why Santos’ administration veered 
toward a progressive rural policy in the first place (and away from the status quo), 
advancing land restitution measures for instance. For its part, the institutionalist 
literature is useful to explain why the CRR has been only partially implemented and 
why certain parts of it managed to move ahead and others were blocked along the way 
within the government itself or by the opposition. The critical agrarian political 
economy literature helps in turn explaining how structural economic forces and rural 
elites ended up constraining significantly the implementation of the CRR. By means of 
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analyzing the Colombian case, I suggest a framework that identifies multiple causal 
and contextual factors shaping rural development policy. This framework thus seeks to 
serve as a useful conceptual tool to explore whether there might be a negotiated 
transition pathway to rural development policy change. 
A key assumption of this framework is that it is essential to capture both short-term, 
emergent processes and long-term, structural tendencies and how they interact with 
each other in a particular historical juncture. In this regard, before explaining the 
framework, I deem relevant advancing three broad theoretical points.  
First, following Vergara-Camus and Kay (2017a), I view the state, and therefore the 
policymaking process that takes places within it, as a “contradictory space of conflicts 
of interests where actors deploy their strategies at multiple levels”, considering both 
material and ideational pressures that “convince or force political authorities into 
taking certain decisions” (p. 243).  
Second, a negotiated transition creates exceptional conditions to foster policy 
change. A peace process may be understood as a “critical juncture” in which “usual 
constraints on action are lifted or eased” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, quoted in 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010, p. 7) producing a distinct political playing field. 
Nonetheless, as the Colombian case illustrates, the effect of this transitional context 
varies across issue areas. Issues directly linked to the end of conflict (e.g., ceasefire and 
disarmament) undergo a relatively effective and rapid implementation process. In 
contrast, issues associated with long-standing substantive issues – such as social and 
economic development, political inclusion and victims’ rights – do not have a 
straightforward implementation process.  
Third, examining the outcome of any substantive issue like rural development 
policy requires accounting for pre-existing structural trends and forces that shape the 
way and extent to which the agreed measures are incorporated during the 
implementation period through an ordinary policymaking process. In viewing how 
long-term political and economic trends overlap with the short-term dynamics resulting 
from the “peace moment”, I attempt to convey two contradictory forces. On one hand, 
the lasting influence of powerful interests in policy outcomes. On the other, the way 
that political actors (e.g., landed elites, state officials, peasant organizations) shift their 
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behavior and strategies in function of the changing circumstances (e.g., before, during 
and after the peace agreement was reached) to increase their ability to achieve their 
goals and exert influence over the course of events. 
 
The Framework’s Explanatory Factors 
My conceptual framework is sketched in Figure 1.1. Here I bring into a single picture 
three major factors that capture apparently separate political, economic and 
institutional processes occurring at different moments – before, during and after the 
peace talks – and different analytical levels (macro, meso and micro) to explain the 
outcome of Colombia’s limited and gradual limited rural development policy change amid 
the context of the peace talks. For the purposes of this study, I define rural development 
policy change as an ideational and material shift occurring during the period of Santos 
government (2010-2018) at the national level geared towards benefiting the rural poor 
and more specifically small producers. In other words, I am interested in analyzing the 
direction of policy change, that is, the extent to which policy change goes along with an 
increase or decrease of the government’s commitment to benefit this target group 
(Bauer and Knill 2014). This focus on directionality, as Howlett and Cashore (2009, p. 
41) point out, is useful to understand whether the policy developments observed are 
moving away from the status quo (cumulative change) or correspond to the existing 
policy equilibrium. 
Epistemologically, the framework draws on Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu’s (2008, 
pp. 124-126) considerations regarding the role that multi-causal explanations (INUS 
causes) may have in explaining particular historical outcomes. The INUS acronym 
stands for: “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary 
but sufficient for the result” (Mackie 1965 quoted in Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 
2008, p. 125). Each of the individual causal factors identified in my framework are 
neither necessary nor sufficient; rather, they are part of an overall combination that is 
sufficient for the outcome. In this combinative causality, I broadly point to pre-existing 




Figure 2.1. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
The first factor of the framework points to the status quo trajectory embedded in rural 
development policy decades before the peace talks, thus heavily constraining the shift 
towards a more distributive orientation. The arrival of Santos to power and the 
emergence of the peace talks, however, opened a window of opportunity for policy 
change due to the circumstances offered by the transitional context. Hence, the second 
factor refers to the peace exceptionality that, informed by Santos’ early rural reformist 
agenda, led to including the rural development item into the peace agenda, the robust 
drafting of the CRR and its influence on policy decisions. Finally, the third factor, 
focused on the post-agreement moment, alludes to the low government capacity in 
adopting and enforcing the agreed measures. This low capacity has do with internal 
difficulties and contradictions as well as with the strong sociopolitical opposition 
against the agreement during that juncture. All of these factors interact with each other 
either enhancing or hindering the distributive policy shift. Factors one and three (status 
quo trajectory and low government capacity) have a status quo-oriented direction, 
while factor two (peace exceptionality) has a distributive-oriented direction. This 
means that while the former favor a negative outcome, the latter favors a positive 
outcome. When analyzed together – as if they were vectors with distinct relative 
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intensities and directions, as Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu (2008, p. 12) suggest – it is 
understood why the outcome of the policy shift was limited and ambivalent, instead of 
being radical or completely static. Still, overall, breaking down the explanation into 
these different analytical factors it is possible to identify how pre-existing economic 
pressures coupled with the government’s clientelistic source of political governance 
and the extreme right opposition end up weighing more than the exceptional 
circumstances offered by the peace agreement.        
Before elaborating on each of these factors, a brief epistemological comment on the 
framework is needed. Following Mahoney and Snyder’s (1999) discussion on the 
transition and regime change literature, my framework seeks to integrate different 
levels of analysis into a single explanatory approach. When building this kind of 
framework, scholars tend to privilege either macro-level or micro-level variables 
depending on their theoretical preferences (Alexander et al. 1987 quoted in Mahoney 
and Snyder 1999, p. 9). Following Mahoney and Snyder’s (1999) terms, “structural 
approaches” usually adopt macro-structural (e.g., world-system position, degree of 
national economic development) or domestic-structural variables (e.g., classes). 
“Voluntarist approaches”, for their part, use instead micro-level variables comprising 
social group (e.g., military factions, social movements) and leadership (e.g., 
government or party leaders) levels. As discussed earlier in this chapter, these authors 
also assert that while structural approaches deny the autonomous causal role of micro-
level factors, voluntarist perspectives consider these as the only variables necessary to 
explain change. An integrative approach, therefore, should seek in its multi-level 
explanation to combine subjective actors and objective conditions as primary causal 
variables and to focus on proximate as well as remote factors that include domestic and 
international variables. My own framework draws from this recommendation as it 
brings together in a single multi-level explanation micro-, meso- and macro-level 
variables.  
Mahoney and Snyder (1999, p. 11) indicate three strategies often used by 
researchers to integrate the various levels of analysis into a single framework (“the 
funnel”, “the path-dependent” and “the eclectic” strategies) and discuss the advantages 
and disadvantages of each of them. Selecting either one ultimately depends on deciding 
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how to solve the tradeoff between adopting a more parsimonious framework that will 
inevitably privilege one type of variable over others or one that is more eclectic with 
the risk of saying that “everything matters”. In my case, I opted for sacrificing 
parsimony in the effort to combine various factors without which it is not possible to 
understand the outcome observed. Still, for each of the factors identified I define their 
direction, intensity, contextual variables and hypothesized causal mechanisms. 
The problem with this integrative approach is assessing the relative weight of the 
causal factors and ensuring that there are mechanisms that link the macro-level 
variables with the micro-level ones. (Wendt 1991 quoted in Mahoney and Snyder 
1999, p. 25). In order to solve this problem, I draw elements as well from the 
integrative approach Mahoney and Snyder propose (“the resource model”). According 
to it, “structures” limit agency “not by obstructing, but by making available a finite 
repertoire of tools for action” (p. 25). A repertoire that, importantly, “actors can 
potentially modify and improve” (p. 25). In this understanding, structures do not 
determine human agency. They rather operate as “environments that delimit the range 
of possible actions without determining action”. From this perspective, “people act 
through structures, rather than structures through people”. Therefore, human agency is 
conceived in a reflexive way, meaning that actors “self-consciously deploy structural 
resources and modify their behavior in response to changing situations” (p. 25). In my 
own framework, I show how structural factors like global economic forces translate 
into concrete political processes in the context of the implementation of the CRR, such 
as the direct lobbying exercised by agribusiness at the president’s office. Likewise, I 
also show how political actors, like Álvaro Uribe, adapted their own actions based on 
the new context of the peace talks, consolidating his political power by centering his 
opposition on the peace process and the government’s legitimacy. As mentioned 
before, when examining the relative importance of the different factors and variables 
analyzed to explain the outcome observed, I consider that the status quo trajectory and 
the low government capacity outweigh the peace exceptionality factor, although this 
factor is crucial to explain why there was a substantive shift in policy to begin with.    
 
Status Quo Policy Trajectory 
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Drawing on the contributions of critical agrarian scholars discussed before, a key factor 
that explains the limited rural development policy change in Colombia, even in the 
context of the peace talks, is the pre-existing status quo policy trajectory. That is, the 
policy’s regressive outlook, which since the 1970s privileged landed elites and 
agribusiness sectors over the peasantry in its orientation and supports. This structural 
feature of this policy area relates historically to the long-standing rural inequality that 
has characterized Colombia since the nineteenth century, as described in Chapter 3. 
Also, more recently, it is related with global economic processes of capitalist expansion 
indicated in Chapter 4, such as land grabbing, trade liberalization and concentration of 
the agrifood chain, that have further aggravated the domestic power imbalances. These 
pressures have translated into a loss of public expenditure in agriculture and a larger 
policy capture by interest groups. The direct bearing of these trends on policy are that 
they constrain the choices made by government decision-makers due to the lobbying 
exercised by large agricultural business associations. At the same time, however, I also 
identify emerging global norms that run against these economic trends and have 
opened space for governments to develop distributive policies. I illustrate in Chapter 4 
how these material and ideational forces played out in Colombia by comparing Uribe’s 
with Santos’ rural development policy. Similarly, Chapter 5 argues that the emerging 
norms provided a favorable background for the adoption of distributive norms in 
Colombia in the context of the peace talks leading up to the CRR’s drafting. However, 
Chapter 6 describes the way in which the status quo inertia influenced negatively the 
CRR’s implementation. Once Santos, as part of the peace process, made efforts to shift 
policy away from this orientation, there were already in place long-standing ideas, 
institutional arrangements and decision-making processes that severely restricted and 
weakened change in the wake and follow-up of the agreement on the Comprehensive 
Rural Reform.  
 
Peace Exceptionality 
The second explanatory factor, drawing from the literature on peacemaking and 
transition previously reviewed, identifies the peace talks, and more specifically the 
CRR, as a critical driver of distributive policy change during Santos’ administration. 
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Although I argue that Santos’ early rural reformist agenda (e.g. land restitution policy 
and rural development bill) is an important antecedent of the content of the peace 
agenda and the CRR, I also sustain that this substantive agreement played a definitive 
role in creating further policy space for this distribution policy orientation at expense of 
the status quo agenda that, nevertheless, did not disappear but rather remained in place 
competing for the definition of the government’s policy priorities. In other words, I 
view the exceptional circumstances and agreement provisions created by the peace 
process as a key intervening variable in explaining why Santos’ progressive rural 
development policy was furthered. Significant initiatives were already in place, but the 
peace negotiations took the rural development agenda onto another level of political 
importance and government commitment. In order to understand how the CRR came 
to be, I trace in Chapter 3 the changing political context that gave place to the Havana 
negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. It is within this 
favorable domestic and international context that a window opened to include the 
agrarian item as part of the negotiating agenda and to convert it into a fundamental 
part of the peace agreement. In Chapter 5, I identify two hypothetical causal 
mechanisms to understand the role of the peace exceptionality in enacting rural 
development policy change. The first one is securitization. As discussed earlier, this is 
a norm-based mechanism that helps to explain how and why decision-makers in the 
exploratory phase of the negotiations linked rural development reform to lasting peace. 
Whereas in other transitional contexts, strong social mobilization was essential in 
exerting political pressure to force the elites to negotiate substantive rural policy 
reforms, in this case there was no such pressure from below. Instead, the reasons the 
rural development issue was included in the negotiating agenda had to do mainly with 
the ideas and normative frames that both negotiating parties ended up adopting before 
and during the negotiation, particularly with regards to the relationship between stable 
peace and rural development. In order to explain the specific processes that explain this 
inclusion, I draw on Hall’s (1989) insights on how ideas may influence a course of 
action to trace how in each delegation key actors were able to mobilize and make 
institutionally and politically viable ideas on rural development as inextricable to peace 
and to that specific peace negotiation. 
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The second causal mechanism is the CRR agreement’s robustness. The policy 
measures adopted by Santos’ administration in terms of land distribution and family 
agriculture supports were a direct outgrowth of the comprehensive and highly specific 
provisions included in the CRR as well as of the specific implementation mechanisms 
it created. As scholars like Fortna (2004) have pointed out, the texts of peace 
agreements matter and have direct consequences in policy actions. The aspirational 
politics logic in which the CRR operated was instrumental in the constitution of these 
new policy norms that ended up forcing the government to adopt distributive policy 
instruments and institutions. 
 
Low Government Capacity to Enforce Agreement Provisions 
Even though the CRR’s agreement was able to bring about new norms and policy 
measures, its practical effects on rural development policy have been quite limited, at 
least from the point of view of the parameters set by the agreement itself. The 
implementation process of the CRR’s commitments has faced serious constraints from 
within and outside government, severely hindering the scope of change. The third 
factor of the framework, drawing from institutionalist perspectives, precisely addresses 
the low government capacity to enforce the agreement provisions, showing the difficulties it 
encountered when moving from the exceptional circumstances of peacemaking to the 
ordinary policymaking world. During the negotiation phase, there was a strong 
institutional alignment with the CRR goals and measures. Yet, incorporating them into 
the institutional procedures and specific outputs proved to be highly difficult for the 
Santos administration. I argue that the weak capacity of the Santos administration to 
bring about substantive policy change, even after it had already set forth a reformist 
agenda in its early years and negotiated the CRR, had to do with three interrelated 
institutional dimensions that I describe in Chapter 6. First, a lack of internal coherence 
(material and ideational) expressed in problems of bureaucratic coordination and intra-
government competition around goals and values of rural development, which I 
evidence through an analysis of the institutional preparation process of the CRR’s 
implementation. Secondly, the clientelistic nature of the government’s political 
arrangement, which forced Santos to privilege responding to the political demands of 
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the various parties in the loose coalition that comprises the Unidad Nacional over the 
need to adequately enforce the agreement’s commitments. Third, the ongoing 
agribusiness lobbying on the rural development policy agenda that rendered outcomes 
unrelated to the peace agreement.  
The right-wing opposition further undermined the government’s capacity to put the 
agreement into practice by affecting the government’s legitimacy. In Chapter 7, I 
examine as well the nature and strength of these external pressures exerted on the 
implementation of the measures agreed, which had to do mainly with domestic 
sociopolitical mobilizations of interest groups, that is, of social coalitions against the 
agreement. Here it is important to emphasize that the contentious politics surrounding 
the peace process went beyond the rural development issue and, therefore, the 
concerns raised against the CRR have to be seen in light of the broader criticisms 
raised against the overall agreement. I identify as causal mechanism of these pressures 
the negative framings mobilized by former president Álvaro Uribe at different 
moments of the peace negotiations. In particular, once the plebiscite was lost, the 





The advantage of the framework proposed is that based on an INUS model it combines 
structural factors (e.g., global economic trends, global norms, political arrangement) 
with those that are more contingent and dependent of concrete actors’ choices (e.g., 
framings of negotiators on rural development reform). This combination allows seeing 
the influence that all of these forces had in hindering or enabling rural development 
policy change in the particular context of the peace talks in Colombia.  
In what follows I provide a historical context that serves as a backdrop to develop 
the analysis of each of the framework’s factors in the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 3. History Matters: Rural Inequality, Conflict and 
Political Changes Leading up to the Havana Peace Talks 
 
 
Colombia has experienced one of the most protracted armed conflicts in recent history, 
lasting over 60 years. The governmental victim’s registry shows that 8.6 million 
persons became direct or indirect victims of the conflict. This includes approximately 
47,000 persons who were enforcedly disappeared, 267,000 persons were killed by 
homicides, more than 7 million persons became internally displaced, and more than 
32,000 persons who were kidnapped. This thesis focuses on the period of the Havana 
peace talks and Juan Manuel Santos’ administration (2010-2018). In order to 
contextualize this period and understand better its significance, this chapter provides, 
on one hand, a brief historical snapshot of Colombia’s rural inequality and its 
relationship to FARC’s struggle and the armed conflict in general, and, on the other, it 
traces in detail the immediate antecedents of the Havana peace talks, indicating the 
changes in the recent armed conflict dynamics since the end of the 1990s and the 
political implications of the transition between the governments of Álvaro Uribe and 
Juan Manuel Santos in 2010. 
 
3.1 A Long History of Rural Inequality and Armed Conflict  
 
The inclusion of the agrarian issue in the Havana peace talks is by no means 
surprising. Given that agrarian reform has been at the heart of FARC’s revolutionary 
program since its origins in 1964 and that rural inequality has been a structural feature 
of Colombia’s political economy, it was rather the most obvious and natural item in 
the agenda.  
 
Rural Inequality: The Crux of Colombia’s Political Economy 
Colombia is no longer the agrarian country that it used to be up until the 1960s. In the 
last decades, with its growing urban population and move upwards from a low-income 
to a middle-income country, agriculture ceased to be the economy’s major source of 
revenue. In the 1970s, it represented 25 percent of total GDP. By 2017, its share in 
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GDP had dropped to less than 7 percent (see Appendix 1). Oil and coal exports have in 
fact replaced coffee as the main commodities, and the service sector – especially 
financial services – has increased its share in total output. Manufacturing, even if it has 
slowed down in the last years, also represents an important share in Colombia’s 
relatively modern economy, which is now far from the picturesque and backward 
country painted by García Márquez’s macondian world. Moreover, political power is 
concentrated in urban centers, particularly in Bogotá, the country’s capital, from where 
the central government operates and decides upon its major policies, as well as 
congress and the courts, and where the bulk of the electorate lives. This does not mean, 
however, that rural areas are not relevant today economically and politically. 
Colombia’s twenty-first century political economy is still heavily determined by rural 
inequality, a feature that has remained remarkably unchanged. Low labor productivity, 
high levels of economic informality, pervasive organized violence and a sustained 
illegal coca business in peripheral areas are all expressions of this core problem that 
political elites have not been able to overcome over many decades (Uribe López 2013). 
A lack of state authority and socioeconomic exclusion of vast rural areas have 
therefore persisted over time as root causes of the armed conflict. Without a strong 
nation-state, Colombia failed to develop an inclusive national project. Divisions along 
party affiliations and geographic regions further impeded the formation of a coalesced 
economic and political elite interested in building a strong central state. This fragility of 
central authority would be an ongoing feature in Colombian politics throughout the 
twentieth century (González González 2014). 
The Havana peace talks were an exceptional attempt to address this structural gap, 
this time with a serious commitment to do so by the government – at least during the 
negotiation phase. Yet, as I show in subsequent chapters, this attempt, as in other 
occasions, suffered a strong backlash from the different factions of the rural elites 
(agribusiness and large cattle ranchers) staunchly positioned against any alteration of 
the status quo and who, despite their decreasing economic importance, remain 
politically influential (Gutiérrez Sanín 2010; Escobar 2002). I leave this political 
analysis for later. Here, I move on to characterize rural inequality and its evolution 
through time. 
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There are various ways to talk about rural inequality. One of them is to look at the 
gap of living conditions or wage differentials between urban and rural areas. This 
approach is important as it indicates whether economic growth is fostering 
convergence or is rather widening the distance between rural and urban dwellers’ well-
being. The rural hourly wage in 2013 only represented 55 percent of the urban hourly 
wage, a figure that did not change in relation to 2008 (Tenjo 2015). Furthermore, 75 
percent of the rural employed population earns less than the minimum wage, as 
opposed to 39 percent in urban areas, and average per capita monthly income is 
196.672 Colombian pesos (approximately $US100), whereas in urban areas it is 
692.763 pesos (approximately $US350) (Misión para la Transformación del Campo 
2015, vol. 1). The precariousness of rural livelihoods has to do in great measure with a 
lack of access to productive assets. Most rural households do not have any productive 
asset, and only 4 percent have full access to credit, land, irrigation and technological 
innovation (Misión para la Transformación del Campo 2015). Rural poverty, 
measured via monetary income or the multi-dimensional index, although it has 
decreased in the last years, has remained twice as much as in urban areas (see Table 
3.1). 
Another way to look at rural inequality is to look at the internal features of rural 
areas, particularly in terms of the agrarian structure (Machado 2002). Access to land, 
although it is not a sufficient condition, still determines in great measure the quality of 
rural livelihoods and it is therefore a relevant proxy of well-being in rural areas (Ibáñez 
and Montenegro 2014; Arteaga Castro et al. 2017; Ibáñez and Velásquez 2018). In a 
context in which more than 75.4 percent of rural employment depends on agriculture, 
and in which more than 80 percent of agricultural units are family-run farms under 10 
hectares, the extension of land controlled by this segment of production defines the 
rural basic income (Corredor 2016, p. 153; Departamento Administrativo Nacional de 
Estadística 2016). According to Gáfaro et al. (2012), the land Gini coefficient reached 
0.87 in 2011. Today, only 36.4 percent of rural households have land and out of those 
who have land only 40 percent have a formal title (Instituto Geográfico Agustín 
Codazzi 2012; Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 2011). As the 
World Bank (2003) has noted, the lack of proper access to land and property rights has 
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been an obstacle to rural development in Colombia and a critical source of the high 
poverty levels in the countryside. 
Both ways of addressing rural inequality are relevant and complementary. There is 
a rich literature in Colombia’s agrarian scholarship that has addressed them both 
(Misión para la Transformación del Campo 2015). For analytical purposes, however, 
here I focus mostly on the land-centered inequality, as I find it more useful  for 
depicting (in a 50-year view) the broad developments in Colombia’s political economy 
and rural policies throughout the twentieth century, which are in turn the macro 
scenario under which the armed conflict and the peace talks unfolded.  
      




Monetary poverty Extreme poverty 
Rural Urban Gap Rural Urban Gap Rural Urban Gap 
2002 na na na 60,9 45,3 1,34 32,8 12,3 2,67 
2003 79,8 39,8 2 56,3 44,7 1,26 28,6 11,1 2,58 
2004 na na na 58,3 43,6 1,34 29 10 2,9 
2005 na na na 56,4 41,1 1,37 27,8 9,1 3,05 
2006 na na na na na na na na na 
2007 na na na na na na na na na 
2008 59,6 26,9 2,2 57,1 37,2 1,53 32,9 11,1 2,96 
2009 na na na 54,3 35,8 1,52 29 9,8 2,96 
2010 53,1 23,5 2,3 49,7 33,3 1,49 25 8,3 3,01 
2011 53,1 22,2 2,4 46,1 30,3 1,52 22,1 7 3,15 
2012 48,3 20,6 2,3 46,8 28,4 1,65 22,8 6,6 3,45 
2013 45,9 18,5 2,5 42,8 26,9 1,59 19,1 6 3,18 
2014 44,1 15,4 2,9 41,4 24,6 1,68 18 5,1 3,53 
2015 40 14,4 2,8 40,3 24,1 1,67 18 4,9 3,67 
2016 37,6 12,1 3,1 38,6 24,9 1,55 18,1 5,6 3,23 
2017 36,6 11,4 3,2 36 24,2 1,49 15,4 5 3,08 
Source: Author's construction based on data of DNP, DANE and Misión Rural 
Note: Monetary poverty measures the percentage of the population with income 
below the minimum monthly income defined as necessary to cover their basic 
needs, that is, to acquire a basket of goods (food and non-food). Extreme poverty 
takes into account the purchasing power with respect to a basket of food goods. 
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), meanwhile, is built based on five 
dimensions: educational conditions of the home, conditions of childhood and 
youth, health, work, and access to home public services and housing conditions. 
These 5 dimensions involve 15 indicators, and households that have deprivation in 
at least 33 percent of the indicators are considered poor. 
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Table 3.2 shows how land tenancy in Colombia has become even more 
concentrated in recent decades. In 1960, 76.5 percent of the agricultural units had less 
than 10 hectares and occupied 8.8 percent of the agricultural land available. In 2014, 
81 percent of the agricultural units had less than 10 hectares and occupied 4.9 percent 
of the agricultural land. As LeGrand (1986) rigorously described, the origins of land 
inequality start in the mid-nineteenth century when the state decided to compensate 
high-rank military officials with state land (baldíos) after the civil war. Soon after, a 
progressive legislation emerged to allocate these baldíos preferentially to peasants 
working on them for a period of at least five years. Nonetheless, market pressures 
counteracted this policy. Rising global demand for primary commodities drew 
economic elites into the countryside and towards large-scale land and agricultural 
investments. This initiated a long-term cycle in which peasant colonos occupied 
baldíos that were then appropriated, often times forcefully, by large landowners or 
capitalists, motivating a further frontier expansion of peasant colonos into new baldíos 
seeking to work autonomously. The conflict that arose between peasants and 
landowners throughout the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century was not only about accessing land but, more importantly so, as LeGrand 
explains, about controlling labor. Insofar as peasants had continued access to baldíos, 
they would opt for working freely on their own plots while landowners would fall short 
of hands to work on the large estates. The peasant movement for agrarian reform that 
originated in the 1920s and that resulted in Law 200 of 1936 was therefore demanding 
land access and at the same time free autonomous labor. The big landowners and 
capitalists, who were already organized in the agricultural business association Sociedad 
de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC), opposed this reform led by liberal President Alfonso 
López Pumarejo (Saffon 2010; LeGrand 1986; Sánchez, López-Uribe, and Fazio 
2010). The result was that sharecroppers were expulsed from their land and large-scale 
agricultural development prevailed. 
In the 1960s, when Colombia’s import substitution industrialization was at full 
speed, in terms of a growing manufacturing and construction sector, amid rising social 
and political conflict, surged a new attempt to redress the agrarian imbalances. This 
time it was Carlos Lleras Restrepo, also a liberal reformer, who first as minister of 
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agriculture and then as president tried to carry out a new agrarian reform in the context 
of the US-led Alliance for Progress geared towards appeasing communist rural 
uprisings throughout Latin America. Law 135 of 1961 created robust instruments that 
Restrepo’s administration (1966-1970) tried to put into practice, including the national 
land reform agency’s (INCORA) authority to expropriate unproductive land. The rural 
elite, once again, politically opposed this reform on the ground and in congress. In 
1973, they achieved trimming the law to its minimum expression. From there on, the 
anti-reformist stance became the norm (Uribe López 2013).  
 
Table 3.2. Agricultural Units by Size, 1960-2014 
  Units Area (hectares) 
  1960 2014 1960 2014 
Unit size ha Number % Number % Number % Number % 
<5      756.605  62,5%  1.444.125  70,5%     1.238.976  4,5%      1.883.822  2,7% 
5<10      169.145  14,0%      214.306  10,5%     1.164.749  4,3%      1.522.611  2,2% 
10<50      201.020  16,6%      281.518  13,8%     4.210.777  15,4%      6.175.048  8,9% 
50<100        39.990  3,3%        54.281  2,7%     2.680.471  9,8%      3.795.553  5,5% 
100<500        36.010  3,0%        43.469  2,1%     6.990.471  25,6%      8.593.720  12,4% 
500<1000          4.141  0,3%          4.852  0,2%     2.730.764  10,0%      3.374.907  4,9% 
> 1000          2.761  0,2%          4.689  0,2%     8.321.619  30,4%   43.826.754  63,4% 
Total   1.209.672  100,0%   2.047.240  100,0%    27.337.827  100,0%    69.172.416  100,0% 
Source: Author's construction based on DANE's data, National Agricultural Census 1960 and 2014.   
Notes: 1) The Census of 1960 only surveyed 24 percent of Colombia's territory, excluding Chocó and the 
departamentos that were called then Territorios Nacionales. 2) For the 2014 results, I excluded the territories 
occupied by ethnic groups and the areas not used for agricultural purposes. 
Reyes (2009) has argued how with the emergence of drug lords and paramilitary 
groups in the mid-1980s, the process of land concentration was accentuated. Between 
the 1980s and mid-2000s, these groups violently dispossessed peasants of an area equal 
to around 6 million hectares, a figure that is above the current cropped area (under 5.7 
million hectares) (Higginbottom 2005; Gutiérrez Sanín 2010; Comisión de 
Seguimiento a la Política Pública sobre el Desplazamiento Forzado 2009). As I argue 
in Chapter 4, Álvaro Uribe’s policies reinforced this counter-agrarian reform by 
supporting a large-scale agricultural development model, thus further undermining the 
living conditions and means of production of the peasantry. The initiative led by 
president Santos to restitute land property rights to peasants and to include a chapter of 
land distribution and rural development in the peace talks with FARC was, as had 
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happened in the 1930s and 1960s, opposed by the same rural elite now represented by 
Uribe. In Chapter 7, an analysis of Uribe’s opposition against the peace process and 
the rural reform is developed. It is important though to see it as part of this broad 
history of reactions against any attempt to address the structural rural inequality. 
Without this political and economic context, the origins and dynamics of the armed 
conflict and peace efforts cannot be properly understood.         
 
FARC’s Rural Origins and Agrarian Discourse 
The dispute over access to and control of rural land has been at the center of the armed 
confrontation (Richani 2013). In fact, for FARC, agrarian reform has not only been at 
the forefront of its political demands since its historical origins, but it is what has given 
meaning and discursive coherence to its struggle. However, as it turned into a large 
army primarily concerned with warfare, dependent on drugs and kidnappings for its 
funding, and continuously perpetrating massive human rights violations, FARC’s 
peasant-oriented political claims became highly distorted. 
Although formally created as a guerrilla group in 1964, FARC’s main leaders8 were 
colono peasants that since the 1940s had joined the liberal party’s self-defense groups in 
the south (mainly Tolima, Huila, Cauca, Valle and Caquetá) to protect themselves 
from the conservative government’s repression during La Violencia period (1948-1958). 
By 1950, some of these groups, led by communist leader Isauro Yosa, fled with around 
200 peasant families previously displaced to El Davis region in Rioblanco, Tolima, 
where they settled down for about a decade seeking refuge from violent attacks by the 
police and organized into a peasant community that would attract close to 2,000 rural 
workers (Molano 2016, Chs. 1 and 2). Influenced by the community experience in El 
Davis, communist ideas diffused by the Colombian Communist Party in Tolima, and 
                                                 
8 This was the case, for example, of Pedro Antonio Marín, better known for his ‘nom de guerre’ Manuel 
Marulanda Vélez or ‘Tirofijo’ (surefire), who would then become FARC’s commander-in-chief for over 
four decades until his death in 2008. After the events of April 9, 1948, he left his family farm in Ceilán, 
Valle and sought refuge in the western cordillera. In June 1949, he armed a group of 19 men to protest 
and took over the town of Génova in reaction against the newly elected president, conservative 
politician Laureano Gómez. With this group, he joined the larger army led by Gerardo Loaiza and his 
four sons in Rioblanco. After conservative vigilantes attacked the town, Marín, alongside other peasants 
and their families, fled to the woods and organized into self-defense groups. For a detailed description of 
Marín’s story see Molano 1994; Molano 2016.      
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peasant revolts that had gained force since the 1930s, FARC’s ideational basis was 
from the outset geared towards defending peasants’ land rights and against latifundio 
(González, Bolívar, and Vázquez 2003; Giraldo Ramírez 2015).9 During this period, 
repression from the conservative government increased.  Publicly announced in July 
1964, FARC’s “agrarian program” (Programa Agrario) explained their decision to adopt 
the armed struggle in response to the grievances suffered and the state repression 
against the peasant movement in the south since 1948, that culminated in the 
Marquetalia military operation (1964). Part of Plan Laso, the US-funded anti-
communist strategy inspired in the National Security Doctrine, Marquetalia became 
FARC’s foundational myth, as it justified its emergence as a guerrilla group in reaction 
to a war imposed on them (Molano 2015; Leal Buitrago 2012; Rempe 1995).10 Plan 
Laso also meant the beginning of a counter-insurgency policy in which certain colono 
regions became labelled as “FARC zones” (repúblicas independientes), thus linking from 
the outset security with land issues, as the elites in Bogotá were concerned that the 
peasant communities would give leeway for FARC’s communist “threat” against the 
state (Karl 2017; González Arias 1991). 
Considering that previous attempts to execute an agrarian reform had failed, the 
goal of the Programa Agrario was to develop a revolutionary land reform, “against the 
bourgeoisie’s fake one” (FARC-EP 1964, my own translation). Moreover, it sought 
“radically changing the social structure of the countryside and handing over free land 
to peasants […] by means of confiscating latifundios”. Besides its basic claim for free 
allocation of land to peasants, the Programa Agrario also called for property rights to be 
assigned to all kinds of rural laborers, abolishing archaic forms of land exploitation and 
creating an economic unit based on land’s productivity (see more in Chapter 5). It also 
                                                 
9 For detailed analyses on FARC’s history see Pizarro (1991); Pizarro (2011); Aguilera Peña (2011); 
Ferro Medina and Uribe (2002); Molano (1994); Alape (1972). 
10 May 27, 1964, the day that Operación Marquetalia started, is taken as FARC’s official creation date, as 
it is said that as a response to state aggression a group of peasants organized themselves in a guerrilla 
group. By the end of 1965, this guerrilla group carries out its first conference (Primera Conferencia 
Guerrillera) laying out its military, political, educational, organizational and propagandistic plans, and 
defining as an objective the subsistence of the movement that was named Bloque Sur. By the end of 1966, 
at the second conference (Segunda Conferencia Guerrillera), the Bloque Sur becomes Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), which is why it is known as the constitutive conference (conferencia 
constitutiva). 
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called for condoning peasants’ debts; providing productive supports to individual and 
associated peasants, such as technical assistance, seeds, finance, infrastructure, 
machinery, and irrigation; establishing guaranteed prices; protecting indigenous lands 
and forms of organization; and generally improving peasants’ living conditions, 
elevating educational levels and securing food and employment. 
Over the course of the years, FARC’s initially agrarian-centered discourse would 
evolve into a wider political program; however, it would maintain all the way up to the 
Havana peace talks its key tenets on land reform (see Appendix 2 below). At its second 
conference in 1966, the peasant resistance group created in 1964 formally became 
FARC. In line with other guerrilla movements rising at that time in Latin America, 
especially motivated after Castro’s victory in Cuba in 1959, FARC viewed the struggle 
for agrarian reform as part of a broader Marxist-oriented project of taking power over 
and transforming state structures (Ferro Medina and Uribe 2002, p. 36). At its third 
conference in 1969, FARC defined itself as the “most elevated expression of the poor 
peasantry”, and continued advocating the free distribution and titling of land and the 
confiscation of the land owned by big landowners and multinational corporations. 
During this early period, FARC was a small “partisan guerrilla”, subordinated to the 
communist party’s guidelines and mainly dedicated to defend itself from military 
operations. At the end of the 1970s, nonetheless, FARC moved into an offensive 
position, beginning its military expansion in a context of significant social mobilization 
and state repression perceived by its leaders and other Marxist-oriented organizations 
as a “pre-revolutionary moment” that demanded increasing guerrilla warfare 
(González, Bolívar, and Vázquez 2003). 
In the sixth conference of 1978 that took place soon after the events of the 1977 
national strike, FARC expanded its political program and adopted the “combination of 
all forms of struggle” as a way to articulate the guerrilla’s military operations with the 
social movements’ actions. Similarly, in the seventh conference of 1982, FARC – now 
with the surname EP, that stands for the People’s Army (Ejército del Pueblo) – ordered 
its fronts to influence popular organizations to push for a democratic agrarian reform 
and called for intensifying the armed struggle. The guerrilla group sought to increase 
violence as a response to state repression. At that conference, FARC also drafted an 
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“agrarian reform revolutionary law” establishing what they conceived as their 
redistributive policy for the regions they controlled. According to it, properties with an 
area larger than 1,500 hectares or owned by foreign companies would be expropriated 
by and pass on to FARC. A committee set up for these matters by the guerrilla’s 
leadership, would hand them over to landless peasants based on previously defined 
“economic unities” (FARC-EP 1982). Displaying state-like functions in the regions 
they possessed military presence and strengthened by their involvement in the coca 
business since the late 1970s (Gutiérrez 2015), by the early 1980s FARC’s military 
component slowly took over the political one. The Programa Agrario, as illustrated by 
the “agrarian revolutionary reform law”, evolved into a “new government” program 
containing as well broader economic, social and political issues. 
Despite its increasing links with narcotrafficking and its military orientation, 
FARC’s agrarian ideological basis would remain an important part of their struggle 
and would eventually be the starting point for any peace negotiation with this guerrilla 
group.  
 
3.2 Antecedents Leading to the Peace Talks 
 
Besides FARC, several Marxist-oriented guerrilla groups were also formed around the 
country during the 1960s and 1970s, including the pro-Chinese Popular Liberation 
Army (EPL), the nationalist Movement of April 19 (M-19) and, most importantly, the 
Cuban-inspired National Liberation Army (ELN), still active today. The emergence in 
the 1980s of powerful “drug lords” that followed the cocaine business boom and of 
paramilitary groups tied to cattle-ranchers, further complicated a conflict characterized 
by multiple armed actors and types of organized violence. In the 1990s, the Colombian 
Government reached peace agreements with the Movimiento 19 (M-19), the Ejército 
Popular de Liberación (EPL) and the Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL), 
guerrilla groups whose members were demobilized, received amnesty and were 
reintegrated into the Colombian political system and civil life (Pizarro 2016). 
In 1991 the Colombian Constitution was renewed through a Constitutional 
Assembly in which the demobilized groups participated. Later, between 2003 and 
2006, a peace agreement was negotiated and signed between the Colombian 
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government and paramilitary groups that included conditional suspensions and 
reduced prison sentences. As a result, more than 37,000 combatants of the 36 
paramilitary fractions demobilized collectively, along with a small number of 
individual members of guerrilla groups. Before the final peace agreement between the 
Government and the FARC-EP, the parties had already recorded three failed attempts 
to find a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. The first intent lasted from 1984 to 
1987, the second from 1991 to 1992, but perhaps the most significant one was carried 
out between 1999 and 2002. This peace process coincided with poor military 
performance on the side of the Government and with the strengthening the FARC-EP 
(both by influence and by the amount of its members). At the start of the negotiations, 
there was strong public support for a negotiated solution out of the conflict. This 
support, however, changed due to the fact that the FARC-EP took control over the 
large demilitarized area, designed to hold the peace talks, and carried out kidnappings 
and military trainings in this area. What changed in 2010 that led to the Havana peace 
talks? Domestically, developments in the military correlation of forces between the 
government and FARC during the 2000s, the political transition from Santos to Uribe 
in 2010 and internal changes within FARC’s leadership were key factors. Abroad, 
what mattered most were the rise to power of left-wing movements in the region and 
the change of administration in the US government from Bush to Obama in 2009. 
Other scholars (e.g., Richani 2013) have provided excellent in-depth discussions 
regarding the armed conflict in Colombia and its relationship with the global political 
economy. Moreover, recent accounts have started to describe the atmosphere the 
country was in during the transition to the Havana peace process (Acosta 2016; Santos 
2015; Gómez Giraldo 2016). My purpose here is to provide a broad picture that 
captures the way the “planets [were] in proper alignment” for the window to open 
(Kingdon 2013, 166). Indeed, the Havana peace process created a critical juncture that 
made it possible, amongst other things, to prioritize rural development in the public 
agenda. 
The broader political change that created the window for bringing agrarian issues 
back into the public agenda was the beginning of the peace talks, as I show in Chapter 
5. Although it is not at the center of my question, having a basic understanding of how 
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the peace talks emerged is essential to grasp the context under which the specific 
discussion on rural development took place in Havana. In this sense, I describe key 
changes that created the political conditions for the peace process to develop. These 
had to do, first, with the state’s strategic military victory over FARC, which changed in 
a significant way the correlation of forces between the two actors. Second, with the 
government transition from Uribe to Santos in 2010. Third, with FARC’s internal 
organizational adjustments after the death of historical members of the Secretariado 
that gave place to a new leadership that had to assume the peace negotiation. 
 
Figure 3.1. Changes in the Political Context 
 
 
Changes in Armed Conflict Dynamics 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez, a charismatic right-wing leader, was elected president in 2002 with 
a historically high popular vote. After the failure of the peace negotiations of San 
Vicente del Caguán,11 the crux of his campaign – and, once in power, of his 
                                                 
11 The government and FARC carried out the 1998-2001 peace talks in the urban center of the 
municipality of San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá. That is why this process is known as the Caguán 
process.  
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administration – was gaining back territorial control and winning the war with FARC. 
Citizens, primarily those with political and economic power in urban areas, had lost 
trust in the government and the country was labelled as a threat to regional and 
international security. In this unruly context, Uribe set for himself the task of 
improving confidence in the state internally and abroad, and the first step in doing so 
was making sure people felt safe. Security thus turned into his administration’s mantra 
and, in the following eight years, the word “peace” practically disappeared from the 
government lexicon, as it had become synonym of weakness. The government 
dispelled at all costs the phantom of Caguán’s fiasco. Uribe rose to power representing 
the mano dura (“heavy hand”) the majority of Colombians seem to have been longing 
for, particularly after the discovery that FARC had been deceiving president Pastrana 
all along. 
Failure of Caguán’s Peace Talks 
Andrés Pastrana reached the presidency in 1998 with the promise of negotiating peace 
with the FARC. In the previous years, Colombia was to slide into what many called a 
“failed state” status, as the combined actions of drug cartels, guerrilla and paramilitary 
groups led to unprecedented levels of violence – measured by number of fatalities, 
frequency and scope of massacres, incidence of armed clashes, number of internally 
displaced people, economic costs of war, among other indicators  (González, Bolívar, 
and Vázquez 2003). Nonetheless, after Pastrana’s four years of peace talks with FARC, 
that resulted in conceding FARC a demilitarized zone comprising five municipalities 
in the southeast (42,000 km square) as a condition to advance in the negotiation, the 
process of San Vicente del Caguán ultimately went nowhere (Kline 2007; Téllez, 
Lesmes, and Montes 2002). According to many analysts, this outcome had to do 
mainly with the fact that neither party was completely interested in putting an end to 
the conflict. Instead, both FARC and the government were drawn into the process by 
numerous other factors, including using the negotiation to increase their military 
position vis-à-vis one another; regional and international pressure; and domestic public 
opinion (Richani 2013; González, Bolívar, and Vázquez 2003; Aguilera Peña 2011). 
72 
In effect, throughout the 1990s, FARC concentrated itself in strengthening its 
military prowess. Since its eighth conference in 199312 – that reviewed the strategic 
plan defined in the seventh conference in 1982 – FARC increased its number of 
combatants from around 6,500 in 1991 to over 18,000 in 1999. It also stretched its 
military presence from 437 municipalities to 1,000, and got a hold of 40 percent of 
Colombian territory, thus posing a real threat to the state (Brittain 2010, p. 17-22). 
Fuelled by large revenues derived from coca production, kidnapping and extortion (in 
that order, perhaps $250 million annually), in the mid-1990s FARC acquired the 
military initiative and tactical advantage against government forces, scoring several 
important military victories (Ospina Ovalle 2017; Marks 2007).13  
By 1998, when the peace talks began, FARC’s leadership was convinced of the 
organization’s ability to take power over by force and establishing a revolutionary 
government. According to its strategic military plan, reaching Bogotá – the country’s 
political and economic center – was an attainable mid-term goal (Spencer 2011). That 
is why, when the peace talks started, FARC, at its military peak, had no intentions to 
lay down weapons but rather to further accumulate power to prevail in its struggle. 
Right from the outset of the negotiations FARC had already obtained what it wanted: 
a withdrawal of government troops, a ceasefire and a large physical space that 
facilitated training personnel, gathering resources and weaponry, strengthening their 
state-like control of the south, and an opportunity to publicly expose its political views 
and gain national and international credibility. All of these gains were geared towards 
FARC’s broader shift from a “mobile war” to a “war of positions”, that allowed them 
to hold fixed territories for a long period of time, even though they were never able to 
obtain wide popular support (Richani 2013; Ospina Ovalle 2017; Marks 2017; Spencer 
2011; Ortiz 2002). 
                                                 
12 FARC developed its strategic guidelines through a series of conferences and plenums. The conclusions 
of these meetings were carefully recorded and distributed to the dispersed fronts to provide strategic 
guidance. The conclusions of these conferences are now readily available at FARC’s webpage. During 
the armed confrontation, these were high target documents that were captured and studied in detailed by 
the Colombian security forces. For an analysis of the most important conference, the seventh one held in 
1982, see Spencer (2011). 
13 According to Ospina Valle, FARC surprised and defeated military units in places such as Las Delicias 
and Puerres, 1996; San Juanito and Patascoy, 1997; Miraflores, El Billar and Mutata, 1998. During 
these actions, the military units were not only defeated but FARC was able to seize hundreds of troopers 
as hostages (Ospina Ovalle 2017, p. 542). 
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During this period, FARC privileged its military wing over the political one mainly 
due to three reasons. First, as a reaction to the systematic persecution and virtual 
extermination by paramilitaries and state forces of the Unión Patriótica, the left-wing 
political party that FARC and the Colombian Communist Party (CCP) founded during 
the 1985 peace talks in Uribe, Meta, to facilitate the guerrilla groups’s transition 
towards a political movement (Dudley 2004).14 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War in the region, which was signaled by 
the peace treaty in El Salvador in 1992, Colombia was experiencing a period of 
democratization that culminated with the peace agreements with various guerrilla 
groups and the 1991 Constitution (Ortiz 2002). At the same time, dirty war and 
political violence, particularly against the left, soared. In this context, FARC decided 
to abort the peace negotiations, move away from electoral politics and reinforce its 
armed struggle. 
A second related reason had to do with the distancing of FARC from the CCP 
since the late 1980s. Even though FARC was born as an “armed instrument” of the 
CCP, and had maintained strong political and ideological ties to it, since the early 
1980s both organizations grew apart due to their different understandings of the armed 
struggle. In the juncture of the constitutional process, they further moved away from 
each other.15 While FARC opted out, the party decided to become involved in the 
National Constitutional Assembly. For FARC’s leadership this meant continuing the 
armed struggle on its own, abandoning the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in replacement 
of a much less rigid ideological package, labeled as “Bolivarian”, and prioritizing 
warfare in what they called the “combination of all forms of struggle” (Aguilera Peña 
2011; Ospina Ovalle 2017; Ortiz 2002). 
                                                 
14 Dudley describes the Unión Patriótica (UP) as an equivalent to Sinn Féin, the Irish Republican Army’s 
political wing, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). “As with Sinn Féin and the PLO, the 
UP was the voice of the insurgents, a means through which the FARC could test their ideas at the polls. 
It was also supposed to be part of a pathway to peace, a way for the Colombian rebels to enter the 
political mainstream and leave their guns behind. In reality, it was neither, but the FARC spent a huge 
amount of energy and effort in establishing its party” (Dudley 2004, p. xix). 
15 According to Ospina Ovalle, while the CPP understood the armed struggle as one of many lines of 
effort, for FARC it was the main approach to seize power. “These two views grew yet further apart 
when, after 1982, FARC formally opted to exploit the drug trade to enhance its means” (2017, p. 530). 
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A third reason of FARC’s shift into war was its increasing links with 
narcotrafficking. FARC decided to enter into the drug trade in the 1982 conference, as 
part of its financial plan to back up the broader territorial expansion strategy. By the 
1990s, it had become clear that FARC had moved from being the small peasant-led 
guerrilla group of the 1960s to a large army that derived at least 40 percent of its 
income from the illegal drug economy. Moving up the production chain, FARC 
became involved not only in extracting a tax to coca growers (gramaje), but also in the 
distribution and export of cocaine creating alliances with international trafficking 
groups, such as the Arellano-Felix cartel in Tijuana, Mexico (Marcy 2010; Cook 2011; 
Henderson 2015). This narcotization of FARC, coupled with its ongoing extortion and 
kidnappings, led to a major increase of violence in the late 1990s and to a rent-seeking 
logic that moved the organization away from its original political goals, and more into 
a terrorist-like organization (Hough 2011). At the same time, these financial 
capabilities, which translated into greater war-fighting capabilities, were what allowed 
it to challenge governmental authority (Marks 2017). 
For its part, Pastrana’s government had no real desire – or planned strategy – to 
make progress in the Caguán negotiations. Pastrana initially saw the peace process 
merely as a way to win the presidency, as he launched his peace platform during his 
bid to win the runoff vote against Horacio Serpa, the Liberal Party’s candidate, who 
had won the first round of elections by a small margin. According to Richani, this 
peace platform “tipped the electoral balance in Pastrana’s favor” (2013, p. 172).16 Once 
elected, despite its own ill-preparedness, Pastrana’s administration continued to pursue 
the peace process. This was partly explained by the fact that the rising expectations by 
important segments of Colombian society of reaching a political settlement became 
difficult to ignore by the government. In 1997, the popular demands for peace had 
already manifested through 10 million votes in favor of the Peace Mandate (Mandato 
por la Paz), a symbolic vote in which citizens demonstrated their support for a 
                                                 
16 Richani further notes “[t]he Pastrana’s electoral machine used the prospects of peace talks with great 
efficiency. A case in point was that a few days prior to the second presidential round of elections, 
Pastrana’s emissary met with FARC leader Manuel Marulanda. The media widely publicized that 
meeting, and the noted photo of Marulanda wearing a wristwatch from the Pastrana campaign most 
likely ensured Pastrana’s ensuing victory” (2013, p. 173). 
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negotiated solution. Another reason was that many among the government, especially 
among the military, conceived the talks as a way to buy time for carrying out a major 
reform of the armed forces that could alter the negative balance of forces, and thus 
improve the government’s bargaining position. The military concerns of FARC’s 
growing warfare capacities, coupled with its increasing ties to narcotrafficking as it 
exploited the vacuum created by the major cartels’ destruction, resonated as well 
within the Clinton administration (Marks 2017; Richani 2013, p. 176; Henderson 
2015). 
Viewing FARC as a destabilizing force that could undermine its strategic interests 
in the region, the US government hardened its position against FARC and Pastrana’s 
peace initiative, and instead offered the Colombian government significant military aid 
conditioned to a substantive military reform and a reinforcement of the antidrug war 
(Richani 2013, p. 177).17 Pastrana had set as one of his administration’s core purposes 
improving relations with the US, especially after the bilateral relationship became 
deeply strained during the period of his predecessor. As the presidential campaign of 
Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) was found to receive funding from the Cali drug cartel, 
Clinton’s administration lost confidence in the newly elected government, and pushed 
for Colombia’s decertification in 1996 and 1997 and the revocation of Samper’s visa to 
enter the United Sates (Crandall 2001; Chernick 2008). Against this backdrop, and 
after a FARC unit kidnapped and assassinated three US NGO activists in February 
1999, Pastrana welcomed that in July 2000 the US Congress approved a four-year 
USD 1.3 billion assistance package, called Plan Colombia (Berrios 2017, p. 548; Rosen 
2014, Ch. 3). Although it was fundamentally laid out as an antinarcotics policy – as the 
US could not afford to become involved in another Vietnam-style counter-insurgency 
intervention – this assistance was geared towards supporting Colombian military 
reform, a key antecedent for Uribe’s security policy against FARC.18 With the US-
                                                 
17 According to Crandall (2001), right from the start of the peace talks, the US government received 
pressure from Capitol Hill, where the Republican majority “was concerned that Pastrana’s moves to 
initiate peace negotiations with FARC might undermine antidrug efforts” (p. 113). As a matter of fact, 
Congress passed a resolution that would have “cut off counternarcotics assistance to Colombia if 
Pastrana’s peace initiatives – especially the proposed plan to grant the FARC a demilitarized zone – 
interfered with coca eradication efforts”.  
18 Following Richani (2013), in order to put these figures in perspective, “in 1995 Colombia received 
only USD 30 million in US support. By 1998, that amount had increased threefold to USD 98 million 
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backed Plan Colombia, the military forces in Colombia, who had been critical of the 
Caguán’s talks since the outset – due to the government’s decisions to demilitarize 
Colombian territory and include military reform as part of the negotiation’s agenda – 
increased the pressure to civilian authorities against further making concessions to 
FARC, and to escalate military actions (Rangel 2000).19 The lack of real progress in the 
negotiations and a reinforced military led to the military operation of taking back 
Caguán that began on February 23, 2002, marking the beginning of a new cycle of war 
in which Uribe fully jumped on board.20  
 
Uribe’s Democratic and Defense Security Policy 
Upon taking office in August 2002, Uribe Vélez designed the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy (DSDP) (officially released in June 2003), radically reorienting the state 
posture from one of negotiation to confrontation (Ministerio de Defensa 2003). Many 
experts agree in concluding that if it had not been for the DSDP, FARC would not 
have sat down in 2012 to explore a peace settlement in Havana with president Santos 
(Personal communication Former Advisor of Ministry of Agriculture, September 22, 
2017 ). Eight years of unwavering execution of the DSDP dramatically altered the 
balance of forces and, as one of FARC’s top leader recognizes, “while it did not beat 
us, it surely gave us a strong blow” (Personal communication Member of Farc’s 
Leadership September 18, 2017)21. At its base, the DSDP aimed at consolidating the 
rule of law, providing security as a key public good and protecting civilian population. 
                                                 
and by 1999 to USD 294 million. In total, between 1999 and 2002, the US gave to Colombia USD 2.04 
billion in aid, 81 percent of which was for military purposes” (p. 178).  
19 According to Richani, “a direct confrontation between the military and the president came in May 
1999 when Victor Ricardo, the peace commissioner, announced that the government was considering 
extending the withdrawal from the five municipalities for an indefinite period of time. Defense 
Ministerio Rodrigo Lloreda resigned in protest, believing like the military that the government had 
already made too many concessions to FARC, a view that by then Washington agreed. Subsequently, 
Lloreda and his military backers vehemently opposed the renewal of the demilitarized areas. In due 
course, the military’s high command used this occasion to present a show of force and submitted the 
collective resignation of twelve generals, twenty colonels, and fifty other officers” (2013, p. 179).   
20 On February 20, 2002, “FARC hijacked a domestic airliner, forcing it to land on a stretch of highway 
in Huila department. All passengers were freed but one – Colombian Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay – 
the fifth member of Colombia’s Congress to be kidnapped by FARC since 2001”. Right after that, 
president Pastrana announced the end of the three-year-old talks. “Aerial bombardment, the first phase 
of military operations to retake the demilitarized zone, began at midnight” (Kline 2007, p. 120).  
21 I have translated any literal reference to the interviewees into English. 
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In practice, however, it came at a high toll on human rights, as I describe below. 
Strategically, it meant gaining back the territorial control that FARC had obtained 
since the mid-1990s, especially through the military campaign called Plan Patriota, laid 
out as a full endorsement of the armed forces to Uribe’s political leadership on security 
matters.22 According to one of its key architects, General Ospina Ovalle,23 Plan Patriota 
had three aims “closing the capacity gaps in a grid of self-defense […]”; “neutralizing 
and dismantling FARC’s armed structures reducing their combat capacity and their 
strategic plan for the seizure of power […]”, and “attacking FARC’s leadership, 
especially those of the Secretariat” (Ospina Ovalle 2017, pp. 536-540). Most of the 
military effort was thus focused on area control and conducting offensive operations 
against FARC, particularly in three crucial regions.24 One, in FARC’s strategic 
rearguard in the southeast (Meta, Caquetá and Guaviare) where it had established base 
areas used to replenish its combat power and as a springboard to launch attacks and 
created a state within a state. A second target was Cundinamarca, where Bogotá is 
located and where FARC had increasingly gained strength as part of its plan to encircle 
the capital.25 A third key area was northwest Antioquia that was key for FARC due to 
its use of Urabá and the Darien Gap in Panamá for obtaining resources and securing 
transit  (Berrios 2017, pp. 550-553).  
                                                 
22 Richani (2013) notes that “prior to Uribe’s election in 2002, virtually no integrated state-military 
policy existed. The lack of a state-military policy started in 1958 when the military transferred power 
back to civilian rule after both hegemonic warring parties, liberal and conservative, gave the military 
political autonomy” (p. 202). During Uribe’s period, the armed forces were subordinate to the Ministry 
of Defense. Based on the DSDP, the military issued a “general military strategy” as an applied version 
to support president Uribe’s counterinsurgency approach (Marks 2006, pp. 205-206) . 
23 Between 2003 and 2004, Ospina Ovalle served as General Commander of the Colombian military and 
between 2004 and 2007 of the armed forces. Along with General Fernando Tapias and General Jorge 
Enrique Mora, Ospina Ovalle was one of the three architects of the military reform and the Plan 
Patriota at the end of Pastrana’s government and during Uribe’s first administration (Marks 2007). Jorge 
Enrique Mora would be later on appointed by Santos as one of the negotiators once the formal talks 
began in November 2012.   
24 According to Berrios (2017), area control was “conducted by regular infantry and cavalry units and 
through the use of Soldados de mi pueblo or local soldiers […] recruited by the army as regular soldiers but 
allowed by law to serve their mandatory military service in their municipalities […]. “Offensive 
operations against FARC were done by counter-guerrilla battalions, mobile brigades and Special forces 
units, which had the mission to kill or capture FARC leadership” (p. 551). For an in-depth description of 
Plan Patriota see Berrios (2017); Ospina Ovalle (2017); Spencer (2011). 
25 For a description of FARC’s entrance in Cundinamarca and the municipalities near Bogotá since the 
1980s, see (Peña 1997). 
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Carrying out Plan Patriota supposed among other things improving military training 
and professionalization of the armed forces, developing joint operations between forces 
(Comando Conjunto), elevating the air-force capacity (air bombs), strengthening military 
intelligence and targeting “high-value” goals (Porch and Delgado 2010; Berrios 2017). 
It meant as well increasing military personnel to expand military presence throughout 
Colombian territory. Between 1998 and 2004, the number of professional and 
volunteer soldiers rose from 22,000 to 55,000, and regular soldiers, including high 
school draftees, from 46,000 to 73,000. Overall, total military personnel grew from 
260,000 in the early 1990s to 447,408 by the end of 2011. These reforms were 
accompanied by a significant increase in military expenditure. Between the early 1990s 
and 2011, it rose from 4.1 percent of GDP to close to 6 percent, becoming one of the 
highest in Latin America. This unprecedented reinforcement of military strength and 
technical capacity led to a general reversal of forces on the battlefield. Already by 2003, 
the number of military-initiated attacks against the guerrilla group exceeded those 
launched by the latter. Moreover, FARC withdrew from the outskirts of the urban 
areas back to its safety zones in the jungle and returned to a guerrilla war tactics. State 
legitimacy was strengthened and FARC’s leadership was decimated (Richani 2013, p. 
181-189, 206). 
While is true that the DSDP and Plan Patriota served to alter the conflict dynamics 
in favor of the state, their application on the ground also meant a significant increase in 
human rights violations and a severe restriction of civil liberties (Leal Buitrago 2006; 
Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo 2003). 
Framed in the global context of the post 9-11 US war against terrorism, Uribe’s 
administration, with the support of the US government under G.W. Bush, defined the 
DSDP as a policy against terrorism (Rosen 2014). The Colombian government 
classified FARC as a terrorist organization and, under the umbrella of UN Resolution 
1373 on terrorism, persuaded various states and multilateral organizations to do the 
same, including the OAS and the European Union (Leal Buitrago 2006, p. 9). 
Similarly, the new version of Plan Colombia approved by the US Congress was 
readdressed from just funding counter-narcotics operations to support counter-
insurgency, now framed in terms of anti-terrorism (Rosen 2014; Stokes 2006). This 
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anti-terrorist paradigm provided space to adopt legal and administrative measures that 
expanded the faculties of the armed forces to carry out detentions without judicial 
orders, telephone interceptions and home searches without warrants, among others.26 
With the loss of territorial control and the military offensive, FARC’s tactics shifted 
increasingly into terrorist actions such as the bomb placed in February 2003 at El 
Nogal, an elite, high-class social and business club located at the economic center of 
Bogotá.27 Uribe’s administration instrumentalized FARC’s terrorist actions 
successfully mobilizing Colombian society, particularly the economic and political 
elite, against FARC through a very strong discourse of “the common enemy” (Marks 
2006; Palau and Arias 2010; Echandía and Bechara 2006; Richani 2013). In the first 
year of Uribe’s administration alone, NGOs reported the killing by state forces or 
paramilitary groups of 49 activists, 160 forced disappearances, 144 cases of torture, and 
the arbitrary detention of 2,546 individuals. Besides human rights abuses and 
stigmatizing human rights defenders, social leaders and journalists, Uribe’s DSDP was 
questioned due to abuses by national intelligence service and extensive ties of armed 
forces members with paramilitary groups. In addition, there was a national scandal 
with regards to the more than 3,000 extrajudicial killings made by armed forces 
(commonly referred to as “false positives”, that is, civilians that were assassinated and 
reported as combatants killed in action, apparently in response to pressure to body 
counts) between 2004 and 2008 (Richani 2013, p. 204; Human Rights Watch 2012). 
Uribe’s administration was reelected in 2006 with the mandate of continuing war 
against FARC despite the critiques received by human rights’ NGOs on the DSDP. In 
this second period, Juan Manuel Santos was appointed as defense minister and Sergio 
Jaramillo, who had already been working as security advisor for the ministry in the 
design of the DSDP, was named by Santos as one of his deputy ministers. During this 
time, Santos assumed as civil authority the responsibility of leading key military 
operations against FARC’s commanders. With the use of intelligence and special 
                                                 
26 The Colombian Congress approved an anti-terrorist law in December 2003. Even though in August 
2004 the Constitutional Court declared the law unconstitutional, the bill illustrates the extent of the 
faculties given to the state forces justified by the war against terrorism. See Leal Buitrago (2006). 
27 The 200 kg bomb placed in the third-floor garage of the club killed 36 people and wounded more tan 
200.  
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operations, between 2008 and 2010 the armed forces killed Ivan Ríos, Raúl Reyes and 
Jorge Briceño, all of them top members of the Secretariado. The killings took place at 
the same time that FARC’s historical leader, Manuel Marulanda Vélez died in 2008 
from natural causes. The loss of four of its seven members of the Secretariado in a very 
short timeframe, in addition to the military setbacks suffered by FARC, including the 
Operación Jaque – a rescue operation in which former presidential candidate Ingrid 
Betancur and sixteen other hostages were taken away from FARC – represented a 
significant blow for FARC’s position. For war strategists like Ospina Ovalle by 2010 
“FARC had reached a state where it was in both the tactical and strategic defensive” 
(2017, p. 539). Nonetheless, FARC adapted its tactics to this new war scenario by 
measures such as decentralizing decisions to bloc commanders even further and 
creating mobile units returning to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, there was evidence that 
DSDP had reached its maximum level and was in a trend of diminishing returns. In 
this context, Santos was elected in 2010 as Uribe’s successor with the promise of 
continuing with the mano dura. 
 
From Uribe to Santos: The Moment for Peace is Ripe 
After a ten-year period of full-on war against FARC, the Colombian public opinion 
received with surprise the announcement in August 2012 that the government would 
initiate peace talks with FARC. Especially because Santos, after being Uribe’s defense 
minister, had assumed the presidency two years before with the mandate of sustaining 
the military confrontation. However, various domestic and international factors were 
in place for the peace dialogues to emerge. 
 
Political Recognition of the Existence of an Armed Conflict 
Few days after becoming president, Santos adopted a series of measures that marked a 
difference with Uribe’s government. Over time, the distance between the two 
administrations increased, the peace talks with FARC being the breaking point. For 
many observers, attempting a negotiated settlement with the guerrilla group was the 
natural outcome – and indeed the strategic goal – of the DSDP. For Uribe and his 
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sympathizers, however, it meant outright treason of his security policy that Santos had 
promised to maintain. Beyond their personal rivalries, the underlying conflict between 
Uribe and Santos had to do with their opposed understanding of the confrontation 
with FARC. For Santos, in line with the country’s previous liberal legal and political 
tradition, this confrontation was defined as an internal armed conflict that could be 
solved via a political agreement. Uribe, instead, only conceived it as an anti-terrorist 
war against criminals that in no way could have a political outlook. 
As already described, during Uribe’s administration and within the global context 
of post 9-11, the government moved away from the armed conflict legal framework, 
which had been the norm in Colombia in the past and had enabled attributing the 
guerrillas a status of political actors. Without it, FARC was conceived as a terrorist 
group with whom no political negotiation was feasible. At the same time that Uribe’s 
government classified FARC and ELN (the other guerrilla group that did not 
demobilized during the early 1990s) as terrorist organizations, it led the demobilization 
process with paramilitary groups through a legal framework (which came to be known 
as Justicia y Paz) that later served as a legal basis for the peace talks with FARC. By the 
time he was elected, Santos was aware, however, that in order to fully exercise the rule 
of law he had to explore the possibility of ending the armed conflict through a political 
negotiation. Even if the state had strategically defeated FARC, there was no way to 
completely beat it without incurring elevated economic, military, political and 
humanitarian costs, as FARC had moved again to guerrilla warfare (Echandía and 
Bechara 2006). Despite the success of the DSDP, the government’s key decision-
makers regarding the armed conflict concluded that the conflict was “ripe” for a peace 
settlement as it had reached a situation of “mutually hurting stalemate” (Zartman 
2008). That is why Santos reactivated the back channeling with FARC as soon as he 
became president, recognized the existence of an armed conflict, developed a legal 
framework that could support an eventual process and developed an international 
diplomacy geared towards creating a favorable environment for this process. 
Contacts with FARC leaders were made throughout the second half of 2010 and 
2011. Nevertheless, he continued with the military attacks against the guerrillas, 
including the special operations in September 2010 and November 2011 that ended up 
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with the deaths, respectively, of Jorge Briceño (also known as ‘Mono Jojoy’), FARC’s 
strongest military leader, and Alfonso Cano, who had succeeded Manuel Marulanda 
as FARC’s General Commander. Continuing with this military pressure amidst the 
exploration of peace talks was essential for Santos to protect himself from right-wing 
opposition (Velásquez 2015). The successful targeting of high-ranking guerrilla leaders 
also motivated the government to negotiate as it knew that it could become 
counterproductive because it risked leaving the FARC without the political capacity to 
engage in constructive peace negotiations and would become a fragmented, loose 
army, dispersed in its regional fronts with varying economic interests (Herbolzheimer 
2016). 
Aware of the need to prepare the terrain for eventual negotiations, once in power 
Santos passed on to Congress the bill of the victims’ law that included an explicit 
mention to the armed conflict in Colombia (El Espectador 2011). Passing this law 
supposed as well for the government moving in the direction of recognizing state 
responsibility in human rights violations, particularly in the extrajudicial killings of the 
falsos positivos. Months later, early in 2012 Santos presented in Congress a proposal of 
constitutional reform that came to be known as the Marco Jurídico para la Paz (legal 
framework for peace). This reform – based on the premises that Justicia y Paz had 
already established – sought to enable the government to carry out negotiations with 
illegal armed groups by opening a path for transitional justice and political 
participation of the insurgency (Congreso de la República 2012). Both bills were highly 
criticized by Uribe and ended up sealing the confrontation between the government 
and the ex-president, now organized in a new party formed around his figure, the 
Centro Democrático, which as it will be shown in Chapter 6 played a crucial role in 
effectively putting into question the whole process.   
Another important step in the process of smoothing the peace talks was Santos’ 
reestablishment of relations with neighbor countries, especially with Ecuador and 
Venezuela, which had been severely deteriorated by the end of Uribe’s administration. 
Four days later after he stepped in the Palacio de Nariño, Santos met bilaterally with 
president Chávez and with president Correa and jumpstarted a new phase of 
cooperation with the two countries (Wills Otero and Benito 2012). During his first 
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months in the presidency, Santos made a big effort to position his government in the 
region strengthening diplomatic ties both bilaterally and in regional organizations, 
managing to balance the relations with the neighbors and with the United States. 
Accordingly, Barack Obama’s election in 2009 helped president Santos in having a 
margin of maneuver for the peace talks. Obama’s foreign policy differed significantly 
from Bush’s and had as a central point in its liberal agenda improving human rights 
and binding military actions to international legal standards. Despite being a strong 
ally in the military approach against FARC, Obama’s administration was, even if not 
publicly active initially, supportive from the outset of Santos’ decision to explore a 
political settlement in this new scenario, and its new discourse helped weakening the 
domestic outcry for continuing war.  
When Santos was elected in 2010, the perceived threat that FARC could take over 
the country that was prevalent among the Colombian elite throughout the mid-1990s 
had disappeared. FARC was pushed back to the periphery and its capacity to harm 
had become marginal, even as it continued to have control over entire rural 
populations. As security conditions improved – especially from the perspective of the 
elite in the major urban centers – the economy began to grow again, and the armed 
conflict, although always present, ceased to be a pressing issue in the public agenda. 
Before the public announcement of the formal talks in August 2012, public opinion 
was not, unlike the pre-Caguán context, completely absorbed by the armed conflict 
agenda. Nevertheless, Santos administration had greater political margin than Uribe to 
explore a peace settlement, as there was an important sector of the economic elite 
interested again in putting an end to the conflict through an agreement in order to 
rapidly securing investments in agroindustry and natural resource extraction, that 
wanted to take advantage of the high commodity prices at the time. Especially as these 
elites were conscious that the compromised that had to be made were relatively low 
given the balance of forces. Moreover, as victims became increasingly visible with the 
discussion on the victims’ law there was in the public opinion a greater awareness of 
the human cost of continuing with the armed conflict and of the need of re-establishing 
the rule of law and human rights standards after the abuses that resulted from the 
DSDP’s application on the ground.  
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FARC’s Decision to Negotiate 
In response to the DSDP, FARC adopted the Plan Renacer, a new war strategy that 
enabled it to accommodate to the new scenario and sustain its guerrilla warfare. 
Nonetheless, when Santos arrived to the presidency the members of the Secretariado 
were conscious that with the new balance of forces the opportunity to advance in 
achieving the goal of taking power over through the armed struggle had come to an 
end and started seeking a political way out of the conflict. By 2011, not only key 
members of the Secretariado were dead, thousands of its members had either been 
killed or abandoned the armed struggle, and its political base was reduced to small 
areas where it maintained historical ties with the communities or where it exerted 
control through repressive means. With the Secreatariado’s restructuring, Rodrigo 
Londoño, who assumed FARC’s leadership soon after Alfonso Cano’s death in 
November 2011, showed a pragmatic approach to negotiate with Santos government. 
For FARC, a new peace process was an opportunity to become relevant and legitimate 
political actors again, and stop been seen as terrorists and drug lords.  
In this context, the influence of the Venezuelan and Cuban governments over 
FARC’s leadership was essential in their decision to explore a peace settlement and 
making the transition into a legal political organization. After more than a decade of 
being delegitimized abroad as a terrorist and drug-based organization, FARC lost 
much if not all of its capacity to move outside Colombian jungles. Cuba and Venezuela 
were the only countries where they could be relatively safe, and even so in both cases 
the governments had interests in FARC’s putting an end guerrilla warfare. For the 
Cuban regime, FARC had affected the left’s upsurge in Latin America but also 
justified the increasing US military presence in the region. Since the Caguán process, 
Castro had been highly critical of FARC’s methods, particularly of kidnapping and 
narcotrafficking, and had insisted since then on their need to transform themselves into 
a political movement. For his part, Chávez was also interested in FARC’s decision of 
initiating peace negotiations, as the increasing investigations about the Secretariado’s 
presence in Venezuela and its economic and political ties with high-level military 
officials were affecting his government’s already weak legitimacy. Chávez himself, a 
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FARC member of the Secretariado recognized, played a major role in convincing them 
on embarking into a serious negotiation and provided logistical support during the 
backchannel meetings of 2010 and 2011. 
Besides the pressure of Cuba and Venezuela, another factor that influenced FARC’s 
decision had to do with the political environment in the region since the mid-2000s, as 
various left-wing leaders reached power in Latin America via democratic elections. 
Lula in Brazil, Chávez in Venezuela, Tabare Vásquez and Mujica in Uruguay, Correa 
in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, Ortega in Nicaragua, all of these leaders were a clear 
demonstration that the left could reach the executive power without recurring to the 
armed struggle. In Colombia, on the contrary, the left was far from reaching power, 
and the armed confrontation, and particularly FARC’s strong military operations and 
attacks to civil society, were seen inside certain sectors of the political left as a 
hindrance for a democratic victory. Carlos Gaviria, for example, a left-wing leader that 
achieved the highest voting result in the left’s history in Colombia during the 2006 





With all these factors aligned, FARC and Santos administration began exploring 
alternatives to negotiate and in February 2012 began the formal exploratory meeting in 
Havana. Describing how this meeting took place and, particularly, how it enabled 
introducing the agrarian issue on the table is what I will do in Chapter 5. First, 
however, I examine in the chapter that follows the status quo trajectory in rural 
development policy and how Santos’ government shifted away from it and carry out a 
reformist agenda that informed and then was shaped by the CRR agreed in Havana.
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Chapter 4. Breaking from the Past: Recent Puzzling Change in 
Santos’ Rural Development Policy amid a Persistent Status 





Long-term legacies of rural inequalities often create patterns of policymaking that 
normalize economic privilege and political exclusion, making distributive change 
harder to achieve. The historical context provided in Chapter 3 showed that 
throughout the twentieth century Colombia’s state failed in addressing the rising rural 
gap. The emergence of the peace talks in 2012 including a rural development item in its 
peace agenda raised again the question of whether this new juncture would serve to 
tackle agrarian structural problems. In order to grasp the extent of this opportunity, it is 
fundamental to understand the previous economic and ideational forces at work in the 
current context as well as the change underway at the policy level. This chapter seeks 
precisely to do that by means of examining, on one hand, the status quo trajectory of 
rural development policy in Colombia (the first hypothesized causal factor of the 
conceptual framework) and, on the other, its unexpected disruption by Santos’ 
reformist agenda (a key element of the second causal factor, the peace exceptionality), 
which was further heightened by the CRR reached in Havana. 
Regarding the status quo trajectory, I argue that domestic processes of policy 
capture and weak state capacity must be seen in light of broader global and regional 
forces that either constrain or enhance rural distributive change. The global capitalist 
demand for land and primary commodities as well as the concentration of the agrifood 
system have led the Colombian state to favor large agricultural groups’ pre-existing 
political and economic power, at expense of the peasantry. Similarly, pressure for 
agricultural trade liberalization and reduction of the state’s intervention in agriculture 
have translated into a diminished capacity to provide rural public goods since at least 
the 1990s. This status quo policy orientation was exacerbated during Álvaro Uribe’s 
administration (2002 and 2010), under which highly regressive initiatives were carried 
out.   
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This trajectory, however, was derailed by Santos’ administration (2010-2018), 
which from the outset made clear its interest in developing a progressive agenda, at 
least in terms of providing the peasantry basic access to land and public goods. At one 
level, this rupture with previous regressive measures was facilitated by the policy space 
produced by alternative global and regional norms on food and agriculture, which 
helped defining the terms and parameters for reintroducing in the Colombian public 
debate a distributive rural agenda. At another level, this policy shift was motivated by 
Santos’ reformist vision. Although framed always within the limits of a liberal 
economic perspective, this vision, insofar as it upheld land distribution and a stronger 
intervention of the state in fostering small-scale agriculture, did represent a move away 
from the anti-peasant measures defended by Uribe. The initial reforms advanced by 
Santos, particularly the land restitution policy and the rural development bill, were a 
key antecedent for the discussions in Havana setting the stage for the government’s 
position on the peace agenda, as I will show in Chapter 5. At the same time, once the 
agreement on the rural development item was struck in mid-2013, the vision and 
commitments included in the CRR shaped in important ways Santos’ rural policy, 
although, as I explain in Chapter 6, the adoption and implementation of the 
agreement’s provisions was far more limited than what was expected.  
Going back and forth in time and straddling between policy processes, the 
exceptional circumstances and tools provided by the peace agreement and the political 
dynamics of the implementation, Chapters 4 through 7 – each focusing on a particular 
moment and factor – highlight overall the ambivalent outcome of rural development 
policy during the Santos administration and the partial effect of the window for change 
produced by the transitional context. In this chapter I am interested in describing the 
policy trajectory, its global influences and puzzling disruption.    
The chapter is structured in four sections. The first one describes the global and 
regional forces influencing rural development policy, tracing both the structural 
economic trends and norms that emerged in reaction to them and their effect in 
Colombia. Section two defines the concepts and definitions to analyze empirically 
Uribe and Santos’ rural development policies. Section three and four examine 
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separately each of these administrations’ policy initiatives, surveying specifically three 
policy dimensions: land access, public goods provision and agricultural supports.  
 
4.2 Policy Change in the Global Context: Between Structural Economic 
Restrictions and Favorable Global and Regional Emerging Norms 
 
Situating Colombia’s recent rural development policy in a broader context globally and 
regionally is relevant for understanding the potential for the peace agreement to truly 
enact rural reform. Previous attempts at agrarian reform have failed in Colombia due 
to complex and historically contingent reasons. However, it is important to establish 
whether the fundamental power dynamics governing Colombian economy and society 
have changed enough to allow the peace accord to foster meaningful distributive 
policy. Caution is warranted, given that, as in the past, possibilities of change are 
bound by political and economic restrictions defined by previous long-standing 
structures. Unlike the past, however, today these structures – even if still primarily 
domestically determined – are increasingly entangled with and dependent on global 
and regional forces, actors and norms. In this context of global entanglement, 
distributive rural change is even harder to see, as global dynamics tend to reinforce 
entrenched national interests bolstering higher inequality and policy capture. 
Undoubtedly, the peace accord represents a landmark attempt to address Colombia’s 
longstanding agrarian problems, not least because it has taken advantage of a global 
context of favorable norms on land distribution and supports to family agriculture. Yet, 
the remarkable resilience of elites amid globalization may impede bringing about 
significant agrarian policy change and maintain it within its status quo trajectory. 
On one hand, globalization alters the way domestic policy change is studied due to 
what global governance scholars identify as a growing governance complexity that has 
at least three dimensions (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014; Rosenau 2006; Ruggie 2004).  
First, the “thickening web of governance” across subnational, national and 
transnational scales, which requires examining rural development policy as determined 
by multiple, overlapping domains of authority, and not by a single national political 
authority (Cerny 2010; Lake 2010; Slaughter 2004; Latham 2001).  Second, the 
increasing “diffusion of power” along various material and ideational axes, which 
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points to the need to account for both interests and norms in policy reform rather than 
one sole source of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005).  Thirdly, the gradual 
intermingling of state and nonstate actors – such as NGOs, social movements, 
businesses, multilateral bodies – in policy processes that leads to viewing policy as 
determined not by a single force (e.g. Executive government) but rather by various 
public and private, transnational and domestic actors that compete and cooperate with 
each other in pursuing their own agendas and goals (Conway 2011; Koppell 2010; 
Büthe and Mattli 2011; Clapp and Fuchs 2009). Now, even in this “polycentric 
governance” context, the sovereign state remains the most relevant unit in the overall 
global political structure. Its long historical “resilience” and “weak evolutionary 
stability” as an institutional form (Krasner 2001) has shifted the discussion away from 
whether the state is or is not in retreat and towards a more productive analysis on the 
interaction between multiple spheres of (public and private) authority (Rosenau 2006). 
In the case of rural development policy change in Colombia, I focus on the national 
government as the main locus of authority responsible for enacting statements, 
decisions and measures related to this policy, but always in relation to direct and 
indirect pressures exerted by other actors, which have to do with both structural forces 
and global norms. 
 
Structural Economic Trends Impact the Government’s Policy Space 
A first type of pressure is the structural one exerted by global and regional economic 
forces (Strange 1996). While global capitalism has shifted in the last decades towards 
increasingly digitally-based, highly financialized accumulation processes (Castells 
2009; Peterson 2003), competition and conflict over natural resources and 
commodities in specific territories has never been as stark as today (Clapp and 
Helleiner 2012; Cotula 2012). Emergent phenomena like the “global land rush”, the 
transformation of rural landscapes into extensive biofuel crops, and the 
internationalization and corporatization of the food value chain (Margulis, McKeon, 
and Borras 2013) have a direct impact on rural areas, domestic agrifood systems and 
the way central governments make decisions about them (Arndt and Kierkowski, 
quoted in Dauvergne and Lister 2012). 
90 
In Latin America, the long commodity boom that started in the early 2000s has led 
the region’s economies, including Colombia’s, to a re-primarization of their 
development models (León Rodríguez 2012). Mainly based on China’s appetite for oil 
and food, this commodity boom has drawn national and foreign investors alike into 
rural areas, who have in turn demanded the state for clearer rules and procedures for 
capitalist expansion. Traditional landed elites linked to activities like cattle ranching 
are now joined by an agribusiness and energy elite composed of domestic and 
transnational firms in lobbying the state for favorable policies. Governments, 
increasingly dependent on the revenues of these extractive activities for their own 
functioning, are structurally constrained in their capacity to move away from these 
elites’ agenda (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017b, pp. 433-435; Strange 1996; Clapp and 
Fuchs 2009). Whether it is a decision on what to do with available state land or the 
environmental impact of a large energy project, governments tend to privilege elites’ 
interests over those of local communities, disregarding existing norms or ideological 
commitments. These decisions end up reinforcing the elites’ preexisting political and 
economic power. 
In reaction to the revaluation of land and agricultural commodities as world class 
assets (Clapp and Helleiner 2012; Clapp, Isakson, and Visser 2016), there are 
indications of a renewed land concentration in various Latin American countries. 
Legal provisions introduced early in the twentieth century to prevent unproductive 
land concentration, such as the “social function” clause or the maximum farm size 
clause (“agricultural family units”), are being contested through new regulations, as 
large-scale projects require vast tracts of land to be able to expand their investments. 
Monocrops like soybean, sugar cane and palm oil more than doubled throughout the 
region in the mid-2000s. According to the FAO statistics, between 2000 and 2016, the 
number of soy hectares increased in South America from 24 million to 58 million; 
sugar cane jumped from 5 million hectares to 11 million in 2016; and palm oil from 
378,000 hectares to 838,000 (FAO Stat 2018). Besides the deleterious environmental 
effects of these crops, the massive growth of agribusiness in these countries leads to a 
concentration of commodity chains, both downstream and upstream, and thus to a 
great lobbying power in policymaking. As they take over key activities and gain 
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commanding positions in the value chain, governments pay more attention to these 
giant firms, supporting them via different types of subsidized credits or market 
protection. 
While agribusiness achieves not only greater market but also policy space, family 
agriculture, on the other hand, with less ability to compete and less state support, is 
further marginalized from the commodity chain and undergoes an intense process of 
internal differentiation  (Webber 2017; Lapegna 2017). Some small farmers either 
completely move out to urban areas into other economic activities or actively pursue 
nonfarm livelihoods to supplement their falling agricultural income (Dirven 2011; 
Weller 2016). Others remain in agriculture as their main economic activity, but in a 
very precarious situation often accepting unequal partnerships or deals with large 
agribusiness firms to be able to stay afloat in the market. Only a small percentage of 
them is able to improve its position in the market and sustain its production beyond 
subsistence levels, becoming leading entrepreneurs in their own communities buying 
adjacent land or employing less successful neighbors. The effect, again, is one of an 
increasing asymmetry between agribusiness and family agriculture in voicing its own 
demands in government (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017a). As government institutions 
and policies reflect only certain types of demands, they stabilize and normalize 
“political legacies of concrete historical struggles” into measures, procedures and ways 
of functioning that have distributional effects and increasing returns to power (Vergara-
Camus and Kay 2017a). 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, even in countries where ambitious progressive rural 
development policies have been put in place at the national level, allocating direct 
supports to family agriculture and revamping state efforts to distribute land to peasants, 
these policies have not been effective enough in improving small-farmers autonomy 
and their own position within the market (Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017b, pp. 415-
417). Besides the concentration of the agrifood chain, this marginal impact of recent 
government intervention is associated with two ongoing global processes since the 
mid-1980s: agricultural trade liberalization and state reduction. Agricultural trade 
liberalization in Latin America, as in most developing regions, must be understood as 
part of the larger process of structural adjustment that most countries in the region had 
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to adopt after the 1982 debt crisis. This meant a profound transformation of the 
development model, from import-substitution industrialization to neoliberalism, which 
went beyond deregulation of international trade flows (Haggard and Kaufman 1992). 
It encompassed as well a wide set of monetary and fiscal policies aimed at balancing 
public finances. One of the key premises behind the opening of the Latin American 
economies was the reduction of government intervention so that economic agents 
could follow market-price signals. 
In agriculture, eliminating distortions of relative prices implied dismantling state 
agencies directly involved in the production, processing, storing, distribution and 
consumption of agricultural crops, like the National Company of Popular Subsistence 
(CONASUPO) in Mexico or the National Institute for Agricultural Marketing 
(IDEMA) in Colombia, both shut down in the mid-1990s (Appendini 2014). The 
alignment of agricultural policy with overall market reforms, also meant reorienting 
new public programs towards supporting farmers considered to have a commercial and 
competitive potential in open market conditions. Recent efforts to bring the state back 
into rural development policy face a scenario of weak institutions not fully capable of 
supporting a distinct pathway of rural development. In the course of deregulation, 
private firms (importers, processors, distributors) filled the gap left by the state and 
erected a new governance regime. Given that firm concentration and vertical 
integration are so strong now, it is difficult for new policies to break from these existing 
arrangements. Far from being politically neutral, market reforms thus had a significant 
“distributive effect”, as Snyder (2001) points out in the case of Mexico, affecting the 
“political equilibria” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). The vacuum left by the 
withdrawal of the state from key regulatory activities, mostly benefited large-scale 
traders and processors. In this new market-oriented scenario, big firms translated their 
“corporate power” (Clapp and Fuchs 2009) to influence key policy areas vacated by 
the old state-based regime setting rules and regulations according to their own interests 
and affecting negatively the public interests (Ellis 2009). 
 
Colombia’s Status Quo Trajectory 
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In Colombia, in line with these regional trends, three broad tendencies characterize the 
development of agricultural policy in the period 1990-2010. First, agricultural policy 
lost its relative importance vis-à-vis the overall public expenditure, and the contribution 
of agriculture to total growth fell. Even though total public expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP increased from 16.1 percent in 1990 to 28.4 percent in 2009, agricultural public 
expenditure dropped from an average of 0.67 percent of GDP during 1990-1996 to 
close to 0.27 percent during 2000-2009 (UNDP 2011, pp. 315-316). This fall in 
agricultural expenditure, often associated with the loss of agriculture’s share in GDP, 
declined faster than the activity’s output, as the Index of Agricultural Orientation 
(IAO) shows.28 While in 1990 the IAO was 0.22, in 2009 was 0.09 (UNDP 2011, p. 
316). 
Secondly, agricultural policy during this period was further captured by elite 
interest groups – mainly the gremios, or agricultural business associations – that tilted 
the allocation of resources towards private subsidies and away from investment in 
public goods (UNDP 2011). Agricultural policy capture is not new in Colombia. 
LeGrand (1986), Bagley (1979) and Hartlyn (1981), for example, have analyzed how 
agrarian reform was obstructed in the 1930s and 1960s by the two big agricultural 
business associations, the Colombian Agricultural Society (SAC) and the National 
Federation of Cattle Ranchers (Fedegán) and tilted policy in their favor. These 
associations gained prominence in the first half of the twentieth century as Colombia’s 
economy became dependent on export-oriented crops and also gave significant space 
to extensive cattle-ranching. While the peasantry also became organized in national 
associations like the National Association of Peasants (ANUC) that was very strong in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s (Zamosc 1986), the Ministry of Agriculture sustained a 
constant communication with and a preference towards the gremios (Gutiérrez 2015). 
By the 1990s, with trade liberalization underway, there was a profound change in 
agricultural policy and a reorganization of the sector. The dismantling of various price 
supports and tariff quotas affected all crops (Jaramillo 2010), pushing the gremios to 
organize themselves better and become more aligned to the open-market scenario. 
                                                 
28 The IAO measures the extent to which agricultural public expenditure corresponds to the share of 
agriculture in total GDP, where 1 equals a perfect correspondence between the two ratios.  
94 
After the initial shock of liberalization, the palm oil, flowers, banana, coffee and sugar 
cane sectors were able to adapt to this new scenario and become leading activities with 
strong state support during the Gaviria (1990-1994) and Samper (1994-1998) 
administrations (Cuéllar Benavides Forthcoming). Meanwhile, small farmers involved 
in short-cycle crops lost relevance in both production and the policy agenda. The 
OECD’s recent review of Colombia’s agricultural policy (2015) details precisely how 
Colombia’s overall support to the agricultural sector was highly skewed against 
collective services and small farmers, instead privileging direct supports that are 
primarily directed towards the large-scale farmers. For the period 1999-2007, in 
average only less than 8.4 percent of total supports were allocated to general services 
while Market Price Supports – the most regressive of supports as it is based on 
commodity output – concentrated on average  85 percent of them (p. 198).29 
A third interrelated feature highlighted by the UNDP is that the sector’s public 
institutions were significantly reduced in this period (see Appendix 3). Whereas in 
1990 the sector had 17 agencies responsible for a wide range of planning, execution 
and monitoring tasks, including substantial specialized rural development agencies, by 
2010 only 8 of them remained. This shrinking of the sector resulted out of various 
reforms carried out throughout the 1990s and early 2000s aimed at reducing public 
spending, which unsurprisingly affected the scope, breadth and effectiveness of 
agricultural policies on the ground, particularly those dealing with peasant supports, 
and reinforced its corporativist character as budget allocation and execution became 
increasingly concentrated in the Ministry of Agriculture and thus more prone to elite 
lobbying and capture (UNDP 2011, pp.310-312).  
 
Rise of Alternative Global and Regional Norms on Rural Development 
                                                 
29 The OECD’s analysis of Colombia’s agricultural policy is based on the Total Support Estimate (TSE), 
an indicator expressed as a percentage of GDP that measures the cost of the support of agricultural 
support. The TSE, in turn, is disaggregated into three broad types of indicators: the Producer Support 
Estimate (PSE), the Consumer Support Estimate (CSE) and the General Services Support Estimate 
(GSSE). The PSE is mostly driven by market price supports (MPS) that include trade measures such as 
import tariffs, import quotas, tariff quotas and export subsidies, among others. The GSSE, for its part, 
indicates government expenditures to finance activities that provide general services, such as the 
agricultural knowledge and innovation system, inspection and control services, development and 
maintenance of infrastructure, etc. (OECD 2015, pp. 194-197). 
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Besides structural economic pressures, the emergence of global and regional norms 
around agriculture, food and rural development overall also played a crucial role in 
shaping the Colombian government and policymakers’ values, beliefs and ideas in the 
context of the peace talks. In reaction to the negative effects of trade liberalization, 
large-scale farmland acquisitions, growing corporation concentration in the 
international food industry, norms on environmental sustainability, food sovereignty 
and land justice rose on the agenda of and gained influence in global food governance 
in recent decades (Clapp, Desmarais, and Margulis 2015; Clapp 2017). These emerging 
norms contested the existing “transnational policy paradigm” (Best 2012) on 
agricultural trade, which had become the dominant norm in the global economy since 
the adoption of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Clapp 
2017, p. 337). Despite the global structural trends and the status quo policy trajectory, 
these emergent norms have helped opening policy space in countries like Colombia to 
favor a distributive agenda based on land access, family agriculture supports and 
provision of rural public goods. 
 
Norms Promoting Land Access 
After it had been proclaimed dead, since the mid-2000s land reform emerged again 
into global governance debates. With the advent of neoliberal policies in the 1980s, 
land reform policies, especially those informed by a strong role of the state in fostering 
land redistribution via administrative measures, were marginalized from the agenda of 
international development institutions and states. This “fall from grace” of 
redistributive land reform, as Borras (2005) calls it, occurred “despite the persistence of 
land monopolies and land reform on the political agendas of peasant movements” (p. 
91). This recent reemergence of calls for land reform has been partly due to the global 
land grab and to continued concerns on the persistence of rural poverty in the 
developing world.  
Transnational social movements have resisted processes of further accumulation by 
dispossession through various legal and political venues, including La Vía Campesina’s 
Declaration of Rights of Peasants. In it, the peasant global movement affirms the “right 
to land and territory” (La Vía Campesina 2009). Similarly, transnational NGOs have 
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called for an explicit “human right to land”, understood as the right to access land for 
food security, housing and cultural value (Künnemann and Monsalve Suárez 2013). 
Moreover, multilateral organizations like the World Bank, the FAO and UNDP have 
also centered their attention back on land access and land rights. Using a human rights 
perspective, for example, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food developed 
in 2009 claims around the non-commercial dimension of land, linking it to the 
protection of indigenous peoples and their ways of life, but also to fundamental rights 
like the right to food and the right to water (Cotula 2013, p. 1617). In 2012, the FAO, 
for its part, approved the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure 
of Land, Fisheries and Forests. These guidelines resulted of a negotiation with a high 
level of participation of civil society organizations and social movements, and an 
important step in the recognition of the rights of marginalized peoples, especially in 
terms of land and natural resource control and tenure rights (Brent et al. 2016).  
In addition, land reform has also gained attention in multilateral institutions which 
have recognized the importance of land access in overcoming rural poverty amid a 
food crisis context. In 2006, for example, the UNDP supported the International 
Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, which was held in Porto 
Alegre and centered its discussions on rural poverty reduction strategies wherein land 
access was crucial (Borras, Kay, and Akram-Lodhi 2007). 
In Colombia, these emerging global norms on land governance, especially those 
defined in terms of the human rights framework, were highly influential in constructing 
the legal and political discourse around land restitution, which also drew heavily from 
norms on transitional justice (McKay, Rodriguez, and Fajardo 2016). As Chapter 5 
describes, land restitution policy played a key role in serving as basis for introducing 
the rural development issue into the public agenda and into the peace negotiations. 
 
Family Agriculture Becomes Popular and the State Comes Back in 
Alongside the emerging norms on land governance, the food and environmental crises 
during the 2000s also gave rise to global norms around the need to support family 
agriculture in the developing world and to bring the state back in rural development 
policy. The World Bank, for example, in its thirtieth annual World Development Report 
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of 2008, which is dedicated to agriculture, highlighted the importance that family 
agriculture had for poverty reduction, economic growth, environmental sustainability 
and food security, particularly in countries with a high percentage of their poor living 
in rural areas (Clapp 2009; World Bank 2007). Almost a year later, the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development’s 
(IAASTD) published its report, Agriculture at a Crossroads (2009), which resulted from a 
multi-stakeholder panel to address issues such as hunger, poverty and environmental 
challenges. The report emphasized the need to tackle inequities against smallholding 
farmers in developing countries and to support their technological innovations. At the 
same time, the UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, the 
High-Level Conference on World Food Security, the G8 Summit and the OECD, 
issued policy statements recommending, among other things, strengthening public 
agricultural investment and state institutions geared towards the countryside (Clapp 
2009). 
In Latin America, these norms were primarily adopted and led by Brazil, as the PT 
government developed a robust federal-led family agriculture program, linking land 
distribution with financial supports, technical assistance, market access and 
consumption. This program was legally established by Decree 1946 of 1996, during 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, and institutionally was carried out by the 
Ministry of Agrarian Development, a ministry created in 2000 separate from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, traditionally biased in favor of agribusiness. Brazil’s family 
agriculture program was endorsed by MERCOSUR and adopted as well in countries 
like Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. With the support of the FAO, it became a 
regional norm that expanded through Andean and Central American countries as well, 
influencing domestic rural development policies. These massive programs were carried 
out during a period in which the BRICS where expanding globally and adopting new 
forms of state developmentalism and regional governance (Mittelman 2013; Riggirozzi 
2012), public investment in rural development became widely accepted again. It is in 
this global and regional context – in which experts and international organizations 
were putting pressure to address structural rural problems – in which the Colombian 
98 
government conceived as legitimate and desirable fostering rural development and 
including this issue as part of the negotiating agenda.  
 
Global economic trends and norms affect in a contradictory, uneven way, and 
through various actors, processes and mechanisms, how national governments make 
decisions on rural development policy at particular junctures. Policy decisions in 
Colombia thus have to be framed and understood in this broader global and regional 
context of multiple forces and contestations.    
 
4.3 Moving from the Macro Trends to the Policy Change Perspective 
 
Global political economy literature is highly relevant to capture the broad tendencies 
just described. Yet, it is not sufficiently specific to grapple with domestic-level 
processes associated with policy change from one government to another. In this sense, 
I now shift the attention to a policy analysis in order to examine the evolution of rural 
development policy between Uribe and Santos drawing analytical tools from the policy 
change literature. 
The broad features of Colombia’s agricultural policy – fall of agricultural spending, 
emphasis on private rather public supports and deterioration of rural public institutions 
– highlight the status quo trajectory it followed since the 1990s. However, I do not 
intend doing here a sectoral comprehensive assessment. Such a task is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, as there are numerous agencies and policy instruments comprising 
agricultural policy. Ranging from the tariffs used to protect certain products from 
import competition to the labor training to improve human capital’s formation in rural 
areas, agricultural policy is quite broad. Each of these instruments constitutes in itself a 
complex policy environment with multiple sources of change. Evaluations like the 
ones given by UNDP (2011), OECD (2015) or the Commission for the Countryside’s 
Transformation (2015) are oriented towards this broad examination of the entire 
agricultural policy framework. My focus lies rather on understanding whether there 
has been a shift in the directionality of rural development policy – which is part of 
agricultural policy – during Santos government. In other words, and drawing from 
Hong, Kwon and Kim’s (2018) discussion on the need to determine the direction of 
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social policy change, I aim to examine Santos’ rural development policy orientation. 
Howlett and Cashore (2009, p. 41) precisely point out the importance of studying a 
policy’s directionality to distinguish between types of changes. Centering the attention 
on it helps in determining if the changes observed during Santos administration are 
either regressive or progressive. A regressive change represents a fluctuation within the 
existing status quo policy equilibrium. A progressive or distributive one indicates instead 
a move away from the existing equilibrium toward another qualitatively distinct, 
favoring a more equitable allocation of resources and privileging the poorer sectors of 
agricultural producers and rural dwellers.  
 
Policy Issues and Dimensions 
I examine three issues out of a broad universe of policy issues that signpost what a 
distributive rural development policy may look like: land access to the rural poor, 
agricultural supports to peasants and public goods provision. Depending on how it is 
defined, rural development policy may be seen as comprised by a broader set of issues, 
such as environmental, social, trade and macroeconomic ones. However, the issues 
selected are useful to focus the analysis on those aspects of policy that best indicate any 
change in its directionality, as these are the ones affecting the rural poor directly. 
By land access, I understand the state allocation of land and land property rights to 
small peasants and landless rural workers. This allocation may take the form of a land 
transfer of a plot acquired or recovered by the state, a legal recognition of a previous 
occupation of state land or a handover of a land violently dispossessed. In other words, 
land access may occur via either distribution, formalization or restitution. For the 
purposes of this analysis, I am not considering here the allocation of collective land 
and collective rights to ethnic minorities – indigenous and afro – that has its own rules 
and procedures based on the 1991 Constitution (and Law 70 of 1993 for the collective 
territories of Afro-Colombians). By agricultural supports, I am referring to state-funded 
services directly allocated to small farmers to assist them in their agricultural 
production process, including financing, technical assistance, association and 
marketing services. In Colombia other actors different than the central government 
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may also provide some of these services.30 However, as my interest is examining the 
central government policy’s directionality I exclude from the analysis all these other 
actors. 
Finally, I define agricultural public good provisions in rural areas as central government 
spending geared towards investment on tertiary roads, irrigation systems, agricultural 
research and innovation, agricultural information systems and agriculture inspection 
services. I leave aside public investments in other rural public goods, such as housing 
and water, health, education, and digital infrastructure that are also essential for 
improving rural dwellers’ well-being for two reasons. The first is that after the 
administrative decentralization law was passed in 1989, local authorities are the ones 
legally responsible for providing many of these social services (especially water sewage, 
health and education), so the central government, even if it does have some programs 
to benefit the most marginal rural areas where local authorities have a very small 
revenue, does not usually include these issues as part of its rural development budget, 
with the exception of rural housing that since the 2000s has become a national policy. 
The second reason is that I am mainly focusing on public goods oriented towards 
supporting agricultural production, as they have a direct impact on small farmers’ 
income.   
Besides identifying and defining the above policy issues, in order to better specify 
the type of analysis I am doing, it is also relevant to make explicit the policy 
dimensions I am accounting for and how. As policy change scholars Hong, Kwon and 
Kim (2018) point out, policy analyses like the ones carried on Colombia by UNDP 
(2011) and OECD (2015) have great empirical descriptions and information, but are 
not theoretically self-reflective of the kind of assessment they are undertaking. They 
often focus almost exclusively on budget allocation and institutional framework 
leaving aside goals and beneficiaries. Carrying out a systematic empirical discussion 
                                                 
30 Agricultural business associations, for instance, use part of the levy they collect from the producers for 
technical assistance – the most known example of these services is the one given by the National Coffee 
Federation that since the 1960s developed a very robust rural extension service geared towards its 
associates. Regional and local governments also often fund agricultural support services. Big provinces 
like Antioquia, Cundinamarca and Valle del Cauca have set up their own regional schemes to provide 
technical assistance and marketing supports to small farmers. Private foundations and international 
cooperation agencies, for their part, usually have projects on the ground that comprise both financing 
and technical assistance. 
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thus requires a clear definition of the dimensions covered and the way these are 
operationalized. According to Hall’s (1993) famous distinction between abstract and 
concrete policy decisions, policy may change in at least three different levels of 
“orders”. “First order” changes take place when there are calibrations of policy 
instruments within the existing institutional confine. “Second order” changes occur 
when there are alterations to the policy instruments within an existing policy regime. 
“Third order” or “paradigmatic” changes allude to an overall shift of policy goals 
derived from an exogenous shock that leads to a new equilibrium, whereas first- and 
second-order changes are incremental but do not alter the existing policy regime. Yet, 
according to Howlett and Cashore (2009, p. 39) since Hall’s work was first published, 
more recent empirical and conceptual research has led to some refinements of this 
initial categorization, especially in terms of clarifying how to differentiate “incremental 
change” from “paradigmatic”. Although incremental change is often associated with 
marginal change and paradigmatic change treated as atypical and unstable, there may 
occasions in which incremental changes is cumulative and thus lead to a paradigmatic 
change, depending on its directionality.      
In this regard, adapting Howlett and Cashore’s (2009, p. 39) policy taxonomy 
components, for each of the three issues above I examine three distinct policy 
dimensions: content, outputs and outcomes. Policy content, following Zittoun (2009), 
refers to the broader ends or aims of policy and may be studied through the discourse 
that policy actors themselves put forward (“policy statements”) regarding the goals, 
objectives, strategies, settings and target groups. Data on these policy statements may 
come from either direct declarations made by policy actors (e.g. ;Minister of 
Agriculture, the President) or institutional documents in which these policy goals and 
objectives are laid out (e.g., National Development Plan or the annual report of the 
Ministry of Agriculture to Congress). Outputs, for their part, as Bauer and Knill (2014) 
define it, have to do with policy means or tools expressed in both administrative (e.g., 
institutional arrangements, policy instruments) and legislative (e.g., bills issued) 
measures. As Hong, Kwon and Kim (2018, p. 4) indicate, even if legislative and 
administrative data may partially overlap, for measuring purposes it is important to 
treat them separately, as the former is more related to policy reform in the intentions of 
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the legislator while the latter is directly connected to actual implementation. Outcomes, 
finally, indicate the direct consequences of policy on citizens measured through the 
effective goods or services delivered, as well by the public expenditure allocated. For 
the various policy instruments and issues studied there is data publicly available at the 
National Planning Office and the Ministry of Agriculture detailing annual progress in 
delivery and expenditures. I do not include an analysis of impacts as these have to do 
with the overall effect of policy actions, such as the reduction of poverty, and need a 
longer timespan to be properly assessed, although the impact evaluations carried out by 
the National Planning Office on specific policy instruments (e.g. Agro Ingreso Seguro) 
are also considered. Paying attention to these different dimensions allows not only 
distinguishing between the various policy elements that can undergo change, but also 
on the interactions between them. 
With these definitions in mind, in what follows I provide an analysis of Uribe’s 
rural development policy to highlight its regressive character, which will be useful to 
compare with Santos’ progressive policies. 
 
 
4.4 Uribe’s Regressive Policy 
 
Álvaro Uribe’s administrations (2002-2006 and 2006-2010) reinforced the status quo of 
agricultural policy. During his administration, there was no change in the 
directionality of rural policy, but actually a heightening of its regressive character and 
its anti-peasant bias (Chapter 7 provides a description of the political and economic 
sectors supporting him). Amid the global demand for agricultural commodities and the 
pressures for increasing large-scale commercial farms that I described in the previous 
section, the agricultural development model that informed Uribe’s policy considered it 
was more efficient to spend public funds supporting large agricultural farms than small-
scale farmers. It claimed that while the latter needed social assistance to get out of 
poverty, the former had the sufficient economies of scale to improve their own 
competitiveness and thus bolster economic growth and employment (Personal 
communication Former Advisor of Ministry of Agriculture, September 22, 2017 ). The 
emphasis of agricultural policy was hence on agricultural supports towards big 
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landowners and agribusiness. Land access, agricultural services and provision of public 
goods benefiting small-scale farmers significantly decreased. The 2003 institutional 
sector reform largely reflected these priorities, further deepening the trend of 
dismantling the sector’s public institutions that had started in the 1990s. The reform 
replaced various rural development agencies for a single one that lacked the resources 
and capacity to deal with the multiple problems and demands of small farmers and 
poor rural dwellers across the country. Beyond the model itself, in practice the 
allocation of regressive subsidies to particular rich individuals and firms reflected 
Uribe’s political and economic alliances with big landowners, who felt represented by 
his right-wing political project. By contrast, his government stigmatized rural social 
movements and repressed protestors, while not sanctioning the violent dispossession of 
land by paramilitary groups. A brief description of each of the policy issues illustrates 
the kind of regressive rural development policy Uribe followed.  
 
Land Access 
Reyes (2009) and Richani (2013, Ch. 2) argue that with the rise of paramilitary groups 
and drug lords in the mid-1980s, there was a re-concentration of land that pushed back 
the slight progress made decades before in land distribution. During Uribe’s 
government, some of this land violently dispossessed – which amounted in total to at 
least 5.5 million hectares according to a Follow-Up Commission Report (2009, p. 11) – 
was legalized by entrepreneurs with state support and used for consolidating large scale 
agricultural projects (Grajales 2011; Thomson 2011; Gutiérrez Sanín 2014; Vargas and 
Uribe 2017). Leaving aside the highly controversial legal debate on the business firms 
that were either directly linked to paramilitary groups or took advantage of the fragile 
property rights context to acquire land cheaply,31 the point I want to make is that the 
                                                 
31 Various national and transnational agribusiness groups have been condemned for having links with 
paramilitary groups. In 2007, Chiquita Brands, a US banana-exporting company, was fined US$25 
million by the US Justice Department for making monthly payments to paramilitary groups in the 
Urabá region for over six years (Colectivo José Alvear Restrepo 2008). In December 2016, the 
Colombian Constitutional Court ordered the Latin American businessman Germán Efromovich, owner 
among others of Avianca Airlines, to give back 2.000 hectares of land in South Cesar to peasant 
communities that in 1996 were displaced from their farms by paramilitary groups. This land was later 
acquired in 2008 at a low price by Efromovich who argued that was not aware of the previous violent 
dispossession (Semana 2016 a; Verdad Abierta 2016a). 
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policy orientation was not only of complete disregard towards land distribution, but 
also lacked any condemnation of land dispossession. As I show in Chapter 7, the rural 
elites that benefited from the violent appropriation of land and were supportive or 
sympathetic to Uribe’s policy were one of the major actors opposing land restitution 
and the peace talks’ commitments on land distribution. 
The Rural Development Bill passed by the government to Congress in August  
2006 and approved by it in 2007 (Congreso de la República 2007) included a provision 
(article 157) that allowed registering a title deed after five years of land occupation 
without any measure to guarantee the legality of occupation, thus opening a window 
for legalizing land violently dispossessed (Grajales 2011; Comisión Colombiana de 
Juristas 2006). It also included other provisions aimed at transferring state land to 
agribusiness firms interested in developing large-scale investments. In its statement of 
reasons, the government argued that the bill’s intention was to “adapt the countryside 
to the new realities of the national and global economy”, which required a “renewed 
impulse of entrepreneurial development”, and the privileging of “agribusiness 
competitiveness and profitability” (Congreso de la República 2007). Due to its various 
unconstitutional provisions and strong civil society pressure against it, the Bill was 
later rejected by the Constitutional Court (Semana 2009). Nonetheless, with it Uribe’s 




While Uribe’s government reduced the amount of rural development agencies, it 
significantly increased the poverty and social assistance agencies at the central 
government. Rural poor and peasants were primarily treated as passive beneficiaries in 
need of cash payments, rather than as producers capable of generating their own 
income through agricultural production if given the sufficient supports (García Trujillo 
2009). Expenditure on public technical assistance decreased, and rural extension 
services were privatized without state regulation or support. Marketing supports to 
small-scale farmers were not developed, and even though financing increased in this 
period through the Banco Agrario – the bank created in 1999 with public funds after the 
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sector’s reform to give loans to agricultural producers – it increased its benefits to 
medium- and large-scale farmers. The Bank’s loans for small producers decreased from 
86 percent in 2002 to 66 percent in 2010 (Finagro and Misión para la Transformación 
del Campo 2014). The Ministry of Agriculture did implement during this period a 
couple of programs geared towards rural development, such as PADEMER and 
Alianzas Productivas. Yet, these initiatives were primarily funded by an external loan 
with the World Bank, and their scale was very small (FIDA 2007; Econometria 
Consultores 2006). 
The biggest and most renowned agricultural program of this period was Agro, 
Ingreso Seguro (AIS), which had been approved in 2007 by law 1133 as a support 
mechanism to compensate and prepare producers for the fierce external competition 
they would face with the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States 
that same year. This program, with an annual budget of $US250 million, established as 
its key objectives to improve producers’ competitiveness through capitalization, 
technology and irrigation infrastructure. However, it ended up benefiting mainly large-
scale agriculture and intermediaries. In 2009, it came under fire due to misallocation of 
resources towards wealthy farmers that led to the resignation and legal prosecution of 
Uribe’s minister of agriculture (Argüello and Valderrama-González 2015). The impact 
evaluation carried out on this program showed that directing public resources mainly 
to private subsidies did not translate into better competitiveness indicators 
(Econometría 2011). It concluded as well that the small amounts allocated to general 
public services, especially technical assistance, had a large effect in improving 
producers’ agricultural income.  
Another key example of the type of agricultural policy developed by Uribe was the 
subsidy scheme that provided price and market supports to large agribusiness. This 
scheme was especially relevant to develop the palm-oil sector, a sector predominantly 
comprised by medium- and large-scale farmers due to its high set-up costs. Starting 
from 138,457 hectares in 1997, by 2009 palm oil cultivation had increased to 360,537, 
representing an increase of 160 percent (Maher 2014). By that year, Colombia had 
become the fifth largest producer in the world (behind Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Nigeria) and the largest in Latin America. Promoted through the National Policy 
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of Biofuels issued in 2008 and Law 939 of 2006, supports to the palm oil sector 
included measures such as tax-exemptions, direct supports, price stabilization 
mechanisms and the creation of a blend mandate to include a percentage of biodiesel 
in gasoline (CONPES 2008; Congreso de la República 2004). In tax exemptions alone, 
palm oil producers received in 2011 a support that amounted to more than 200 
thousand million Colombian pesos (USD 100 million), a value that surpassed by five 
times spending on subsidies for poor peasants and displaced families in 2010 (García 
Romero and Calderón Etter 2012; Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2010a). 
 
 
Provision of Public Goods 
The biggest development regarding the provision of agricultural public goods during 
Uribe’s government had to do with the replacement in 2003 of the existing rural 
development agencies responsible for this provision with the Instituto Colombiano para el 
Desarrollo Rural (INCODER), a single national rural development agency that assumed 
all the tasks these other organizations previously had. Justified on the basis of 
efficiency, this reform would supposedly improve the sector’s delivery as one single 
agency was better than multiple and relatively autonomous institutions at coordinating 
the execution of the various programs and policy instruments. In practice, however, as 
the UNDP (2011) points out, the INCODER left many issues behind and never had 
enough resources to deal in a serious way with the diverse and complex demands of 
small-scale agricultural producers and rural dwellers. Public spending in rural 
development fell sharply and with it the attention to the rural poor from an agricultural 
production perspective. The share of rural development programs in the total budget 
decreased from an average of 46 percent between 1990 and 1998, to 12 percent 
between 2003 and 2010, and public expenditure on agricultural research only 
amounted to 3 percent of total agricultural expenditure (UNDP 2011). Resources 
allocated to irrigation projects increased significantly during this period. However, 
these were either geared towards large-scale firms or individuals as part of AIS or 
towards large-scale projects that even if they included small farmers as beneficiaries 
they were mostly for medium- and large-size farms, and due to their lack of 
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environmental sustainability ended up being questioned by the media and civil society 
organizations (Fajardo 2014). 
Interestingly, a parallel policy development took place at the end of Uribe’s period, 
associated with the emergence of the Programa de Consolidación, which as I describe in 
detail in the next chapter, was created in the Ministry of Defense as part of the security 
and coca crop substitution policy. As a way of building trust with rural communities 
that had been living for decades in FARC-controlled areas, this program sought to 
complement military operations with rural public goods provision and supports to 
family agriculture at a regional level. In the southeast region of La Macarena, it 
invested heavily on tertiary roads, schools and technical assistance. Although it was 
mainly funded and operated by USAID and was administratively separate from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, it established the basis for future government-funded rural 
development programs during Santos government linked to sate- and peacebuilding.  
As the previous description showed, Uribe’s administration pushed forward a status 
quo policy agenda benefiting primarily landowners and agribusiness in detriment of the 
peasantry. As I will show in Chapter 7, these actors perceived that the rural 
development provisions laid out in the peace agreement put at risk their interests and 
highly opposed it since its it began. Now, I move on to compare it Santos’ policy to see 
what changed and why.  
 
 
4.5 Ambivalent Policy Change in Santos’ Government 
 
In June 2010, Santos was elected president as the heir of Uribe. It was widely expected 
that he would continue not only his predecessor’s security policy, but also the 
economic path set forth by him. His Bogotá-elite family background, well-known 
commitment to free-market ideas and close ties with the country’s large economic 
groups were reasons to believe that he would continue with the promotion of foreign 
direct investment and state supports to large-scale businesses. The National 
Development Plan issued in 2011 effectively translated this status quo economic 
outlook into policy priorities, defining as the main source of growth the oil and mining 
sector (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2011). Throughout his administration, 
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this outlook persisted over time. The international financial community hailed his 
macroeconomic orthodoxy. Foreign direct investment grew from an average of 8.1 
USD million between 2006 and 2010 to an average of 14.5 USD million between 2011 
and 2016, and tax reforms did not affect the wealthy (Presidencia de la República 
2017a). In agriculture, as Colombia’s eastern plains became seen as one of the last 
agricultural frontiers available in the region (Dinero 2011), Santos fostered as well 
large-scale investments imitating the agricultural development of El Cerrado region in 
Brazil. After various failed attempts, as I describe in Chapter 6, in January 2016 he 
achieved passing a law in Congress that conceded vast tracts of state land to large-scale 
agribusiness projects (Congreso de la República 2016a). Up until this point, it is the 
same status quo story of the last decades. Interestingly though, at least within the rural 
development policy area, Santos began to adopt as well early on in his government a 
pro-poor distributive agenda, at odds with the neoliberal one. This reformist agenda 
opened the way for and shaped the content of the inclusion of a rural development 
item in the exploratory meeting in Havana, as I describe in Chapter 5. 
This new and unexpected policy agenda was not a revolutionary overhaul of the 
system. Yet, by the standards of long-standing regressive policy and, particularly, of 
Uribe’s measures, the reforms did represent a significant shift. With the appointment of 
Juan Camilo Restrepo, an old-school politician who championed land distribution and 
agricultural supports to the peasantry, as minister of agriculture in August 2010, Santos 
set the stage of this policy shift. Restrepo, a public figure who had been a fierce critic of 
Uribe’s administration and who would become in 2016 Santos’ chief negotiator for the 
peace talks with the ELN, rapidly developed a policy agenda that clearly differed from 
the previous government in significant ways. Although belonging to the political 
establishment – as an old member of the Conservative Party, who had been among 
other things minister of finance of Pastrana – Restrepo was nonetheless sensitive to the 
problems of the countryside and of the need to use state resources to support family 
agriculture. He reflected a liberal reformismo agrario that was very present in the 
Colombian establishment during the 1930s and the 1960s that conceived land 
distribution and productivity as part of a modernizing project linked to development 
and growth. Bringing into the ministry renowned experts in rural development with no 
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political ties, he drastically changed the policy course of the ministry, paying attention 
to the problems of violent land dispossession and land informality, scarce rural public 
goods provision and poor living conditions of rural dwellers (Official of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development 2015). 
Santos’ also demonstrated this shift by leading the land restitution initiative in 
Congress that became a core part of the Victims’ Law approved in 2011. Over time, 
and once the Havana peace talks was underway, previously irrelevant issues like land 
access, rural development with a territorial approach, family agriculture’s livelihoods 
and the right to food, among others, became a central part of the government’s 
discourse. A distinct set of policy goals, institutions and budget priorities pointed to a 
change in the policy’s directionality, now more focused on distribution (see Appendix 
4). These measures drew heavily from the UNDP’s 2011 Human Development Report, 
the 2015 Mission for the Transformation of the Countryside and the 2015 OECD 
Agricultural Policy Review, that were key sectoral roadmaps that outlined substantial 
recommendations. The reformist path adopted by Santos and minister Restrepo ended 
up heavily influencing the discussions in Havana of the rural development item and 
shaping the agreement on the Comprehensive Rural Reform reached in May 2013, as I 
show in Chapter 5. As the former High Commissioner for Peace expressed, Santos’ 
reformist commitment occurred before the peace talks, thus it was essential in 
facilitating the negotiations (Personal communication Former High Commissioner for 
Peace, August 8, 2018). At the same time, the CRR provide the government with a 
more ambitious framework and specific goals to advance in this reformist path. Yet, by 
2018 it was clear that this reform was – due to various political constrains I show in 
Chapter 6 – far more limited than what by 2011 was signaled by the government itself 
as a structural rural reform (Indepaz 2011). Still, overall, it is important to note that 
whereas Uribe invested 2.2 USD billion in rural development between 2003 and 2010, 
representing 59 percent of the sector’s total investment budget, Santos more than 
doubled this figure, allocating almost 4.5 USD billion between 2011 and 2017, that is, 
77 percent of the total investment budget (see Table 4.1). This huge increase in rural 
development reflected Santos’ priorities and policy orientation.  
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Table 4.1. Rural Development Policy Budget in Uribe and Santos’ Administrations 
In millions of USD (constant COP of 2003) 
  Uribe (2003-2010) Santos (2011-2017) 
  Total Average Total Average 
Land access 19,5 2,4 291,8 41,7 
Agricultural supports 704,3 88,0 2.467,9 352,6 
Public goods 584,8 73,1 679,0 97,0 
Total Rural Development 1.308,6 163,6 3.438,7 491,2 
Total Sectoral investment 2.211,8 276,5 4.494,8 642,1 
% of Rural development in 
Total Sectoral Investment 59,16% 66,0% 76,50% 76,8% 
Source: Author's construction based on Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
Note: Investments on fishing, rural housing, forest, or those geared towards 
large-scale farmers were excluded from the analysis. 
 
Land Access 
A big shift in Santos government policy discourse was emphasizing land rights for the 
peasantry. This emphasis included, primarily, giving back land to those who had been 
violently dispossessed of it. Yet, it also meant scaling up land titling and land 
distribution. The policy’s privileged target group was no longer, at least in discourse, 
traditional landowners, highly favored in Uribe’s government, but peasants – especially 
those victims of the armed conflict. Even if in practice large agribusiness remained an 
influential actor in policymaking, the fact that smallholders became prominent in the 
government’s narrative indicates a reformist undertone of Santos’ policy. His three-
pronged approach to land access (restitution, distribution and titling), introduced by 
minister Restrepo in the preface to the Rural Development Bill drafted in 2012 (p. 9), 
was associated with Carlos Lleras Restrepo’s agrarian reform of the 1960s (Verdad 
Abierta 2016b). Indeed, Santos himself, as well as his agricultural cabinet, dedicated 
considerable attention and time to the land question. Between 2010 and 2018, the 
government pushed forward new bills, institutions and policy instruments to make this 
commitment tangible, in addition to allocating further resources. The yearly budget on 
land access increased from an average of 2.4 USD million in Uribe’s government to 
41.7 USD million. At the end of Santos administration, however, results were more 
meagre than expected and the agribusiness agenda was still in place. Perhaps the 
comparison to Lleras Restrepo was exaggerated. Santos never intended to drastically 
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expropriate land from large landowners or turn himself into a defender of La Vía 
Campesina’s proposals on allocating all land to peasants and promoting food 
sovereignty. Right from the outset, he saw, from a liberal standpoint, land property 
rights and well-being in the countryside as a pre-requisite for economic growth and 
peace. Still, putting peasant land rights back in the policy agenda constituted a change 
in and of itself, a goal that was taken to a different level with the CRR agreed in 
Havana. 
Early on, land restitution became a top priority for Santos. He attended himself to 
the congressional debates of the Victims’ Law and made a statement in June 2011 
when Congress approved the bill with a land restitution chapter (Indepaz 2011). Based 
on the law, the government developed the institutional framework required for 
implementing the land restitution policy, including the Land Restitution Agency. 
During 2012 and 2013, it allocated significant resources deploying the Agency’s 
personnel across regions and creating the procedures to receive peasant’s restitution 
claims. As the law divided the restitution process into an administrative and a judicial 
phase, the government concentrated its efforts, first, examining whether the claims 
were eligible and, secondly, supporting the peasants in preparing their legal cases 
before submitting them to the courts. By March of 2018, after six years since its 
creation, the Land Restitution Agency had supported 85,505 claims and of these 3,666 
had already a favorable sentence (Unidad de Restitución de Tierras 2018). 
Besides restitution, land titling received a lot of attention from the Santos’ 
government. Based on the assessment that land informality – estimated by the National 
Planning Office in 59 percent (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2014) – inhibited 
development and facilitated violent land dispossession, the government sought to 
tackle the issue considering two types of formalization. One associated with state land 
previously occupied by peasants that had not either received the government’s 
resolution or been registered, and another related with private land that was not 
registered due, for example, to transaction costs of registering a land inherited by the 
children within a poor peasant family. The government translated this policy priority 
into various policy instruments and legal provisions. In 2012, the Ministry of 
Agriculture created the Land Formalization Program that developed a new 
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methodology and procedure to formalize land titles that moved away from the 
demand-based system to a regional-based approach. Drawing from the results of this 
program, legal provisions on land titling were included in the 2012 Rural Development 
Bill draft. Even though this draft at the end did not make it to Congress, it provided the 
conceptual and legal basis for future measures. In the National Development Plan of 
2014, the government, following the recommendations of the Mission for the 
Transformation of the Countryside on carrying out a comprehensive policy for the 
social structuring of rural property, included a goal on land titling as well as measures 
to adopt the regional-based approach (Misión para la Transformación del Campo 
2015). Moreover, in 2015, based on the CRR’s framework and provisions, the National 
Land Agency was created and its organizational structure included a Direction for the 
Management of Land Property that had as a mandate to operate through the regional-
based approach (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2015a). Finally, in May 
2017, the government issued Decree Law 902 as part of the laws that implemented the 
peace agreement, and which included a whole procedure to make land titling more 
effective. By the end of 2017, the National Land Agency formalized 44,930 land titles 
that corresponded to 145,000 hectares (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2018a).   
 The government’s comprehensive view on land access reintroduced into the policy 
agenda the issue of land distribution as well, after it had been politically marginalized 
for a long time. Since Law 160 of 1994 adopted market-oriented mechanisms to land 
reform, the view that the state had a role in providing land to landless peasants – 
prevalent during the 1960s and early 1970s – lost traction (Fajardo, Darío 2002; Lahiff, 
Borras, and Kay 2007). Some attention was placed in responding to the land claims 
made by indigenous groups, but land distribution to peasants received few resources or 
administrative energy. An important step taken by Santos in this regard consisted in 
making use again of agrarian legal procedures to recover state land from illegal or 
ineligible tenants. In the Rural Development Bill Draft, minister Restrepo sought to 
include provisions to speed up these procedures that would eventually lead to 
redistribution of land to peasants. In April 2012, Santos appointed Miriam Villegas, a 
progressive executive who had worked closely with peasant organizations, as director 
of the INCODER. During her administration, she moved forward various cases of 
113 
administrative land seizure and recovery of state land that were lagging behind. Yet, 
she only lasted a year in her post, because, as I explain in Chapter 6, her aggressive 
stance on recovering ill-obtained state land and unexploited farms was not welcomed 
by the agribusiness sector. Nonetheless, the commitments made in Havana on land 
distribution, related with a creation of a land fund, a land subsidy and a land 
purchasing credit line, led the government to setting up the National Land Agency and 
the drafting of Decree Law 902. Although, as I show in Chapter 6, not much progress 
was made in terms of concrete outcomes, the Santos government laid out the legal and 
institutional framework for a renewed role of the state in land distribution.    
The government’s comprehensive land policy included addressing land use issues as 
well. Based on the CRR, the government pushed for the creation of a specific 
jurisdiction within the judiciary system aimed at dealing with land tenancy and use 
conflicts from an agrarian law perspective. Whereas the last attempt of establishing 
agrarian courts had failed in the late 1980s, Santos led the discussions of it in Havana 
and then the drafting of a bill that in early 2018 was still being discussed. A public 
debate emerged on the benefits of such a jurisdiction, especially in terms of improving 
peasants’ access to justice (Abril Bonilla 2018). Moreover, the government developed 
through its National Planning Office a policy for carrying out a Multi-Purpose Land 
Cadaster (CONPES 2016a), an issue that was also included in the CRR and is essential 
for planning, registration and taxing purposes. Additionally, several land use conflict 
resolution mechanisms that became part of the CRR were developed at the national 
and local levels, like the National Council for the Use of Rural Land, created in 
December of 2015 and the Local Dialogue Procedure. 
 
Agricultural Supports 
Recognizing the role of the peasantry in rural development was another item that set 
Santos’ policy apart from Uribe’s. During Uribe’s administration, Juan Camilo 
Restrepo had been a public critic of the AIS Program. His objection to it was not only 
in terms of the illegal use of the program’s funds to support landowners that had 
politically supported Uribe’s campaign, but also because of the status quo agricultural 
development model the program was framed in. Once he became appointed as 
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minister, Restrepo completely redesigned the program (renaming it Rural 
Development with Equality Program, DRE for its initials in Spanish). Based on the 
emerging global and regional norms on rural development, he moved it away from the 
provision of direct subsidies to large-scale farms and agricultural firms to the provision 
of public goods provision (mostly irrigation infrastructure) and services for small- and 
medium-scale farms (credit and technical assistance). By 2012, the $USD 250 million 
budget of the program had been completely reallocated to bolster small farmers’ 
productivity and growth. Yet, once Restrepo left the ministry in 2014, the program was 
shut down by the subsequent ministers – such lack of continuity within Santos’ 
government itself will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
As part of this renewed attention to support small farmers, during Santos 
government the technical assistance and rural extension services were institutionally 
and legally strengthened. In 2012, the Ministry of Agriculture issued its technical 
assistance policy framing this support as a public service that should be provided at the 
municipal level with national oversight and financial muscle, have universal coverage 
and be free of charge for the peasantry (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 
2012a). This service became so relevant in the government’s agricultural policy that the 
goal in the National Development Plan was to pass from 644,500 producers receiving 
technical assistance in 2014 to 3,031,247 producers – although in practice by the end of 
2017 only 797,766 producers had received this service, that is, a 26 percent progress 
from the goal traced (Sinergia DNP 2018). In 2017, based on the results of this policy, 
the Rural Development Bill Draft and the commitments made in Havana, the 
government passed in congress the law for the creation of the National Agricultural 
Innovation System. This law established that this system would be composed of three 
interrelated subsystems, one of rural extension one, another of training and education 
and a third of research and innovation. 
As part of the DRE Program, the government targeted its preferential loans to 
finance small-farmers’ agricultural investments. As a result, between 2012 and 2017 
total agricultural loans to small farmers increased from 236,482 to 273,076 loans, 
which in value meant an increase from 1.6 billion pesos to 3.4 billion (Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2018). The institutional organization of the agricultural 
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credit system was not modified – its framework had been defined by Law 16 of 1990 – 
but the existing instruments were effectively refocused to benefit the peasantry. Other 
existing programs aimed supporting small-scale farmers were further boosted. 
Productive Partnerships (Alianzas Productivas), for example, a program created in 2002 
with a World Bank loan to support the funding and marketing of small-scale 
agricultural enterprises by linking them with larger firms in the value chain, received 
public funds from the Ministry of Agriculture. This additional public funding served to 
expand the program’s scope from 2,979 beneficiaries to 6,367 between 2010 and 2014 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2018).  
Even though many of these programs were further reinforced, they did not end up 
representing a significant amount of the sector’s budget. Total agricultural supports 
indeed increased threefold from 704 USD million during Uribe’s period to 2.47 USD 
billion in Santos administration. However, much of Santos’ agricultural supports 
budget was destined, on one hand, to overcome the coffee producers’ productivity 
crisis of 2013, as the government used over 600 USD million to finance the coffee 
variety replacement and maintain the coffee price for over a year (Steiner, Salazar, and 
Becerra 2015). On the other hand, this budget also served to finance the projects that 
resulted out of the deals that the government brokered with the peasant organizations 
that led the agrarian strikes in 2013 and 2014. In this sense, rather than reflecting an 
overall coherent policy strategy, these resources responded to particular demands as a 
way to terminate the road blockages carried out as part of the strike (Corredor 2016). 
Another important development with regards to agricultural supports is that the 
Santos’ government, influenced as mentioned in the previous section by emerging 
regional norms on the need to support family agriculture promoted by the Brazilian 
government, MERCOSUR and the FAO, began to adopt a policy strategy and 
measures on it.32 In 2014, in response to the commitments made in Havana, the 
                                                 
32 The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development signed an agreement on technical cooperation 
with the Brazilian government that included as one of key issues the support in developing a family 
agriculture policy. In June 2015, MERCOSUR, with the support of the IICA, FIDA and PBA, a local 
technological innovation NGO, organized an event in Bogotá on family agriculture public policies that 
served as a space for discussion with the national government and peasant organizations on how to 
develop a family agriculture policy in Colombia (Gómez Muñoz 2015). In this event that I attended to 
as representative of the OHCP, the Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development mentioned that 
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Ministry of Agriculture developed a roadmap to draft a family agriculture program 
together with the main national peasant organizations (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Desarrollo Rural 2014). Eventually, this roadmap fell through but it nonetheless served 
as a basis for the sector policy documents on the issue (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Desarrollo Rural 2017a, 2017b) and for the 2017 Resolution on Family Agriculture 
(Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2017c), which were also drafted as an 
institutional response to the commitments made in the Havana peace talks to support 
the peasantry. Along these lines, an important institutional reform within the Ministry 
of Agriculture was the creation of the Vice-ministry for Rural Development (before it 
was only a Direction), which elevated the political relevance of rural development 
programs. 
Finally, another set of instruments adopted in relation to agricultural supports had 
to do with the coca crop substitution program, created in early 2017 as part of the 
implementation of the peace agreement. Even though it depended on the Post-conflict 
Presidential Office and not on the Ministry of Agriculture, it was aimed at providing 
direct supports to small farmers involved in the coca crops that committed themselves 
to move away from them and adopt other livelihoods. Focused on the municipalities 
with the highest coca crop areas, this program received a significant portion of the 
budget geared towards supporting rural development projects – by February 2018 it 
had spent over 200 USD million (Alta Consejería Presidencial para el Posconflicto 
2018). 
 
Provision of Public Goods 
Whereas Uribe dismantled the institutions geared to the provision of rural public goods 
and services, Santos created new ones. The rationale behind the creation of the three 
new agencies (Land National Agency, the Rural Development Agency and the Agency 
for the Renovation of the Territory) was the need to strengthen the state’s authority 
and increase public investment in rural areas, particularly those most affected by 
conflict. Small farmers’ productivity and well-being required thus a basic set of goods 
                                                 
MERCOSUR’s and Brazil’s recommendations on family agriculture were at the time being studied 
carefully in order to adopt them in the Colombian policymaking context. 
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and services provided by the state and particularly by the national government in 
coordination with regional and local authorities. 
Early on in his period as minister, Juan Camilo Restrepo began shifting the policy’s 
orientation from one of private subsidies to one of public goods. From his perspective, 
the most effective public investments were the ones geared towards general or 
collective goods and services like irrigation infrastructure, tertiary roads and 
agricultural research and technical assistance, as these would benefit regional 
agricultural projects on a whole, rather than individual producers (Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2013). Through the DRE Program, between 2012 and 
2014, the government funded the construction or restoration of small-scale irrigation 
projects. However, as already mentioned, the scheme developed by the DRE was 
interrupted in 2015 and not much progress was made on irrigation afterwards. Yet, the 
creation of the UPRA as a planning office represented a progress for the government as 
through it a national assessment of the existing irrigation systems was carried out in 
2016 (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2016), as well as a proposal for 
modifying the existing legal framework (El Espectador 2017a). 
Along with irrigation infrastructure, the improvement of tertiary roads was the 
other crucial investment that Restrepo called for to boost rural development and 
agricultural producers’ income and well-being. According to a paper he co-authored 
after leaving the Ministry, investing in tertiary roads increases the output of crops like 
tomato, onion and potato, which are predominantly produced by small farmers 
(Lozano-Espitia and Restrepo-Salazar 2016). Improving these roads meant in other 
words making the public investment with the highest social return. During Santos’ 
government, the Ministry of Transport and INVIAS, the agency at the national level 
responsible for investing in tertiary roads (although regional and municipal authorities 
also have a constitutional obligation to do so) invested over 1.6 USD billion in 
maintaining 39,930 kilometers of tertiary roads (Ministerio de Transporte 2017). In this 
period, the government also drafted a national policy for tertiary roads structuring a 
long-term financial and institutional strategy to maintain tertiary roads (CONPES 
2016b).      
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Besides infrastructure, Restrepo also emphasized the need to strengthen the 
national agricultural research system, the national agriculture inspection services and 
the price information system, considered to be three crucial public services that would 
benefit especially small-scale farmers. During this period, CORPOICA, the national 
agency in charge of agricultural research, was institutionally and financially 
strengthened to become the leader of the processes of agricultural technological 
innovation based on a network-system with global, national, and local researchers and 
producers of various crops and livestock  (Restrepo Ibiza 2014). National inspection 
services led by the ICA also received more government attention. ICA began to 
support producers, especially the small-scale farmers, in adapting their productive 
processes to the national and international standards. Between 2010 and 2017, the 
budget of the ICA increased from 57 thousand million pesos in 2010 to 174 thousand 
million (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2018b). 
During Santos period not much progress was made on marketing policy – after the 
IDEMA, the national marketing agency was shut down in 1997 there has not been any 
comprehensive policy around this issue. Although the Ministry did include some 
provisions on it in the Rural Development Bill Draft, the bill never went to Congress. 
Some of these provisions, like those signaling the need to link public procurement with 
family agriculture production in a similar vein to Brazil, were adopted in the 
Comprehensive Rural Reform, but in practice had not been developed. At the practical 
level, the only marketing instrument that was put into effect was Celu Agronet, a real 
time price information system set up as a service for agricultural producers to provide 
daily market prices through their cell phones in order to improve their decision-making 
and bargain power with intermediaries. By 2017, Celu Agronet reached 636.968 
producers (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2017d).    
Another important policy shift during this period was how the government began to 
plan its interventions having as a unit of analysis not the rural household or the farm 
but rather a whole region or territory with the premise that these type of public 
investments are more effective and inclusive in promoting rural development. This 
regional or territorial focus (enfoque territorial) of rural development was inspired by 
previous interventions like the EU-funded Programas de Paz y Desarrollo. In fact, the 
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National Planning Office adopted it in its policy documents on rural development 
(PDRIET) and pilot project in Southern Tolima. It was also included in the Havana 
Peace Talks, as the Rural Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET, for 
its initials in Spanish) became a key component of the Comprehensive Rural Reform 
agreed. Moreover, it informed the sectoral reform that the government did in 2015, as 
the organizational structure and processes of the two rural development agencies 
created, the ADR and the ART, responded to a territorial approach. In the case of the 
ADR, its technical assistance, marketing and infrastructure services had to be planned 
on the basis of a territorial development project (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo 
Rural 2015b). The ART, for its part, in charge of coordinating the PDET in conflict-
ridden areas was designed in a way that enabled bringing together the results of local 
participative processes and the sectoral programs in a regional action plan. By early 
2018, these type of interventions were only starting, but the institutional design and 




In this chapter I examined Colombia’s status quo policy trajectory, the first factor of 
my conceptual framework, and how it was disrupted in an unexpected way by Santos’ 
reformist policy initiatives. Drawing on global political economy literature, the chapter 
analyzed the global economic trends that exerted structural pressures in domestic 
policymaking reinforcing the already existing policy capture by agribusiness sectors. At 
the same time, it showed how in reaction to these economic trends, social movements 
and international organizations promoted alternative emerging norms on land access, 
environmental sustainability, food sovereignty and supports of family agriculture. 
These emerging norms have also come into play in the domestic context providing 
policy space for an alternative rural development agenda in the context of the peace 
talks.  
The chapter also reviewed the rural development policies of Uribe and Santos’ 
governments. This comparison showed how Uribe’s highly regressive and anti-peasant 
policy orientation reinforced the status quo trajectory. In Chapters 6 and 7, I come 
back to this long-standing trajectory in order to show how key actors that had benefited 
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from this regressive policy orientation (in particular agribusiness and cattle-ranchers) 
mobilized (inside and outside the government) against any shift away from the status 
quo. In the previous description, I showed how in Santos administration rural 
development policy experienced an unexpected change towards a distributive 
orientation. I supported this assertion with the evidence on budget allocated, the 
institutional arrangements carried out and instruments created in this period to foster 
land access, family agriculture supports and rural public goods. The evidence also 
illustrated, however, that the changes in policy were not as strong as announced by the 
government. This ambiguity is what it is interesting to tease out. Santos’ initial 
reformism gained thrust at the Havana peace talks, but then it faced serious obstacles 
from within the government itself and outside of it. In what follows, I explore how the 
transitional context actually gave rise to an agreement on rural development that 
helped moving forward this policy shift. 
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Chapter 5. A Window Opens: The Havana Peace Talks and 





On October 18, 2012, the parties installed the Negotiating Table in Oslo. That day 
Colombian public opinion watched how the leaders of both negotiating parties 
delivered a speech in which they announced the peace dialogue that was about to begin  
– and that would last four years until the Final Agreement was reached in November 
2016. Both of them, each from their point of view, made explicit allusions to rural 
development highlighting its importance within the overall peacebuilding agenda. For 
Humberto de La Calle, the government’s chief negotiator, the aim of the negotiations 
was, at once, putting an end to the armed confrontation and defining a roadmap to 
carry out in a peacebuilding phase the socioeconomic transformations the country had 
postponed for decades in order to overcome rural inequality (Gobierno de Colombia 
2012). For Iván Márquez, FARC’s chief negotiator, the issue of agrarian development 
was a fundamental piece of the negotiations as land dispossession was at the heart of 
the armed struggle they began more than fifty years ago (FARC-EP 2012). Less than 
one year after these statements, the negotiating table would agree on the 
“Comprehensive Rural Reform” (Reforma Rural Integral, hereafter CRR), the first of 
five substantive agreements.  
Chapter 3 described the changes in the political context that led to the peace talks. 
Chapter 4 examined the status quo policy trajectory and the puzzling changes it 
experienced towards a distributive orientation during Santos’ government. In this 
chapter, I develop the second causal factor of my framework (peace exceptionality), 
which goes in another direction of the first one. According to it, while Santos’ initial 
reforms played an important role in establishing a new policy course, the policy’s 
distributive orientation was actually deepened in the context of the exceptional 
circumstances offered by the peace negotiations. In other words, I argue that the 
Havana peace talks (and in particular the CRR) were definitive in furthering Santos’ 
reformist vision and the government’s adoption of pro-poor measures on land access, 
122 
public goods and family agriculture supports. The effect of the peace talks on policy 
change occurred through two hypothetical causal mechanisms. One was the inclusion 
of the rural development item in the peace talks’ agenda. The other was the drafting of 
robust commitments in the agreement itself.  
I explore, in turn, the role of these first causal mechanisms in two ways. First, by 
describing the exceptional features of the exploratory meeting, its structure and 
decision-making procedures, which were instrumental to facilitate the parties reaching 
a substantive document. Second and most importantly, by viewing the inclusion of the 
rural development item into the negotiating agenda as the result of a normative link the 
parties made before and during the exploratory meeting between rural development 
and peace. This linkage, referred to as securitization, was essential in persuading key 
decision-makers in both delegations, especially in the government, to decide on 
including this substantive provision on the negotiating agenda. Drawing on Hall 
(1989), I trace the ideational origins of this normative linkage, but also the institutional 
and political environments that made it feasible.   
 Regarding the second causal mechanism, I argue that the CRR agreement’s 
robustness was crucial to influence the government’s rural development policy towards 
a more distributive orientation. I disaggregate this robustness in terms of its 
comprehensiveness and specificity. 
 
5.2 The Introduction of the Rural Development Item in the Negotiating 
Agenda  
 
The political context described in Chapter 3 provided a conducive environment for the 
emergence of the peace talks. Once the parties were exploring what to include in the 
negotiations, a window of opportunity opened to discuss measures on rural 
development.33 Previous peace processes in Colombia had already offered 
opportunities to address the unresolved “agrarian question”. In fact, the rural 
development item was included in the agendas of the three previous attempts to reach 
                                                 
33 For Kingdon (1995), policy windows are “opportunities for action on given initiatives [that] present 
themselves and stay open only for short periods”. Policy windows, he explains, open either because of a 
political change (e.g. a shift in administration or in congress) or because a new problem captures the 
attention of government. 
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a peace settlement with the FARC: La Uribe in 1984, Caracas and Tlaxcala in 1991 
and 1992 and San Vicente del Caguán in 1998. Therefore, the introduction of the 
agrarian issue in the Havana agenda is by no means surprising. Agrarian reform, as 
seen in Chapter 3, has been at the heart of FARC’s revolutionary program since its 
origins in 1964. Moreover, the relationship between armed and agrarian conflicts 
(Gutiérrez Sanín 2015) has become evident in periods following peace settlements.34 
Right after the National Front Agreement in 1956, land titling to small and medium 
tenants living in public lands (baldíos) increased significantly, as a means of improving 
conditions in the countryside and thus of stabilizing the territories most affected by La 
Violencia. In the 1980s, during the negotiation process with other guerrilla groups, the 
government adopted a number of provisions geared towards improving access to land, 
especially in zones most affected by the armed confrontation (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica 2016). Likewise, in countries with high rural inequality levels that 
experienced a negotiated transition, such as Guatemala, El Salvador, South Africa and 
the Philippines, peace talks also opened a window to introduce measures to tackle such 
inequality and address historically neglected rural problems (Wood 2010; Borras 2007; 
Brett 2013; Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon, and Brink 2009). The question then is 
not why the window opened but how, under what circumstances and in what ways it was 
effectively exploited by key actors. Answering this question is relevant because the way 
the issue was addressed in the agenda ended up defining the scope and parameters of 
the item in the negotiation. It is hence an initial step for understanding how and to 
what extent the Comprehensive Rural Reform affected the course of rural development 
policy. 
The concrete mechanism through which this opening materialized in Havana was 
the “General Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting 
Peace” (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2012), signed by government and FARC 
delegates on August 26, 2012 as a result of a six-month exploratory meeting. During 
this preparatory phase of the negotiation, both parties sought to identify the other’s 
                                                 
34 Fort the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2016), “[…] 
[t]he common thread of Colombian agrarian history has been a dialectical relationship between agrarian 
conflicts, violence, peace agreements and attempts to solve the agrarian problem, the latter expressed 
mainly in the inequitable distribution of land and the poverty rates of the rural population” (97).  
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actual willingness to carry out a serious dialogue and reach a final agreement. 
Summing up the outcome of this meeting, the General Agreement – a major 
innovation compared with previous peace negotiations in Colombia – contained the 
blueprint of how the talks were going to develop, laying out the objectives, 
methodology and agenda, as well as the role of civil society and of the international 
community (Herbolzheimer 2016). An important lesson drawn from failed peace talks 
with FARC was the need to develop, prior to the actual negotiations, a framework 
establishing the rules of the game and the agenda that would guide the formal talks in 
order to guarantee concrete results in a relatively short period. In the Caguán process, 
for example, the themes to be covered were so broad that negotiations turned into 
long-lasting discussions about structural problems of Colombian society, which went 
nowhere.35 The General Agreement served thus to properly define the scope and reach 
of the negotiations in Havana. 
On the agenda that is part of the General Agreement, the parties put forward the 
consensus reached during the exploratory meeting regarding what to include and what 
not to include as issues of the negotiation, achieving a middle ground between a 
substantive and a minimalist focus towards peacemaking. In its final version, this 
agenda contained six issues: (1) comprehensive agrarian development policy, (2) 
political participation, (3) end of conflict, (4) solution to the problem of illicit drugs, (5) 
victims, and (6) implementation, verification and endorsement. Each of these issues 
was further developed into headings and subheadings conceived as the building blocks 
of what four years later became the Final Agreement. The way to address each of these 
issues was subject of intense discussions. Both parties knew that the agenda had the 
power to create the political space and parameters to approach the issue at the 
negotiating table and to determine its reception in Colombia, both by FARC’s rank-
and-file members and by the public opinion more broadly. Setting up a peace roadmap 
                                                 
35 The agenda, defined in May 1999, covered 12 issues and 48 sub-issues. These included human rights, 
agrarian policy (the distribution of lands bought with drug money and the substitution of illicit crops), 
natural resources, the revision of the economic and social development model, reform of the Justice 
system and the states, accords on International Humanitarian Law, the redefinition of the peace-time 
role of the armed forces, and international agreements and the democratic mechanisms legitimizing 
these. For an analysis on this and previous processes between government and FARC, see (González 
Posso 2004) and Pizarro (2016). 
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from a blank slate, the General Agreement was crucial in opening the policy window 
for each of the substantive issues included as part of the agenda.  
The inclusion of the issue of “comprehensive agrarian development policy” in the 
General Agreement as the first item on the agenda, allowed rural development to gain 
public attention and policy relevance once again in the country. The issue contained a 
brief introduction stating that “comprehensive agrarian development is determinant to 
promote the integration of regions and an equality-based social and economic 
development of the country” (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2012).36 Following it, 
six subheadings were laid out:  
1. Access and use of land. Unproductive lands. Formalization of property. Agricultural frontier and 
protection of reserve zones. 
2. Development programs with territorial approach. 
3. Infrastructure and land adequacy. 
4. Social development: Health, education, housing, poverty eradication. 
5. Stimuli to agricultural production and the solidary and cooperative economy. Subsidies. Credit. 
Income generation. Commercialization. Labor formalization.  
6. System of food security. 
 
How did these subheadings develop during the exploratory meeting? What were each 
parties’ initial views on the issue? How were they able to agree on it? I argue that the 
inclusion of this issue in the agenda in such a way had to do with the structures and 
procedures of the exploratory meeting itself, especially because it permitted direct 
negotiation and effective decision-making. Secondly, it had to with the normative 
linkage between rural development and peace.  
 
Effective Delegation, Decision-Making and Method 
Three previously failed negotiations followed by ten years of mistrust and full-on 
military confrontation made any agreement between government and FARC seem 
hardly probable. When both parties met for the first time in February 23, 2012 in 
Havana to commence the exploratory meeting, there was a high level of uncertainty 
about whether this new effort would lead to a concrete result (Personal communication 
Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, August 25, 2017). 
There are features of the exploratory meeting that help explain how the delegations 
were able to draft, against all odds, the General Agreement. These are: (1) the 
                                                 
36 All the quotes of the General Agreement that are presented here were directly translated by me.  
126 
delegations’ authority to advance on an agenda that was facilitated by the personal 
overseeing of the process by President Santos and ‘Timoleón Jiménez’, FARC’s 
general commander; (2) the reserved and unmediated nature of the dialogue; and (3) 
the methodology developed by the parties to jointly draft the text. 
Beyond the fact that, as expected, President Santos and Timoleón Jiménez 
entrusted people of their highest esteem and personal confidence for the exploratory 
meeting, they provided their teams with the sufficient mandate and authority to reach a 
common ground.37 In the case of the government, it is worth noting that this 
presidential mandate is based constitutionally on the “right to peace” that confers the 
executive power with special powers to carry out negotiations with illegal armed 
groups.38 For its part, FARC’s Secretariado imparted clear instructions and sufficient 
powers to the people assigned to Havana (Personal communication Member of 
FARC's Leadership September 18, 2017) . Both delegations thus had ample space 
during the exploratory meeting to decide on crucial aspects, such as the issues 
contained in the agenda, without having to put them to public scrutiny (or in FARC’s 
case, to internal consultation with their rank-and-file membership). This “exceptional” 
space is created in political democratic systems only under very special circumstances 
like a peace settlement. What is important to point out here is the relative autonomy 
and exceptional decision-making power given to the delegations at the exploratory 
meeting in order to reach an agreement, a crucial feature that was maintained during 
the public phase of the Negotiating Table. 
The direct oversight of the talks by both president Santos and Jiménez further 
reinforced effective decision-making of each delegation at the exploratory meeting 
(Personal communication Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Peace, August 25, 2017). Even if they were not physically present in Havana, each 
                                                 
37 The government’s team was integrated by Alejandro Eder, Frank Pearl, Enrique Santos, Sergio 
Jaramillo, Lucía Jaramillo and Jaime Avendaño; FARC’s team was integrated by Mauricio Jaramillo, 
Ricardo Téllez, Andrés París, Sandra Marulanda and Marcos Calarcá.  
38 Article 22 of the Constitution establishes that “peace is a right and a duty of obligatory fulfilment”. 
Developing this constitutional norm, Law 418 of 1997 establishes various measures to facilitate dialogue 
and subscribe agreements with illegal armed groups including the provision according to which the 
authorized representatives of the government may carry out talks with illegal armed groups in order to 
find solutions to end the armed conflict (article 7). Article 10 determines that the direction of the peace 
process corresponds exclusively to the President, as responsible of public order. Those who on behalf of 
the government participate in peace talks will do it according to the instructions imparted by him.  
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leader had a constant and fluid communication with his team and the final word 
regarding any strategic decision that needed to be taken by the parties. In the case of 
the government, for example, every recess during the exploratory meeting saw the 
team travel back to Bogotá to meet with the president and discuss for however long 
necessary the roadmap and decisions ahead (Personal communication Former Advisor 
of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, August 25, 2017). Such micro-
management of the process also guaranteed that the negotiating team had the sufficient 
political orientation and support, a lesson learned from the Peace Commission set up 
by president Betancur in 1982, which despite its ambitious goals, lacked a direct 
channel of communication with the president and a clear institutional mandate 
(Ramírez and Restrepo 1988).  
A second feature of the exploratory meeting that was relevant for its success had to 
do with its unmediated and reserved character. Even though Cuba and Norway were 
selected by the parties as guarantor countries, the talks were carried out directly 
between government and FARC delegates, which entailed serious difficulties in 
building trust but also proved to be critical in the drafting of the General Agreement. 
The onset of the talks themselves and the definition of the agenda during the 
exploratory meeting were therefore not the by-product of third parties’ influence and 
pressure to jump-start conversations – according to some analysts, this was the case in 
the Caguán’s failed process (Richani 2013, 170-178) – but rather the result of the 
parties’ own initiative and willingness to dialogue. Moreover, the fact that these initial 
discussions to define the agenda took place behind closed doors and remained 
confidential until the General Agreement was publicly announced facilitated reaching 
solutions and a common ground acceptable to both delegations. Confidentiality 
provided the parties with political space to bridge positions that otherwise would have 
been very difficult to attain. If the conversations had been public right from the outset, 
both parties would have suffered strong external pressures to defend its initial position 
that would have undermined the very effort of building up confidence incrementally 
and creating a dynamic of mutual respect and recognition. This dynamic, as the former 
High Commissioner for Peace commented, eventually led the delegations to move 
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from their goal of advancing their own interest to seeking a cooperative, win-win 
solution (Jaramillo 2017).      
Finally, the third key feature of the exploratory meeting was developing a practical 
methodology that in the day-to-day work and through concrete outputs supported the 
goal of finding a common ground. According to one of the government advisors that 
participated in the exploratory meeting, “instead of exchanging documents, what we 
[both delegations in Havana] used to do was to meet in a room full of white 
blackboards and, after having long discussions, write down the coincidences until we 
reached somewhere. It was really tiresome but at the end, out of scratch, we built 
something that both parties shared despite our differences” (Personal communication 
Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, August 25, 2017). 
This method of exchanging and jointly writing ideas helped the process move forward 
from intractable positions to small gains that slowly produced the General Agreement, 
which was at the same time concrete enough to have a shared roadmap of the 
negotiation and relatively open for interpreting certain sections of the agenda. Both 
parties converged in using certain terms and concepts in the General Agreement but 
for very different reasons, producing what Bruno Palier refers to as an “ambiguous 
agreement” (2005).   
All of these features of the exploratory meeting help explain how the government 
and FARC were able to move into a formal negotiation with clear rules and agree to a 
substantive agenda. However, they do not explain why and how the specific issue of 
rural development was included in the agenda. In order to do so, I need to examine the 
way in which certain ideas and cognitive frames regarding this issue gained force 
within each party and were adopted as part of the General Agreement. 
 
5.3 Linking Normatively Rural Development to Lasting Peace 
 
After the General Agreement became public, many observers welcomed with 
excitement that the item of “comprehensive agrarian development” was in the agenda. 
Although for many it was obvious that such a structural element of the conflict 
appeared as a negotiating item, its inclusion within the text did not follow a 
straightforward path. It actually resulted from an arduous effort by key actors on each 
129 
side who managed to introduce and move ahead the ideas and normative frames that 
determined the conceptions and decisions of the delegations on this issue. Political 
actors, as constructivist scholars have recently argued, are always guided by normative 
frames understood as “specific metaphors, symbolic representations and cognitive 
clues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest 
alternative modes of action” (Zald in Sell and Prakash 2004, 145). The empirical 
question is how to account for the role these ideas and frames have on decision-making 
in specific historical settings. 
Peter Hall (1989) argues ideas have authority based on their own persuasiveness. 
More importantly, he notes, a certain set of ideas becomes relevant in deciding a 
course of action if they are institutionally and politically viable. Adapting Hall’s 
framework, I examine the conditions and actors that in each delegation enabled linking 
rural development with lasting peace. Moreover, to understand the political viability of 
this framing, I identify, on one hand, how pressing problems in the countryside 
requiring government action facilitated the inclusion of the rural development item as 
part of the agenda. Emerging global norms on rural development, expert knowledge 
and social movement pressures further accentuated this political viability. On the other 
hand, I also identify the political and economic restrictions that limited the scope of the 
item in the negotiation, expressed in the government’s “red lines”. I base my 
description of this process ideas based on the interviews I carried out with the peace 
negotiators of both delegations and also on my direct experience as a government 
advisor in Havana, where I spent the first semester 2013 working on the draft of the 
Comprehensive Rural Reform. 
 
FARC’s Framing on the Agrarian Issue 
In order to account for the way in which FARC addressed the inclusion of the item of 
comprehensive agrarian policy in the exploratory meeting, I examine three factors: (1) 
FARC’s political stance regarding its agrarian demands in peace negotiations; (2) 
FARC’s colono peasantry as its historical social base; (3) and FARC’s social 
composition and rationale with regards to the negotiation, particularly of the members 
of the Secretariado attending the exploratory meeting. 
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FARC’s Agrarian Discourse 
In Chapter 3, I described how FARC’s origins are linked to its demands for agrarian 
reform in the 1960s. It is important to see how these were translated into political 
proposals in the peace negotiations previous to the Havana peace talks. In the 1980s, 
after years of war escalation, the government and FARC reached a ceasefire accord in 
March 1984 at Uribe, Meta, as part of the peace process initiated by president Betancur 
in 1983. In this agreement, there was a provision stating that the government was 
willing to “promote vigorously an agrarian reform recognizing that land is at the core 
of current social conflicts” as well to “expand public services geared towards 
improving peasants’ living conditions” (Comisión de Paz and FARC 1984). 
Nonetheless, this provision had no effect as the process did not make much progress 
and by 1988 was suspended, among other things, because FARC was actually in a 
process of military strengthening and expansion and because it did not gain sufficient 
support within the state (Ramírez and Restrepo 1988; Rojas Puyo 2018, pp. 225-230). 
Other guerrilla groups did continue with the peace talks that culminated with a double 
process. On one hand, the demobilization in 1990 and 1991 of the Movimiento 19 de 
abril (M-19), the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame and the Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabajadores (PRT). On the other, the installment of the Constitutional National 
Assembly in 1991. FARC, as well the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), stayed at 
war against the government. 
During the peace attempt of the Caracas and Tlaxcala dialogues (1991-1992), 
FARC, jointly with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Ejército Popular de 
Liberación (EPL) in the joint platform Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB), 
drafted a letter sent to Congress outlining what they conceived as a possible negotiating 
agenda that contained twelve points (Coordinadora Guerrilla Simón Bolívar 1992). 
One of them picked up the issue of redistributing land “wherever the latifundio is in 
place”. It also signaled the need to build road infrastructure, provide cheap credit, 
make available inputs and technology, and to guarantee the marketing of the produce 
in order to develop agriculture. However, this document went well beyond the strictly 
agrarian issue and called for, among others, reviewing the neoliberal macroeconomic 
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policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank and the contracts on natural 
resource exploitation. These dialogues were interrupted in 1993, war resumed and 
FARC continued to grow and expand throughout the country. Despite the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the significant democratic space opened by the newly adopted 
constitution, FARC maintained its radical discourse. In its eighth conference in 1993, 
FARC made some small adjustments to its original Programa Agrario mentioned in 
Chapter 3. More importantly, it approved its “government platform” (Plataforma de un 
gobierno de reconstrucción y reconciliación nacional) that, in a similar way to the 12-point 
agenda drafted with the CGSB in 1992, alluded to the agrarian issue as part of a 
broader political and economic project. Regarding agrarian policy, it introduced the 
ideas of stimulating agroindustry, protecting agricultural production from unfair 
international competition and developing regional development plans to be formulated 
with communities’ organizations including the “liquidation of the latifundio, land 
redistribution, a redefinition of the agricultural frontier so as to rationalize the 
colonización and protecting environmental reserves” (FARC-EP 1993, my own 
translation). 
During the 1990s, FARC would strengthen its military apparatus and at the same 
time, led by Alfonso Cano, would try to expand and update its program considering 
the new economic and political realities of the country. At the Caguán Peace Talks, 
FARC and the government drafted a broad negotiating agenda (Agenda Común por el 
Cambio Hacia una Nueva Colombia) that included within the 12 points an item called 
“comprehensive agrarian policy” (Política agraria integral). This item in turn contained 
six sub-headings that were important antecedents for the Havana agenda: (1) 
Democratization of credit, technical assistance and marketing; (2) Redistribution of 
unproductive land; (3) Recuperating and distributing land acquired through 
narcotrafficking; (4) Stimuli to production; (5) Comprehensive territorial ordering; and 
(6) Illegal crops substitution and alternative development (Gobierno Nacional and 
FARC-EP 1999). It is worth pointing out that in this agenda emerged issues such as 
territorial ordering, illegal crops substitution and narcotrafficking.  
By the time the exploratory meeting began in Havana, FARC’s agrarian discourse 
had not changed much. During the 2000s, FARC’s political thinking remained 
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practically static, as the increased armed confrontation with the military drew all of its 
attention. In its end-of-year message in December 2010, ‘Alfonso Cano’ insisted on 
demanding agrarian reform and handing over land to its true owners, that is, colono 
peasants and indigenous and afro communities that had been dispossessed of it (Cano 
2010). Along similar lines, in a declaration of the Secretariado del Estado Mayor Central in 
December 2011, FARC reiterated its basic claims for land to peasants and against 
latifundio and neoliberal economic policies (FARC-EP 2011). Overall, as the table in 
Appendix 2 illustrates, FARC’s agrarian discourse maintained over time the core 
elements of the Programa Agrario developed in 1964. Even though since the 1980s 
FARC envisioned a broader political project, its demands – and ultimately its self-
explanatory justification – were linked to the idea of redistributive land reform based 
on the confiscation of latifundio and foreign property. It was, in the words of a FARC 
commander, “what allowed FARC to be a cohesive army around a basic political 
agrarian program” (quoted in Ferro Medina and Uribe 2002, p. 62). That is, it 
constituted their basic source of legitimacy, both in relation to the colono peasantry 
and to the international audiences sympathetic to its struggle. It is what gave a sense of 
“origin” to the revolutionary struggle as well of “potential future”. Over the course of 
the Havana negotiations, FARC’s discourse would incorporate as well concepts such 
as territory and food sovereignty, but these were not yet present at the exploratory 
meeting in the first half of the 2012. Now, fully understanding their positioning during 
these first meetings in Havana requires examining as well FARC’s social and political 
base.   
 
FARC’s Colono Peasant Base 
Besides their normative discourse on agrarian reform that justified the armed struggle, 
FARC’s historical relationship with the colono peasantry of the south, especially that 
one involved in coca crops, is key for understanding why the rural question has been at 
the center of their demands and had to be necessarily included in the Havana agenda. 
To be sure, besides these colono areas of the south where FARC emerged and 
maintained its historical social base, FARC’s expansion and strengthening over time, 
unlike other guerrilla groups in Latin America, was not the result of an alliance 
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between the peasant movement and the guerrilla group (UNDP 2011, p. 219). Even 
though FARC, true to its Marxist-Leninist orientation, claimed to be “the people’s 
army” and to represent the voice of the peasants, it did not participate in any of the 
major struggles of the peasantry across the country between 1970s and 2000s. Initially 
subordinated to the communist party guidelines –what made it the “guerrilla of the 
party”– FARC was distant to ANUC’s (the national peasant association) struggle over 
land between 1969 and 1975. It did not get involved either in the major social 
mobilizations of 1987 and 1988 of the Oriente and Nororiente nor the national agrarian 
strike of 1993 (Giraldo Ramírez 2015). Their military development and control of vast 
territories did not translate into a bold political project nor into a broad support on 
behalf of its struggle amongst lower-class urban and rural sectors (Pizarro 2011). 
Rather than reflecting a growing resonance with social demands, FARC’s expansion 
into every Colombian municipality (Brittain 2010, p. 16) was the outcome of the 
armed conflict dynamics and the group’s tactical and operational decisions, such as 
diversifying their funding sources and improving war conditions (Echandía 2006; 
Echandía 1999). In the end, despite aiming at gaining sympathizers at a national level, 
FARC’s real social base was bound to the colono and coca-leaf production areas where 
they established a strong social, political and territorial control (González, Bolívar, and 
Vázquez 2003). 
 FARC’s discourse on the “confiscation of the latifundio” was coupled with the call 
for supporting peasants dedicated to coca leaf production, with the aim of speaking to 
and preserving its social base in colono areas. The degree of empathy towards FARC’s 
revolutionary project in these regions is far from being homogeneous. As peasant 
families began to adopt coca as their main cash crop from the 1980s onwards, they 
became illegal and therefore unable to legally demand state services through regular 
institutional procedures (Gutiérrez 2015). Besides funding their army on a “tax” on 
coca crop production, FARC exploited this situation of coca growers’ illegality 
politically, and as early as 1984 began proposing livelihoods alternatives for these rural 
inhabitants.39 Most of the demands of peasants living in these areas were about 
                                                 
39 According to Uribe and Cadavid (2016, p. 40), FARC presented to the government a regional 
development proposal at La Uribe peace talks that included a coca crop substitution plan for the area of 
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accessing basic social services and obtaining better agricultural production and 
marketing supports. Yet the state was not able to respond to these demands effectively 
and they remained FARC’s sphere of influence and control. By commanding or 
coopting rural organizations at the local level, FARC became a strong political actor in 
these regions promoting through them their struggle against the state since the 1980s. 
Sustaining a radical agrarian discourse in Havana was therefore central to maintain a 
strong foothold in these political and social bases.40 
 
The Secretariado’s Rationale in Havana 
Another reason why FARC persisted on its agrarian discourse has to do with the social 
composition of the organization itself, whose majority of rank-and-file members have 
rural origins to this day. In the same way that its social base has historically been the 
colono peasantry, FARC’s social class composition remains predominantly peasant 
with 79 percent of its members having a rural background according to a recent census 
made by the National University (2017). In contrast to other guerrilla groups in Latin 
America, the peasant and lower-class members have always outnumbered the urban 
middle-class intellectuals as the recruitment process has usually taken place in marginal 
rural areas. Even though since the 1960s Colombia was already becoming a highly 
urbanized country, FARC’s revolutionary discourse stayed mainly agrarian, aimed at 
its own members. 
FARC’s leadership has also been historically composed by peasant leaders, 
although the Secretariado had as well an important urban middle-class intellectual 
component. Even today, after a decade of significant changes of its leadership, most 
prominently the death of its historical leader ‘Manuel Marulanda’, six out of the nine 
members of the Secretariado have a peasant background. Most of the members of the 
Estado Mayor, commanders of fronts and columns are from peasant origins as well. A 
                                                 
the lower and middle Caguán river in Caquetá. Moreover, in the 1998 peace talks, they also presented a 
highly detailed plan for substituting coca crops for legal cash crops at the municipality of Cartagena del 
Chairá in Caquetá (FARC-EP 1999). 
40 The relationship between FARC and rural communities and organizations in colono and coca 
growing regions is much more complex than what I am describing here. For further analysis refer to 
(Ramírez 2001; Torres Bustamante 2011; Aguilera Peña 2011).   
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key difference between the Secretariado and the rest of FARC’s members are its 
educational levels. Whereas 68 percent of FARC’s combatants do not have any formal 
education or attended only primary school, 3 percent have university education, most 
of which are part of the leadership (Universidad Nacional 2017). This difference partly 
explains a key feature in FARC’s history: the gap between its orthodox Marxist 
discourse and its war and social control actions against civilians in its zones of 
influence (González, Bolívar, and Vázquez 2003). 
FARC arrived at the exploratory meeting with the idea of “winning over the 
revolution via negotiation”, as a government official put it  (Personal communication 
Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, August 25, 2017). 
Unlike Caguán’s negotiations, at the time of the first encounter in Havana the armed 
confrontation was significantly tilted in favor of the military forces. Yet, FARC arrived 
to that first meeting in February 2012 with a staunch position, far from the 
government’s initial perception about FARC's probable willingness to carry out a fast-
track negotiation. According to one of FARC’s Secretariado members, who was part of 
the exploratory meeting from the start, “the government thought we [FARC] had gone 
to Havana simply to surrender but they were wrong about that; we had gone there as 
equal parties seeking a political solution to the armed conflict” (Personal 
communication Member of FARC’s Leadership, September 13, 2017). From FARC’s 
perspective, if they were going to give up the armed struggle – as a voluntary decision 
to continue with their political agenda without resorting to guerrilla warfare, rather 
than out of a lack military capacity – it had to be the product of a political settlement 
that necessarily addressed the access of peasants to property in the countryside. This 
meant, from their Marxist point of view, bringing into the political sphere, at least in 
the specific conjuncture of the peace talks, the conditions under which the peasantry 
may increase the degree of autonomy in relation to the market (Vergara-Camus and 
Kay 2017a, pp. 243-245). In other words, forcing a discussion on the role of the state 
with regard to the expansion of the logic of capital in land ownership, agricultural 
production and natural resource exploitation. 
At the same time though, unlike the Caguán’s process, at the exploratory meeting 
in Havana FARC was more pragmatic and willing to reach a common ground with the 
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government. This was, in part, due to the political and conflict context already 
explained, but also, and importantly, to the FARC’s negotiators that attended the 
exploratory meeting who were fully aware of the need to come up with an agenda that 
could facilitate parties reaching an agreement. In the definition of the rural 
development item, Mauricio Jaramillo, who had been in FARC for over forty years, 
played a very important role. With a rural origin – he was born and raised in Caquetá, 
one of FARC’s historical zones of influence in the south of the country – Jaramillo was 
one of the few members of the organization with a university degree. Although he 
began his studies in medicine at the National University, with the support of the 
Colombian Communist Party he traveled to Cuba to finish them and then to the Soviet 
Union for obtain a further specialization (Ávila 2012). Mainly responsible for installing 
the health system that the FARC decided to create in its eighth conference in 1993, the 
rank-and-file members knew him well, especially in the region of the Llanos del Yarí, as 
the medical centers that he developed in the middle of the jungle were very effective in 
attending the wounded and sick members. During that decade, he also became very 
close to Manuel Marulanda and Jorge Briceño, as he was their personal doctor. Once 
Briceño died in 2008, Jaramillo became part of the Secretariado and the leader of the 
Bloque Oriental, FARC’s largest front in the southeast, and gained the trustworthiness of 
Timoleón Jiménez, Iván Márquez and Pablo Catatumbo. Trained in orthodox 
Marxism but also with a long experience on the ground that made him aware of the 
rural realities in the countryside, Mauricio Jaramillo sustained a position in Havana 
that, while maintaining FARC’s key agrarian discourse, was also open to explore 
alternatives and move away from rigid positions. This is something that perhaps would 
not have been possible with Alfonso Cano or Manuel Marulanda. 
 
The Government’s Framing on Rural Development and Lasting Peace 
The government negotiators were highly aware of FARC’s agrarian demands and 
worked hard to come up with a position that would meet these concerns as much as 
possible.41 Doing so would indicate approval of, and support for, FARC’s transition 
                                                 
41 It is worth noting that previous to the beginning of the exploratory meeting, the government’s 
technical staff developed a matrix that organized FARC’s historical demands based on the meticulous 
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from an armed guerrilla group to a legal political movement, and thus increase the 
probability of reaching a final agreement (Personal communication Formal advisor of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, September 25, 2017). Within the 
government, the main person responsible for this task was Sergio Jaramillo, who was, 
as noted above, deputy minister of defense in 2006-2009 and, once Santos became 
president, appointed as National Security Advisor and then in 2012 as High 
Commissioner for Peace. While Santos assigned the task of leading the exploratory 
meeting to a group of people he personally trusted – including his older brother 
Enrique Santos – it was Jaramillo, due to his background and expertise, who became 
the team’s key strategist in the drafting of the General Agreement. His active 
participation was crucial for addressing the rural development issue, as he laid out the 
government’s conceptual foundations linking the issue with the broader goal of 
building peace. These ideas were, additionally, well received and gained force in the 
government as they were considered to be legitimate and in line with previous 
antecedents and current policymaking. It is important therefore to show both the 
conceptual foundations of these ideas as well as their viability within the government 
due to the strategic location of the person carrying them.    
 
Seeing the End of Conflict as an Opportunity for State-Building 
By introducing a key distinction between ending conflict and building peace in the 
exploratory meeting, Jaramillo provided the conceptual framework that is at the basis 
of the pre-negotiation document (the General Agreement) of which rural development 
is a crucial part. At its start, the General Agreement establishes that parties have taken 
“the mutual decision of putting an end to the [armed] conflict as an essential condition 
for building a stable and lasting peace” (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2012, 
emphasis added). Further on, it reiterates that parties agreed to “initiate direct and 
uninterrupted talks about the issues on the Agenda here established, with the purpose 
of reaching a Final Agreement to end the [armed] conflict that contributes to the 
                                                 
study of the guerrilla group’s documents and conferences. This matrix reflected the government's interest 
in identifying the core issues in FARC's political thinking that could serve as a basis for defining the 
essential agenda items (Goebertus 2017).   
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building of stable and lasting peace”. The separation of these two terms – end of 
conflict and building peace – sought to overcome the difficulties previous negotiations 
had faced of not having a clearly defined objective (Arias 2017). Jaramillo proposed 
this new frame first to the government’s delegation and then to FARC. According to 
this framing, the purpose of the negotiating table was not to reach an agreement on 
peace in general, but on a number of issues that would lead to the termination of the 
armed confrontation. Peace was a much more complex and broader process involving 
multiple actors and sectoral changes across a long period of time that two parties in a 
negotiating table were unlikely to sign in an agreement. Yet, the delegations could put 
an end to the military conflict and include in the agreement provisions geared towards 
initiating a long-term peacebuilding process. This more limited purpose was something 
attainable for the warring parties. Reaching an agreement to end conflict would give 
place to a peacebuilding phase of which society at large could be part. In order to 
secure lasting peace, such an agreement had to address not only the aspects related to 
the end of conflict (ceasefire, laying down of weapons, reintegration of ex-combatants), 
but also those that have fed the conflict for decades (Jaramillo 2017 and 2013). That is 
why the agenda of the General Agreement contained substantive issues including rural 
development, striking a careful balance of having a realistic but also ambitious 
roadmap for the negotiation phase. 
The inclusion of these substantive issues in the agenda had a double meaning for 
Jaramillo. It meant, on one hand, recognizing and facilitating FARC’s transition from 
an insurgency to a political movement by addressing their historical demands for 
agrarian reform and political inclusion that had motivated and justified their armed 
struggle. On the other, it meant seeing the end of conflict as an opportunity to carry out 
basic state-building tasks that were pending, amongst other things, because of the 
armed confrontation (Jaramillo 2017). In this conception, reaching an agreement to 
end conflict that addressed issues related to its persistence would activate a transitional 
period aimed at consolidating the rule of law and the state’s presence in the territory as 
a guarantee of non-repetition and satisfaction of citizens’ rights. In such a transition a 
structural transformation of the countryside geared towards improving rural dwellers' 
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well-being, reduce poverty and inequality, would play a definitive role (Jaramillo 
2013). 
Conceiving the peace negotiation as more than just the ceasefire and disarmament, 
but actually involving a solution to structural problems, was by no means new. In 
Colombia, there is a long tradition of conflict and peace experts and policymakers that 
since the 1960s have established the connections between conflict and social structure 
(González, Bolívar, and Vázquez 2003). Moreover, at the international level, strong 
arguments had already been put forward in favor of considering peacebuilding beyond 
strengthening security and formal democratic institutions. After the widespread 
reappearance of conflict in various countries, it became evident that peacebuilding had 
to also tackle social grievances derived from preexisting socioeconomic imbalances  
(Cramer and Richards 2011; Cederman, Skrede Gledistsch, and Buhaug 2013). In fact, 
critical assessments of the UN’s peace missions carried out in the 1990s emphasized 
how these international interventions had focused only in establishing procedural 
democratic mechanisms while failing to address broader economic and political issues 
(Arévalo Bencardino 2014; Paris 2006). The ability of Jaramillo therefore rested in 
organizing these ideas on peacebuilding in a structured, coherent narrative that could 
be accepted by president Santos as an overall framework to approach the negotiation. 
In the preparation of the exploratory meeting, Jaramillo and his team provided the 
government with the first conceptual basis on rural development establishing the 
reasons that justified the inclusion of this issue in the agenda. Strategically, this issue 
was conceived within the negotiation as the “golden bridge” that could bring together 
both parts at the beginning of the talks and build confidence in the process itself 
(Personal communication Former Advisor of the OHCP, September 21, 2017). 
However, this conception emphasized the need to frame this issue beyond simply 
meeting FARC’s demands and more in terms of the desirability of taking advantage of 
the opportunity to end the conflict to address the country’s neglected rural problems. 
On one hand, this meant reversing the effects the conflict itself had produced in the 
countryside, particularly in terms of forced displacement and land dispossession. On 
the other, it meant reducing the rural-urban poverty gap by strengthening public 
investment, distributing land and formalizing property rights, delivering basic social 
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services and creating favorable conditions for equitable rural development. This 
securitized framing – in which rural development is essential as a guarantee of non-
repetition – was instrumental in justifying why the government was negotiating this 
item with FARC and establishing it as part of the agenda. This framing was well 
received within the government delegation because of its own argumentative authority 
but also, and more importantly, as I discuss next, because there was a favorable 
institutional environment for these kind of ideas.  
 
Reformist Vision within the Government 
The ideas linking rural development to peacebuilding that supported the government’s 
stance of including this issue as part of the agenda have a strong discursive power. 
Persuasiveness is, to be sure, a relevant mechanism in seeing how ideas influence a 
government’s political decisions, as it has the power to “change the perceptions a 
group ha[s] of its own interests, […] ma[king] possible new courses of action” (Hall 
1989, 369). Yet, as Hall also notes, any explanation of this kind must go further than 
simply discussing the innate qualities of ideas themselves and trace, at least, who are 
the “persuaders” putting forward these ideas, from which (economic and political) 
position are they doing so and what is the institutional environment in which these 
ideas are discussed. In other words, he highlights the need to understand how a 
particular set of ideas (and not other) becomes institutionally viable within a specific 
historical context. That is, why they were likely to be accepted according to the 
“administrative biases of the officials responsible for approving [them] […] and in the 
light of the existing implementational capacities of the state” (1989, 373). For the 
context of the exploratory meeting, this means three things. First, further identifying 
Jaramillo’s positioning within the government and, particularly, in relation to Santos. 
Second, pointing out the previous policies that had already brought to Santos’ 
attention the need to see rural development in connection with security policy and as 
part of a peacebuilding agenda. Third, describing the reformist agenda on rural 
development that Juan Camilo Restrepo, the appointed minister of agriculture and 
rural development, was already advancing at the beginning of Santos’ government, in 
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line with a tradition of reformismo agrario (agrarian reformism) of previous liberal 
governments. 
Jaramillo’s overall ideas on the agenda, and particularly those related to rural 
development, were well received by Santos. His legitimacy and authoritative expertise 
gained in previous years, combined with the support he obtained from the team of 
international advisors set up by the president for making decisions on the peace 
process, made Santos receptive to his ideas. As defense deputy minister, Jaramillo 
became advisor to Santos – who was minister at the time – in security issues of high 
confidentiality, being responsible, among other things, for strengthening the military 
intelligence strategy to fight against FARC. In fulfilling his duties, Jaramillo 
established strong connections with military commanders and key officials at the 
United States and the United Kingdom, countries that were providing Colombia with 
security cooperation, which served to position him well within the administration. 
Moreover, his results-based performance, lack of a political agenda of his own, high-
quality advice and profound knowledge of the armed conflict and of FARC, made 
Jaramillo a valuable asset for Santos, who included him since 2007 in his top circle of 
strategic decision-making. Once in power, Santos appointed Jaramillo in 2010 as 
National Security Advisor and gave him the task of preparing the overall strategy of 
the exploratory meeting. In this regard, when Jaramillo presented his ideas regarding 
the agenda items to the president he possessed the delegated authority and legitimacy 
to back up his expertise on the topic (Personal communication Former Advisor of the 
OHCP, September 21, 2017). 
These ideas were reinforced by the international advisors that met with the 
president in the days prior to the first exploratory meeting in Havana. Among these 
advisors was Jonathan Powell, a British analyst who had worked as cabinet chief of 
staff during Blair’s administration and as the UK’s government key negotiator in the 
peace talks with the IRA. According to him, the agenda needed to include FARC’s 
historical demands if the negotiations were to be successful. Backing up the analysis 
that Jaramillo had already presented to Santos, Powell argued that the issues of rural 
development and political participation should be the ones opening the dialogue as 
they were essential in building the “golden bridge” with FARC. Beyond the argument 
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being made, it is important to point out that Santos highly valued the opinion of these 
advisors, particularly Jonathan Powell, as Santos had been very close to Blair 
throughout his political career and he had developed a local version of Blair’s Third 
Way (Santos 1999). So, in a scenario in which decision-making was based on a very 
small group, the president relied heavily on the opinions and ideas of these 
international advisors, as he judged them as sound. 
A key antecedent that biased and conditioned Jaramillo and Santos in viewing rural 
development as an important item in the agenda of the negotiation was their own 
experience with the territorial consolidation policy that was formulated and executed 
by Jaramillo after the results of the democratic security policy began to wane in 2006 
(Delgado 2015). Drawing from previous post-conflict interventions carried out in 
Colombia during the 1950s and the 1980s, this policy was based on the belief that 
military operations were not sufficient to regain control of territories previously held by 
guerrilla groups, and especially not able to build a new relationship with the citizenry 
based on trust (Palau and Arias 2010). The Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena 
(PCIM) (2007-2009) – the pilot intervention of the consolidation policy developed in 
the southern region of La Macarena, Meta, a FARC historical stronghold – took the 
idea of consolidating the rule of law by pushing for presence of civil institutions after 
military operations in areas where the state was weak or nearly inexistent one step 
further (Mejía, Uribe, and Ibáñez 2011).  
The PCIM sought to tackle the limitations of focusing only on military control, 
especially in areas where guerrillas exercised quasi state functions, such as sanctioning 
conducts, solving conflicts between families and neighbors, taxing economic activities, 
among others. This meant that the program was geared towards providing public 
goods and services, starting with security, but also justice, infrastructure, health and 
education, rural income-generating projects. Even though it was part of the broader 
counterinsurgent policy – that was strongly criticized by human rights NGOs for 
emphasizing the military component over the socioeconomic one  (FIP 2011) – the 
PCIM developed a strong capacity to execute development projects within 
communities, improving the livelihoods of poor rural households that were dependent 
on illicit coca crops (Personal communication of Former Advisor of the Ministry of 
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Agriculture and Rural Development, April 13, 2017). Led by a development 
economist– who would later become a key advisor of Jaramillo in Havana for the 
issues of rural development and illicit crop substitution – this program conceived and 
put into practice three ideas that inspired in great part the government’s conception of 
the rural development issue in Havana: support to family agriculture and small-
producers associations, a territorial approach to rural development and a strong 
emphasis on community participation in decision-making,. 
The PCIM served as a way of linking, conceptually and practically, security and 
rural development, for example by carrying out agricultural projects to substitute 
peasant-based coca crops. It therefore became a watershed experience for Jaramillo 
and Santos providing the cognitive and institutional framework which enabled –and 
made seem as relevant and desirable – drawing the connection between ending 
conflict, building peace and rural development. In fact, the difficulties the PCIM 
encountered on the ground, mainly related to the lack of a broader rural sectoral policy 
and the continuous presence of FARC, were still fresh in Jaramillo and Santos’ minds 
at the time of the exploratory meeting, thus serving to internalize and judge as 
necessary the inclusion of rural development as an inextricable part of the agreement to 
end conflict. The institutional path this program had followed – receiving strong 
support by the US and overall positive evaluations – fixed the meaning and boundary 
of this kind of policy in such a way that it was not unnatural for these decision-makers 
to deem as legitimate the inclusion of rural development in the peace agenda. In the 
context of the government’s internal discussions on the exploratory meeting, Jaramillo 
was able to reframe the event of the PCIM in a meaningful way appealing to it as 
“acceptable action” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 33). 
A third institutional circumstance that defined the government’s inclusion of the 
rural development item within the agenda as legitimate had to with the fact that a 
reformist program led by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was 
already underway, as already pointed out in Chapter 4. The ministerial policies led by 
Restrepo provided a strong institutional basis to argue for the need to solve long-
standing rural development problems as part of a peacebuilding agenda. Furthermore, 
Restrepo’s policy agenda became the main reference point for the negotiating team in 
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defining the government’s position at the exploratory meeting (Personal 
communication Former High Commissioner for Peace, August 9, 2018). In effect, 
according to one of Jaramillo’s advisors, the draft of the negotiating team containing 
the headings and subheadings of the “comprehensive agrarian development policy”, 
basically reflected the outline of the ambitious land and rural development bill put 
together by Restrepo’s ministry in 2012. When the negotiations began in Havana, the 
bill was following its due course (Personal communication Former Advisor of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, August 25, 2017). Drafted by a group of 
experts, this bill sought to consolidate in one single text the fragmented measures on 
land and rural development issues as well as to establish a body of law to support a 
conception on rural development mainly focused on public goods provision and access 
to land  (Restrepo and Bernal 2014, Ch. 4). The bill became publicly available during 
the process of previous consent with indigenous peoples, giving place to a wide debate 
on rural development in the country. As nobody knew about the development of the 
exploratory meeting – not even other members of government – Jaramillo and his team 
referred to the last version of the bill to put forward the government’s proposal on the 
issue as a starting point for discussing with FARC. 
Organized in two volumes, one containing provisions on rural development in 
general and the other on specific land policy, the bill condensed the government’s 
reformist view on how to address rural structural problems. The first volume was 
structured in five sections: (1) General considerations; (2) Rural development policy; 
(3) Policy of supports to productive development; (4) Policies to increase human, social 
and physical capital; (5) Land adequacy. The second also in other five sections: (1) 
Planning of property ordering and use of rural lands; (2) Agrarian procedures; (3) 
Formalization and access to rural property; (4) Mechanisms to mobilize the land 
market and the efficient use of land; (5) Final dispositions (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Desarrollo Rural 2012b). The chapters and articles within each section depict the broad 
scope of the bill, which sought to integrate measures on land (land access, distribution 
and formalization, appropriate use, environmental sustainability), with those on 
agricultural production (commercialization, credit, income-generating projects, 
innovation and rural extension, irrigation) and rural inhabitants’ well-being (housing, 
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education, social security, basic infrastructure, food security). The bill also had a 
crosscutting emphasis on community participation and territorial approach to 
development. 
The six subheadings of the “comprehensive agrarian development policy” item 
drew from a number of the bill’s articles and reflected the bill’s structure. The 
negotiating team had developed a first version of the government’s position on the 
issue in a confidential meeting with the president and the international advisors held in 
Cartagena in January 2012. In it, the issues that could be addressed in the negotiation 
were summarized, including land access, comprehensive rural development, supports 
to the countryside, community participation, environment and rural development 
(Personal communication Former Advisor of the OHCP, September 21, 2017). Yet, 
after the exploratory meeting had begun, and an initial exchange between FARC and 
the government had taken place, the negotiating team used the bill’s items to 
strengthen the government’s position at the table. As discussions moved ahead in 
Havana, the six subheadings of the item slowly took shape as government and FARC 
found common ground. The first addressed land access and use, including its 
environmental component. The second put forward the idea of development with a 
territorial approach that was already present in the bill and that was also a basic tenet 
of the PCIM. The third and fourth subheadings made reference to the provision of 
basic goods and services provision in the countryside: infrastructure and land 
adequacy, on one hand, and social services (housing, education, health, potable water) 
geared towards poverty eradication, on the other. All of these items were also 
developed in detail in specific chapters of the bill. The fifth included providing support 
to family and small-sized cooperatives and agriculture; the sixth, included a mention of 
food security. 
What is clear so far is that the government’s negotiating team defined its position 
during the exploratory meeting based on the rural development policy underway and 
Restrepo’s bill. Ideas linking the end of conflict and building peace to rural 
development were therefore not at all foreign to the existing institutional environment, 
but rather considered relevant and necessary. They were received within the 
government as one more step in the direction that had already been set by minister 
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Restrepo and president Santos two years before. In addition to this institutional 
viability, pressing problems at home at the time also helped to politically justify and 
legitimize this agenda item.    
 
The Rural Reform’s Political Viability 
The political viability of including the issue of rural development in the negotiating 
agenda rested upon the broad consensus in place at the moment regarding the 
government’s need to respond to rural development problems. Even before the 
exploratory meeting started and the window of the peace talks was opened by this 
event in the political stream, the government had already decided to undertake some 
sort of initiative to respond to these pressing problems.42 The emergence into the 
political arena of the issue of land dispossession as part of the wider demand for 
satisfying victims’ rights, coupled by the crisis of the agricultural sector due to its 
declining competitiveness, and the pervasive presence of coca crops in peripheral rural 
areas were problems that in of themselves captured the attention of government. A 
rising national agrarian social movement advocating for solutions on all of these, in 
addition to the experts and international organizations’ recommendations on 
addressing rural problems in a comprehensive way, further convinced decision-makers 
on the need to come up with alternatives for these issues, and of the high political cost 
of not doing so. Therefore, when the opportunity to discuss this issue as part of the 
agenda emerged, the proposals advanced by Jaramillo and his team were deemed by 
president Santos as politically acceptable, as they spoke directly to the interests of 
various groups that were already demanding solutions. At the same time, the 
government had to be very careful in crafting the specific terms of the discussion in 
Havana so as not to spark off right from the start the antagonism of strong economic 
and political sectors. Ultimately, the government drew the line of what was legitimate 
                                                 
42 Kingdon (1995) discusses how pressing problems may determine and complement the opening of a 
policy window caused by developments in the political context. Both “problem and political windows” 
are relevant for understanding how an issue becomes prioritized and eventually adopted. “The problem 
windows and the political windows are related. When a window opens because a problem is pressing, 
the alternatives generated as solutions to the problem fare better if they also meet the tests of political 
acceptability” (p. 175).    
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to include in the agenda and what to exclude according to its perception on how to 
better achieve this fine political balance.   
 
Pressing Problems on the Countryside 
As already mentioned, the government, led by minister Restrepo, paid attention and 
provided full support to the development of the land restitution policy that resulted out 
of the Victims’ Law 1448 approved in Congress in June 2011. In his recent book 
regarding the agrarian question and the Havana peace talks, Restrepo mentions that in 
June 2010 he received a call from president Santos who had just been elected asking 
him not only to assume the ministry of agriculture and rural development, but also to 
coordinate an “innovative and bold policy of giving back the land to peasants who 
have been dispossessed of it by guerrilla and paramilitary groups” (Restrepo and 
Bernal 2014, 29, my translation). The problem of forced displacement and coercive 
land dispossession had been identified and formally recognized since the late 1990s.43 
However, it became politically relevant in the public agenda in the late 2000s as 
various sectors mobilized in favor of victims’ rights, including the renowned 
congressman Juan Fernando Cristo from the Liberal Party, who would then become 
Santos’ minister of interior (Montoya Londoño and Vallejo Mejía 2016; Uprimny and 
Sánchez 2010; Saffon 2010). 
After the effort to pass a first victims’ bill in Congress failed in 2009 due to Uribe’s 
resistance to the initiative (El Espectador 2009), Santos, as soon as he became 
president, distanced himself from his predecessor by taking on victims’ claims as one of 
his key political priorities. Moreover, he underscored the need to restitute dispossessed 
land to victims, thus laying ground to the view of connecting land rights with the need 
to put an end to the armed conflict. The phenomenon of coercive dispossession, which 
became widely documented by the mid-2000s by NGOs, the Constitutional Court and 
academics, involved the violent transfer of at least 2 million hectares (Peña-Huertas et 
                                                 
43 Estrada and Rodríguez (Estrada and Rodríguez 2014) trace the trajectory of the land restitution policy 
to 2001, when the Proyecto de Protección de Tierras y Patrimonio para la Población Desplazada 
(Project for the Protection of the Land and the Patronage of the Displaced Population) was created, 
following the measures established in Decree 2007, which in turn was developing provisions laid out in 
Law 387 of 1997 that defined measures on displaced population. 
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al. 2017).44 The creation of the legal and institutional framework to tackle this 
phenomenon led to defining as illegal and illegitimate violent appropriations of land on 
behalf of armed groups and third parties. It also meant the state’s formal recognition of 
the need to fight against violent concentration of land. Based on the land restitution 
policy, the government pushed as well a pro-poor rural development agenda, based on 
claims on justice, rights and equality, thus obtaining political and ideational leverage 
from a wide sector of society – although also significant opposition as I show in 
Chapter 7 (Montoya Londoño and Vallejo Mejía 2016). In this framing, addressing the 
pressing problem of land restitution created a favorable political environment for 
addressing broader land and rural development issues in Havana.   
Besides land dispossession, the poor economic performance of the agricultural 
sector was another strong political reason to make appealing the inclusion of the rural 
development issue in the negotiating agenda. Years of low growth, investment and 
productivity in the countryside, caused among other things by the armed conflict, were 
taking their toll on the sector’s growth and competitiveness (Misión para la 
Transformación del Campo 2015; Arias and Ibáñez 2012). In an increasingly 
globalized environment, state agricultural policies, as described in Chapter 4, had 
practically receded, and small farmers were not sufficiently supported to face external 
competition. As producers started to feel directly hit by what they perceived as unfair 
competition resulting out of the free-trade deals with the United States and Europe, 
and grew increasingly dissatisfied with the government, their demands for state support 
became unavoidable (Cruz Rodríguez 2017). The government came up with an 
immediate response to placate the imminent crisis, particularly the precarious position 
of coffee growers (The Economist 2013). However, the prominence of the problem 
justified seeking long-term solutions as well. Subverting the fall in the agricultural trade 
surplus, which plummeted between 2007 and 2012 from US$2,590 million to US$465 
million,45 in order to reduce the country’s increasing dependence on imports became a 
relevant policy goal framed in terms of attaining food security. Moreover, in a global 
                                                 
44 The figures regarding the extent of this phenomenon vary widely depending on the source. Some 
reports have established the magnitude of the land dispossession in 10 million hectares, others in 1.2 
million. For a discussion on these figures, see (Gómez, Sánchez-Ayala, and Vargas 2015).  
45 I am indebted to Armando Corredor for pointing out this significant trend. 
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context of rising demand for agricultural goods, developing policies to boost exports 
and transform Colombia into a food powerhouse became politically attractive. 
Especially, this was the case considering that the government needed to steer the 
economy away from the perils of Dutch Disease resulting out of the oil and mining 
boom (Argüello and Jiménez 2015). Viewing the end of conflict as an opportunity for 
improving the country’s food security and stimulating agricultural growth was thus 
rendered by the government as a reasonable – and politically viable – alternative to 
address producers’ demands for the sector’s structural solutions.   
The sustained presence of illicit coca crops in peripheral rural areas, despite an 
intense antidrug policy supported by the United States, was another unresolved 
structural problem in the countryside that, due to its strong connection with the armed 
conflict, also served to justify the inclusion of the rural development issue in the 
negotiation. Although after Plan Colombia was launched, coca hectares reduced from 
144,807 in 2001 to 61,813 in 2010, between 2010 and 2011 total crops increased again 
by 3 percent to 63,765 hectares, demonstrating the problem’s stickiness (UNODC 
2011). Significant efforts were made in the 1980s and 1990s by the Colombian 
government and the United States to tackle the illegal drug industry that began to 
flourish around the mid-1970s, while it also had negative repercussions on public 
health, the environment and increased state violence in rural areas. Nonetheless, by 
1997, Colombia had become the world’s top producer of coca leaf and cocaine, 
surpassing Bolivia and Perú. Intending to further confront production – with the 
underlying rationale of cutting supply to drive up the street prices in the US and 
therefore reduce demand and consumption – in 1999 the Clinton Administration 
pushed for Plan Colombia, as noted in Chapter 3 (Rosen 2014; Dion and Russler 2008). 
This meant propping up aerial spraying using a fleet of US-supplied planes and 
helicopters. Eradication efforts during the 2000s had an impact on coca cultivation. 
Nonetheless, when Santos assumed power in 2010, evidence on the “balloon effect”, 
according to which the decrease in crops in one region translated into the pop up of 
coca in others, led policymakers to reevaluate the strategy (Spellberg and Kaplan 
2010). 
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To be sure, the illegal drugs industry was tightly connected with the armed conflict 
and hence viewed within a security policy framework. Armed actors – guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups – had since the 1980s increasingly funded their military operations 
through the coca business (production, processing, distribution). At the same time, 
however, the government also recognized – as illustrated with the design of the PCIM 
and previous alternative development programs –  that the emergence and persistence 
of coca crops in peripheral areas by colono peasants was related to a lack of state and 
legal rural livelihoods (UNDP 2011; Thoumi 1995). As Plan Colombia’s overall effect 
on coca production started to be questioned, among other things because the decrease 
in coca hectares was countered by an increase in yields (Mejía and Restrepo 2008), the 
view of tackling coca crops through a more comprehensive strategy began to gain 
traction. At the end of Uribe’s government, mounting criticism of the environmental 
and health effects of aerial spraying, coupled by rising assassinations of police 
personnel dedicated to manual eradication, drew attention to the need to address the 
problem from a more structural rural development perspective (Varela 2017; Dion and 
Russler 2008). 
Early in his government, Santos laid out his interest in moving beyond policies 
focused exclusively on repressing production (The Observer 2011). The emerging 
global debate on the effectiveness of the war on drugs facilitated this initiative. The 
report of the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, led by former 
presidents of various Latin American countries, emphasized in 2009 the need to reform 
international drug policy (Franz 2016; Latin American Commission on Drugs and 
Democracy 2009). According to them, besides military and police action to confront 
organized crime and illegal armed groups associated with the coca business, 
governments had to increase public goods provision and state presence in coca 
production areas. Coca cultivation appeared to be more common in less developed 
regions with low access to legal markets and a weak state presence (Dion and Russler 
2008; Thoumi 1995). Coca leaf was adopted as a basic cash crop by around 60,000 
rural households that produced it on small landholdings of less than two hectares 
(UNODC 2015). Regional development projects, especially in infrastructure like 
tertiary roads, and technical and market support to producers, was therefore a crucial 
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aspect of a policy geared towards coca substitution. For the government, this meant 
making the connection between coca production and rural development as part of the 
negotiating agenda in Havana.  
 
Pressure by Social Mobilization and Experts 
The relevance attained between 2010 and 2012 by the issues of land dispossession, 
agriculture’s lack of competitiveness and coca crops’ persistence in the political 
scenario was in great measure a result of two factors. First, the pressure exerted by a 
broadly constituted national agrarian movement that succeeded in centering the 
government’s attention on these matters. Second, the convergence of influential experts 
and international organizations with significant presence in Colombia on the call for 
structural rural development reforms. As soon as Santos’ administration began in 
August 2010, social mobilizations and protests soared. Repression, stigmatization and 
criminalization of social movements during Uribe’s administration had reduced their 
margin of action during the 2000s (Archila 2005). Moreover, during this period, and 
precisely as a reaction to Uribe’s repressive policies, social movements were in the 
process of reconfiguring their discourses and organizational platforms after the crisis 
they had undergone in the mid-1990s (Archila 1995). Santos did not affect the existing 
punitive legal approach to social protest. Yet, his moderate discourse and democratic 
orientation, in which social mobilization was recognized as a legitimate form of 
political participation, opened the space for social movements’ ample deployment. A 
context of greater political guarantees was further seized by social movements as they 
had improved their organizational capacity and ability to establish nation-wide 
framings and coalitions (Cruz Rodríguez 2017). 
Of particular importance was the emergence of peasant and indigenous platforms 
that articulated regional and sectoral initiatives in national bodies and under specific 
campaigns.46 Since the end of 2010, with the installation of the Congreso de los Pueblos in 
Bogotá and the Encuentro nacional de comunidades campesinas, afrodescendientes e indígenas 
                                                 
46 According to Espinosa Rincón and Ferro Medina (2016), at least six broad agrarian movements 
emerged or solidified during between 2010 and 2012: (1) ONIC, the national indigenous organization; 
(2) Congreso de los Pueblos and the Coordinador Nacional Agrario; (3) ANZORC and Marcha 
Patriótica; (4) Dignidades Agropecuarias; (5) ANUC and (6) Comunidades negras. 
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por la tierra y la paz de Colombia: el diálogo es la ruta that took place in Barrancabermeja in 
mid-2011, the agrarian social movement gained strength and the particular demands of 
specific sectors, communities and organizations were turned into broad common goals 
and objectives. During this period, they defined as their two major goals demanding a 
political solution to the armed confrontation and proper rural development policies 
and measures. Many of these organizations had developed their agenda and strategies 
previously, and were active during Uribe’s government, as they participated and led 
protests against neoliberal policies, such as the Free Trade Agreement signed with the 
United States and Agro Ingreso Seguro (Espinosa Rincón and Ferro Medina 2016). 
However, it was during Santos’ government that these organizations grew in strength 
and voice forming a wide front on claims for land restitution and a progressive rural 
development bill, and against trade liberalization, large-scale mining projects and 
repressive policies on coca production. The inclusion of the rural development issue in 
the agenda was not a direct outgrowth of the social movement pressure. Yet, the 
increasing relevance and visibility of these mobilizations did serve as a reminder, 
especially to the government, that something had to be done about it and that it had to 
be part of the peacebuilding agenda. 
In parallel to social movements’ pressure, the numerous studies, reports and 
analysis on rural development that came out during that period carried out by 
influential experts, NGOs and international organizations also helped creating a 
favorable atmosphere for pushing for broad sectoral reforms. UNDP’s 2011 Human 
Development Report on Colombia, which for the first time centered exclusively on rural 
development, was of particular relevance. It was able to consolidate a comprehensive 
analysis of the key problems of rural Colombia, linking the effects of the armed 
confrontation on the countryside with institutional and sectoral deficits, and to provide 
a clear policy roadmap geared towards decision-makers (UNDP 2011). Moreover, 
directed by Absalón Machado, a renowned economist on agrarian issues with 
credibility across sectors, UNDP’s report was able to bring together academics, NGOs, 
business associations, local communities, international organizations and government 
institutions in its research process and final outreach. UNDP’s strategic institutional 
location in Bogotá, close to policymaking circles, facilitated the report’s promotion of a 
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common understanding around rural policy and the creation of an overall framework 
from which to assess the various pressing problems. President Santos’ attendance to 
the report’s launching event in September 2011 demonstrates not only the study’s 
resonance and positive reception in policy circles, but also, as Babb points out 
regarding the role of expert knowledge in policy-making (2013), the government’s 
usage of it as a means of legitimizing its policy course (Sistema Informativo de 
Gobierno 2011; El País 2011). The report, a high government official states, became an 
important source for minister Restrepo’s rural development bill, as well as for the 
negotiating team in Havana (Personal communication Former Advisor Office of the 
High Commissioner for Peace, August 25, 2017; Restrepo and Bernal 2014, p. 150). 
The World Bank, USAID, FAO and non-governmental organizations like Oxfam 
also produced relevant analysis and reports in line to UNDP’s policy guidelines. Land 
dispossession and the free trade agreements had attracted since the mid-2000s 
significant attention of think tanks and international organizations, all of which were 
converging around the need to center rural development policy on land access, family 
agriculture and food production sustainability (Garay, Barberi, and Cardona 2010; 
Forero 2010; Oxfam 2013; World Bank 2004; Econometría 2011; Perfetti and Cortés 
2013; Junguito, Perfetti, and Becerra 2014). Reflective of this trend, research agendas 
on rural and land issues flourished. In Bogotá, important universities created or 
strengthened their rural development research programs, led by renowned academics. 
Such a conducive policy environment led the government to begin arrangements in 
2012 for carrying out the 2014 National Agricultural Census and to develop a new 
Rural Mission of experts that commenced its task in 2013 with the goal of providing a 
comprehensive roadmap for policy reform (Misión para la Transformación del Campo 
2015).  
This growing interest on rural development policy in Colombia was indeed part of 
a broader global policy shift that took place during the 2000s, especially after the global 
food crisis, when agricultural policy, food issues and rural poverty became relevant 
again in the global agenda, as described in Chapter 4 in the discussion of the 
alternative emerging norms. In the middle of this domestic and global context in which 
experts and international organizations were putting pressure to address structural 
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rural problems, the Colombian government conceived as legitimate and desirable 
including the rural development issue within the negotiating agenda. 
 
The Government’s “Red Lines” 
As described, an existing reformist vision within the government, pressing problems, 
social mobilizations and experts’ recommendations influenced the decision of 
introducing the substantive discussion on rural development policy in Havana’s 
negotiation. At the same time, however, the political viability of this issue’s inclusion 
was given by what Santos had decided from the outset not to negotiate. The president 
thought there were topics that were not part of the peace talks with FARC (Personal 
communication Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, 
August 25, 2017). Besides, he faced serious political restrictions from the coalition that 
had brought him to power and from the opposition. Before the first session of the 
exploratory meeting took place, the government’s negotiating team sat down with 
president Santos to define their “red lines”, that is, issues not negotiable in Havana 
(Personal communication Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Peace, September 21, 2017). Regarding rural development, these had to do with 
FARC’s claims for carrying out an agrarian reform based on a massive expropriation 
of unproductive latifundios that would constitute a serious risk for private property 
rights; renegotiating investment and trade agreements; and reviewing macroeconomic 
policy, particularly in relation to the country’s growing dependence on natural resource 
extraction. Ultimately, by identifying these red lines, Santos established what he 
considered was not legitimate to discuss as part of the rural development point and 
how far the government was willing to go on this issue in the negotiation, clearly 
demarcating the parameters of what it understood in the peace talks by 
“comprehensive agrarian development policy”. In Santos’ view, it was one thing to 
recognize, as part of a peacemaking agenda, the need to tackle rural poverty, promote 
equitable agricultural growth and escalate public investment and the state’s presence in 
the countryside, especially in areas most affected by conflict. It was another to accept, 
in the name of a discussion on “rural development”, an overhaul of the country’s 
broader economic development model. The central idea behind this was to address 
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only those aspects strictly related to the persistence of the armed conflict (Personal 
communication Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, 
September 21, 2017).      
These red lines, unsurprisingly, reflected the economic stance held by Santos 
throughout his political career, as well as his economic policy since he came to power. 
As mentioned earlier, Santos espoused in Colombia a local version of Blair’s Third 
Way. In his former posts as El Tiempo’s commentator, minister of commerce and 
minister of finance, he was a staunch defender of the market economy, private 
entrepreneurship and liberalization as sources of growth and prosperity. At the same 
time, he admitted that having a strong state was necessary for enforcing the rule of law, 
promoting good governance, ameliorating poverty and providing basic assets to all 
(e.g., education and health). The economic strategy of Santos’ national development 
plan 2010-2014, in a similar fashion to the one of the previous administration, was 
geared towards furthering the economy's liberalization, attracting foreign investment, 
securing property rights in the countryside, and promoting a growth strategy based on 
oil and mining exports (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2010b). A fierce critic 
of socialist perspectives, particularly of those like FARC’s closely linked to Chavez’s 
Bolivarian Revolution, Santos never accepted introducing in the agenda any discussion 
that called into question the economic model. On the contrary, in Santos’ view, the 
armed conflict, as the World Bank had already pointed out in its country’s report, 
besides having nefarious humanitarian effects, was an obstacle to growth that had to be 
removed so as to unleash Colombia's full economic potential (Giugale, Lafourcade, 
and Luff 2003).47   
Besides Santos’ personal economic views and the government’s defined 
development strategy, another reason for keeping off the table these “red lines” was the 
                                                 
47 The central message in World Bank’s report states, “[t]here is no doubt that the long-standing armed 
conflict is the most important issue facing Colombia as a nation, let alone as an economy. The cost of 
violence is difficult to overestimate. Since 1980, some 100,000 people have died directly as a result of the 
conflict, and two million desplazados have lost their jobs, homes and, increasingly, hope, and are now 
lingering at the fringe of society. Another million, perhaps the most education million, left the country 
altogether. By some calculations, the conflict dampens GDP growth each year by two full percentage 
points – in other words, had the war stopped, say, 20 years ago, the income of the average Colombian 
would now be 50 percent higher, and an estimated 2.5 million more children would be above the 
poverty line” (Giugale, Lafourcade, and Luff 2003, p. 2). 
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government’s commitments with the country’s main economic groups. During the 
presidential campaign, Santos earned the support of most of the business sector and 
once in power sought to sustain good relationships with it. Like in any other 
government constrained by capital’s structural power (Cerny 2010), Santos had made 
very clear right from the start of the exploratory meeting that if the negotiation with 
FARC was to succeed, it could not go against business interests, especially of those at 
the center-stage of the country’s economy. In practice, this meant not including items 
that may in any way put at risk major economic activities like oil and mining, which 
since the mid-2000s had become the key source of foreign direct investment and fiscal 
revenue. Moreover, anticipating the political cost that the announcement of the start of 
the formal peace talks would entail if an agenda was agreed upon, Santos sought to 
minimize the opposition’s reaction by making sure that any issue included in it could 
be framed in terms of the constitution. The right-wing opposition led by Uribe 
criticized starkly the negotiations right from the beginning, as Chapter 7 describes in 
detail. Still, the negotiating team’s decision not to accept the inclusion of sensitive 
topics, like the control of natural resources or trade agreements, provided the 
government with the sufficient legitimacy to defend the final version of the agenda.    
Although elected as the candidate that would give continuity to Uribe’s policies, 
Santos’ political economic base was distinct from Uribe’s. While for the latter, cattle 
ranchers represented an important sector of his direct constituency, the former was 
dependent on an increasingly internationalized business sector.48 Accordingly, this 
sector was far more readily willing to accept – at least from an economic 
modernization project discourse – a rural development policy that tackled violent 
                                                 
48 Richani’s (2013) analysis on this point, although not carried out for this specific period, is still relevant. 
According to him, “since the late 1990s we have seen a shift in the political attitude among an important 
segment of the dominant classes in favor of a negotiated settlement for the conflict mainly because of the 
increasing costs of war, which are jeopardizing the country’s economic growth and its incorporation into 
global markets” (129). Moreover, he also notes that “[i]n a stark contrast with the growing power of 
conglomerates, the economic decline of the agrarian elite represented by the coffee growers, cattle 
ranchers, agribusiness groups, and large landowners is reflected in their decreasing share of the GDP 
during the 1980s and 1990s. While the services sector share increased from 43 percent in 1980 to 49 
percent in 1998, the agricultural sector declined from 22 percent of the GDP to 13 percent in 1998. 
These figures reveal an emerging economic structure and a new social configuration of the dominant 
classes. This configuration is clearly biased toward the international segment represented by fourteen 
companies and groups, mostly in the services sector” (137).    
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appropriation of land and irregular property rights, promoted a productive use of 
agricultural resources, and improved rural inhabitants’ human capital, each of which is 
also consistent with a liberal economy. With this in mind, the “end of conflict as an 
opportunity” narrative was essential for the government’s framing of the negotiating 
agenda. Especially because it justified the need to carry out reforms or tasks that were 
in the country’s interest whether or not they were agreed with FARC. In this way, the 
government was able to argue that while the existing development model was not in 
discussion in Havana, it was interested in reaching an ambitious agreement on 
measures to improve rural living conditions, close the rural-urban gap and stimulate 
agricultural growth.   
Far from being naïve, FARC knew what Santos stood for. Even more so, the fact 
that he represented in every way the “establishment” was in FARC’s view a guarantee 
that the various “factions” of capital and of the “ruling class” were in favor of a 
negotiating. Still, they never gave up their ideas on rural development. Certain terms 
agreed on at the exploratory meeting, like “use of land” gave them leeway to continue 
pushing forward during the next phase of the negotiation for a broader discussion on 
issues like natural resource extraction.  
The previous description traced the path the rural development item followed 
towards its inclusion into the negotiating agenda. It showed the evolution of FARC’s 
agrarian discourse up until the Havana’s exploratory meeting, as well as the 
government’s conception linking peace with rural reform. Moreover, it identified the 
institutional and political conditions that favored this inclusion, highlighting how the 
item responded to pressing problems in the countryside, an increasing rural social 
mobilization and experts’ recommendation on the topic, while at the same time its 
scope was bound to the political restrictions established by the government from the 
outset. The opening of this window to discuss a substantive issue in a peace 
negotiation was indeed crucial. Now, I move on to analyze how the parties converted 
the issue into a concrete draft as part of the agreement during the formal phase of the 
negotiations. A description of its main features will serve to understand how it 




5.4 The Robustness of the Comprehensive Rural Reform  
 
In May 2013, after almost six months of intense discussions in Havana, the delegations 
reached for the first time in history a substantive agreement on rural development. Its 
first paragraph begins by stating “[w]ithin the context of this Agreement to End the 
Armed Conflict, the Comprehensive Rural Reform (Reforma Rural Integral), hereinafter 
referred to as CRR, lays the foundation for the structural transformation of the 
countryside, creates conditions for well-being of the rural population – men and 
women – thereby contributing to the building of a stable and long-lasting peace” 
(Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2016, p. 10). As described in the section before, in 
the agenda defined at the exploratory meeting the negotiating parties not only 
exploited the window of the peace talks by introducing the agrarian agenda item but 
also demarcated its roadmap for the negotiation phase, thus facilitating the discussions 
amid the wide ideological gap between them. In this section, I turn to the phase of the 
formal negotiations where there were no antecedents on how to address the agenda 
items in the negotiating table and convert them into provisions shared by both 
delegations. A first outcome of this phase was the 21-page partial agreement on 
“comprehensive agrarian development policy”, which contained concrete 
commitments made by the government that were instrumental in shifting Santos’ rural 
development policy towards a more distributive orientation and, at least temporarily, 
away from the status quo trajectory. As the former High Commissioner for Peace 
stated, “the peace process operated as a lever of change which can help to achieve 
transformations on the countryside that in ordinary policymaking had not been 
possible” (Personal communication, August 8 2018).   
In order to analyze this agreement, I draw partially on the work of peace accord 
implementation scholar Virginia Fortna (2004), whose work has evidenced how peace 
agreements are far from being mere “scraps of paper” and are actually relevant in 
improving the quality of the implementation, to argue that the CRR agreement’s 
robustness was definitive in influencing this policy shift. Compared to other peace 
agreements with agrarian provisions, as noted in the case selection section in Chapter 
1, Colombia’s CRR is the most robust due to both its comprehensiveness and level of 
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detail (see Table 1.2). I understand this comprehensiveness or breadth in terms of the 
wide-ranging issues covered by the agreement. For its part, I view its level of detail or 
specificity in relation to the degree to which the measures agreed may translate into 
concrete policy actions and be subject to monitoring and follow-up.  
The comprehensiveness and specificity of the CRR resulted out of the parties’ 
rationale and incentives to reach such an agreement. On one hand, the government’s 
negotiators were interested in reaching an agreement that would meet three purposes at 
the same time. First, the agreement had to include substantive and ambitious reforms 
that would speak to FARC’s agrarian demands and allow them to continue in the 
negotiating table. Second, it also had to be framed in a way that would be received 
positively in the public opinion in Colombia to secure a broad support during its 
implementation phase. Thirdly, it had to develop obligations and accountability 
mechanisms for the state that would overcome the traditional inertia of the institutions 
of not fulfilling the promises made to rural communities and social movements. The 
government negotiators did think at the table in Havana that the CRR could lead to 
change the political incentives of not paying attention to the countryside by including 
commitments with annual goals, such as the Land Fund. As I will show in Chapters 6 
and 7, internal and external difficulties prior and during the implementation showed 
that events happened in a different way. Yet, it is important to highlight the logic 
behind the CRR’s agreement at the negotiation phase. For the FARC, in turn, it was 
important that the CRR reflected the aspirations of their armed struggle so that they 
could justify in their own membership that the insurgency had been worth it and that 
they would maintain their historical claims of agrarian reform once they transition 
towards a legal political party. This meant, moreover, that there had be measurable 
commitments and plans in the agreement. 
Based on interviews and my first-hand experience in the negotiations as a 
government advisor, in what follows, first, I describe the agreement’s 
comprehensiveness by showing how the negotiating parties developed the notion of 
“comprehensive rural reform”. While recognizing the importance of addressing land 
access issues, this notion framed them within a broader policy strategy aimed at the 
rural inhabitants’ well-being in all of its dimensions. Moreover, the proposals handed 
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over by civil society at the events organized as part of the peace talks’ mechanisms of 
citizenship participation allowed introducing or reinforcing new issues in the 
agreement, as well as making visible and opening policy space for previously 
marginalized rural voices and alternative agendas. The CRR, in this way, condensed – 
in its ambitious scope and goals – the widely shared aspiration for rural change 
postponed for decades.  
Then, I examine the agreement’s specificity and its effect on policymaking by 
tracing the crafting process of the proposals handed over by the government to the 
FARC in the negotiating table, which eventually turned into the agreed provisions. 
Drawing from existing policies, civil society and technical experts’ recommendations 
and relevant international experiences, the government’s delegation constructed these 
proposals pushing forward the limits of what was feasible but also making sure that 
these were realistic and linked to ongoing institutional processes. Examples of the 
proposals made on land access serve to highlight how the specificity of the agreement 
had an impact on policymaking.  
 
Framing the Rural Development Item through a Comprehensive Lens           
Reaching common ground on the CRR was not easy. Although the item’s headings 
defined in the exploratory meeting helped to set the parameters of the discussion, the 
starting points of each of the delegations were starkly different. FARC called for a 
radical land reform of the 1960s variety that entailed a massive expropriation of 
unproductive land and a revision of oil and mining contracts. In contrast, the 
government considered the need to address rural poverty and inequality as part of the 
peace agenda, but within the existing constitutional and legal framework. Even if there 
was a shared belief that rural development was central to a peacebuilding agenda, the 
views on the root problems of the countryside and on the measures to act on them 
were quite apart from each other, as explained in the previous section. An idea that 
served to bridge the gap between the two delegations was the need to approach the 
issue through a comprehensive lens. In line with the UNDP’s report, this meant 
emphasizing “rural” rather than “agrarian” reform as the overarching conception 
guiding the issue’s discussions. This framing of the issue placed the accent on the living 
161 
conditions (bienestar) of rural inhabitants and not on the number of expropriated 
hectares: “the ultimate objective [of the CRR] is the eradication of poverty and the 
total realization of the needs of citizens in rural areas […]”(Gobierno de Colombia and 
Farc 2016, p. 13). Moreover, it focused on the territory (territorio) rather than on the 
individual plot, stressing the importance of strengthening public goods provision to 
foster economic growth and equality at the regional level. By centering on the bienestar 
with a territorial focus, this framing fruitfully led the discussion towards identifying the 
different measures required for achieving it and away from the zero-sum approach of 
land redistribution. Hence, a broad conception of the issue, not entirely focused on the 
contentious question of modifying the highly unequal agrarian structure, allowed 
finding common ground in less controversial policy areas without leaving unaddressed 
the land access and use issues. 
Guided by this comprehensive lens, the delegations structured the agreement on 
rural development around four key pillars – land, public goods and agricultural 
supports, right to food and regional development programs. In the agreement, the 
negotiating parties brought together previously disconnected issues into a single, 
coherent vision of rural reform that recognized the need of paying attention to 
historically marginalized rural areas and communities and gave visibility to alternative 
voices. The Comprehensive Rural Reform, as the negotiators named it, created a 
distinct policy discourse that opened the space for and gave legitimacy to progressive 
demands that otherwise would not have become part of the policy agenda. Inscribing 
within the overall peace agreement considerations, principles and provisions aimed at 
achieving substantive transformations in the countryside, the CRR gave symbolic and 
political weight to distributive aspirations long-held by ignored sectors of society. In 
fact, once it was agreed, the demand of fully implementing the CRR became a major 
mobilization discourse of nation-wide rural social movements in key political 
moments.      
The first pillar of the CRR, access and use of rural land, encompassed provisions 
associated with the distribution of land to landless peasants, the regularization of rural 
property rights, land conflict resolution mechanisms, the rural cadaster and land tax, 
and environmental schemes to protect agricultural frontier zones and fragile 
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ecosystems. It was the most difficult pillar to negotiate as it dealt with the core 
differences between the delegations. Interestingly though, as Moreno (2016) notes, this 
pillar was able to include distinct policy goals within a single strategy clearly 
differentiating between instruments of land access from those of land use that often 
tend to be conflated. Most importantly, this pillar upheld land distribution as a state 
commitment, after it had been discarded as a policy goal since the 1990s when market-
led mechanisms replaced the more traditional ones on land reform. These mechanisms 
took on proposals made by peasant organizations, like the Mesa de Unidad Agraria 
(Agrarian Unity Table), which were very active in the discussions on the rural 
development bill drafted by minister Restrepo in 2011 and 2012 and in the formal civil 
society events organized as part of the peace talks (Gobierno de Colombia 2018). 
This pillar also developed the notion of “comprehensive access to land”, meaning 
that the state had the responsibility not only of giving land to landless peasants but also 
of providing basic goods and supports to secure that this land would actually become a 
productive asset in overcoming poverty and generating an adequate livelihood. This 
notion was coined by the government’s delegation in the negotiating table based on 
policy lessons of previous land distribution programs in Latin America that did not 
succeed in tackling rural poverty. Earlier interventions focused on allocating land only, 
without considering the need of complimenting it with additional agricultural supports 
or goods, such as irrigation, technical assistance or marketing supports (De Janvry and 
Sadoulet 2002). Including these additional supports in the agreement also responded to 
the historical demand made by peasant organizations for state supports that, as 
described in Chapter 4, were quite meagre during Uribe’s administrations. 
   The second pillar of the CRR, called “national development plans” materialized 
into concrete provisions the notion of “comprehensive access” by establishing 
commitments on infrastructure, social development and agricultural supports. All of 
these plans had the overarching goal of overcoming rural poverty and inequality and 
closing the gap between rural and urban areas in a fifteen-year transition phase. Based 
on the multi-dimensional definition of poverty, in these plans the government adopted 
policy commitments geared towards improving the living conditions of rural 
inhabitants that included measures on tertiary roads, electricity, irrigation, education, 
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health, housing, drinkable water, rural extension, agricultural financing, marketing 
supports, and social protection (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2016, p. 24). All of 
these measures were drawn from existing sectoral policies. What the CRR achieved 
was bringing them into the peace agreement language of commitments and provisions 
and introducing three policy conceptions that were not prevalent in the government at 
that time. One was that rural areas demanded more institutional presence and higher 
public investment, particularly in terms of general public goods and services. This 
conception captured minister Restrepo’s view of privileging public goods over private 
subsidies in rural development policy. By translating it into concrete measures in the 
peace agreement, the negotiators cemented this view as a state commitment as a way 
of further influencing the sector’s institutional reform toward a distributive direction.  
A second conception that the agreement reinforced was that of adapting sectoral 
policies to rural contexts. For example, the health, education and housing plans in the 
CRR explicitly recognized setting up flexible infrastructure and service models to 
respond to the geographic and cultural conditions of rural areas. In practice, this 
prompted the corresponding institutions to design new programs or to modify existing 
ones as part of the preparatory process of the agreement’s implementation taking into 
account rural communities’ voices and specific needs. In the case of education, for 
instance, the commitment of achieving universal coverage with comprehensive service 
provision for early childhood meant adjusting the geographic areas, the budgeting, the 
infrastructure planning and the staff deployment of the early childhood national policy 
in order to include the agreement’s goal of covering children of rural areas (Gobierno 
de Colombia and FARC 2016, p. 26). Similarly, in relation to the provision geared 
towards creating a “special public health model for dispersed rural areas with emphasis 
on prevention”, the Ministry of Health had to extend its ongoing small pilot public 
health intervention in Guanía, a department in the Amazon region, to other rural areas 
like Chocó (in the Pacific region). Even though the preparatory process for 
implementing these commitments was not effective enough, as it is described in 
Chapter 6, at least the agreement served to push sectoral policy guidelines into 
considering the specificity of rural areas, a shift demanded long ago by experts, 
regional authorities and civil society but had not happened.      
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A third policy conception endorsed by the national development plans was that of 
supporting family agriculture – or as the agreement puts it the “family-run and 
community-based economies” – as the basis for equitable rural development (Gobierno 
de Colombia and FARC 2016, p. 29). The agreement recognized that “the 
development of rural areas depends on a proper balance between the various existing 
forms of production – family farming, agro-industry, tourism, agriculture on a 
commercial scale – […] and on [the] promotion and encouragement on an equal basis 
of links between small-scale rural production and other production models”. 
Nonetheless, it emphasized the need to especially promote and protect the family-run 
and community-based economies, a discourse that contrasts with that of the Uribe 
administration, which did not conceive the peasant economy as a target of agricultural 
supports but only of social assistance. The six plans established in the CRR to 
stimulate the agricultural production of family agriculture are geared towards 
promoting the economic empowerment of this sector. Drawing from civil society 
proposals made during the peace talks’ public events, these plans –on stimuli for a 
solidarity and cooperative economy, technical assistance, credit, marketing, 
formalization of rural labor and social protection, and associations – turned this 
conception into a comprehensive set of concrete measures, some of which were not 
present before in the institutional policy discourse. For instance, the Comprehensive 
National Technical, Technological and Research Assistance Plan) included a provision 
for “promoting and protecting native seeds and seed banks” in a participatory way and 
incorporating communities’ traditional knowledge (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 
2016, p. 29), a claim that rural organizations like Cumbre Agraria had made at the 
different participatory spaces. In this sense, the agreement served as a vehicle for 
introducing progressive policy views and measures that in the ordinary policy cycle 
would not have taken place. 
Complementing the “national development plans”, the third pillar of the CRR was 
the creation of a “system for the progressive realization of the right to food”. This 
system defined specific measures to eradicate hunger and malnutrition, improve the 
food availability, increase food access and develop healthy consumption and nutrition 
habits. Although a national food security policy already existed, with the creation of 
165 
this system the negotiating parties sought to advance towards the materialization of the 
right to food, highlighting the relationship between small-scale food production, rural 
livelihoods and adequate nutrition in rural areas. The agreement’s focus on promoting 
local and regional food production and food markets and on building local and 
regional food councils moves the existing policy towards a more decentralized, 
participatory and production-oriented approach. Proposals on the right to food made 
by rural women’s organizations like ACSOMAYO served as a basis of the agreement, 
which included, amongst other things, acknowledging “the fundamental role played by 
rural women in their contribution to fulfilling the right to food” (Gobierno de 
Colombia and FARC 2016, p. 32; Lancheros 2017). 
The fourth pillar of the CRR were the Territorially Focused Development Programs 
(PDETs, for its initials in Spanish), a new kind of state intervention tailored for the 
conflict-ridden regions that best reflected the comprehensive orientation of the 
agreement. Previous regional interventions, such as the Programa Nacional de 
Rehabilitación (PNR) of the late 1980s, the Peace and Development Programs of the 
early 2000s and the Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena (PCIM) of the late 
2000s, inspired the PDETs territorial orientation. Rather than focusing on families or 
sectoral projects, the PDETs aimed at improving in a ten-year period the living 
conditions of the inhabitants of sixteen regions selected based on four criteria (armed 
confrontation, poverty levels, weak institutional capacity, and illegal economies). For 
every region, the PDET would develop participatory action plans containing 
assessments and measures on the different issues areas (infrastructure, social 
development, agricultural supports). In turn, the governmental bodies at the national, 
regional and local levels would coordinate the response to these action plans in terms 
of the delivery of goods and services required. The execution of these multi-level and 
multi-actor action plans in the peacebuilding phase would foster, at once, economic 
inclusion, rural citizens’ empowerment and reconciliation. The PDETs reflected the 
aspiration of marginalized rural communities to receive preferential state treatment at 
least during a transitional period as a way of balancing the historical abandonment 
these regions had suffered due to violence and the lack of state presence. The PDET’s 
broad aims of enabling rural inhabitants’ effective exercise of their political, economic, 
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social and cultural rights and reversing the effects of the conflict, presupposed the 
development of a strong relationship between the state and communities as well as a 
strong vertical and horizontal coordination between state agencies. In this perspective, 
land distribution and titling were only one kind of measures among a wide set of 
measures geared towards achieving sustainable rural development. Without the CRR, 
this territorial approach to rural development would have gained political attention 
and would not become part of rural community’s expectations of how public policies 
should be designed and implemented. 
The comprehensiveness of the CRR, supported by its four key pillars, was 
complemented by its specificity in achieving a robust agreement that was an important 
catalyze of the policy shift observed.  
 
The CRR’s Specific Measures 
Peace implementation researchers have recognized as an important attribute of the 
CRR its level of detail (Kroc Institute 2017; Salgar 2016). Unlike other peace 
agreements, the CRR goes beyond general considerations and purposes (e.g. “reducing 
rural poverty”) by establishing as well numeric goals and concrete state commitments 
translatable into policy actions and subject to monitoring and follow-up. According to 
the Kroc Institute Colombia Peace Matrix, the CRR contains 93 stipulations (Kroc 
Institute 2017). Based on the agreement, the Implementation Framework Plan 
prepared by the government, defined 150 outputs with their corresponding indicators 
carry out the CRR (Gobierno de Colombia 2017). The CRR possesses not only a 
significant discursive power that serves to shift the policy towards a comprehensive and 
distributive orientation, but also contains exceptional measures and implementation 
mechanisms that have a direct effect on policymaking (creation of institutions, 
rearrangement of programs, budgeting decisions, etc.). Put differently, the CRR 
crystallized a reformist vision that while was based on some initiatives underway it 
took existing policy into a whole new level, cementing this major reform into a peace 
accord with binding commitments that would not have existed if it had not been for 
the procedural and political aspects of the peace talks. In order to understand the effect 
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of the measures agreed on policymaking, it is relevant to trace the drafting process of 
the CRR’s provisions during the negotiating phase.  
The CRR’s crafting was the result of a writing process in Havana that started with a 
government’s draft of each of the specific items and ended with a discussion and a 
series of revisions of the original draft at the negotiating table. To prepare these drafts, 
the government – specifically the technical staff of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Peace (OHCP) – studied FARC’s proposals on the issue and 
prepared a technical briefing for the negotiating team based on existing policies, 
experts’ recommendations, civil society’s proposals and relevant international policy 
experiences. Before discussing this draft with the FARC, the government’s delegation 
reviewed the final wording of every commitment with the corresponding minister to 
ensure its viability and adequacy. In various issues, nonetheless, the draft prepared by 
the government’s negotiators went beyond the sector’s current policy instruments, as it 
sought to outline ambitious measures for the peacebuilding phase. In this way, the 
agreement served to push forward the existing policy in terms of its distributive 
orientation, while at the same time maintaining realistic goals. The provisions on land 
access serve to understand better this scaling-up process induced by the agreement. 
The CRR’s provisions agreed on land access were instrumental in mobilizing the 
government’s policy towards developing previously nonexistent programs on land 
distribution and strengthening the institutional framework associated with rural land 
and property rights. The Land Fund (Fondo de Tierras) created to benefit peasants 
without or with insufficient land was the most important provision agreed on this item. 
First, because it brought together into a single fund six different sources from which the 
state could recover land: (1) land acquired through illegal activities; (2) illegal 
occupation or appropriation of state land (baldíos); (3) land located in Forest Reserve 
Areas that had lost its environmental use; (4) unexploited land; (5) land acquired or 
expropriated by the state for public utility reasons; and (6) land donations made by 
private actors (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2016,  pp. 14–15). Even though most 
of these sources were already part of the legal framework (all except private donations), 
they had not been conceptualized as part of a large fund for distribution. 
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Moreover, this provision, as I pointed out in Chapter 4, specified the administrative 
and legal procedures that the state possessed to obtain the land in each source and 
indicated the revisions some of these procedures needed to be more effective. For 
example, in relation to the land acquired through illegal activities, the provision stated, 
“the National Government will speed up the necessary reforms for making the legal 
ownership cessation procedure more flexible” (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 
2016, p. 15). Second, the Land Fund was highly relevant because it defined a goal of 
procuring and distributing three million hectares of land during the next twelve years 
of implementation. This ambitious figure, which was subject to intense discussion in 
the negotiating table, surpasses the total number of hectares distributed by the state 
previously – between 1962 and 2011, over 1.9 million hectares were distributed to 
120,295 peasant families (Arteaga et al. 2017). Therefore, it presupposes a great 
institutional capacity to be able to do so, thus forcing the state to make the necessary 
adjustments to achieve this goal. Third, because this provision goes hand in hand with 
the creation of a Beneficiaries Registry that, on one hand, explicitly defined the 
vulnerable and poor rural population as the fund’s target and, on the other, established 
the need to create an administrative and participatory procedure to select the 
beneficiaries. This registry was an innovation of the agreement which, based on 
Brazil’s land reform program, sought to tackle the problem of assigning land to 
ineligible people (e.g., not poor or not involved in agriculture) that was very common 
throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s (Personal communication official from 
Brazil’s Ministry of Agrarian Development, February 2, 2013). 
Other relevant provisions on land access complemented the Land Fund. In terms of 
land distribution, the government adopted two additional market-led mechanisms, a 
comprehensive subsidy for the purchase of land by beneficiaries in prioritized areas 
and a special credit line for the purchase of land. Both of them already existed, but did 
not have an effective execution. Since the early 2000s, the subsidy had become the only 
policy instrument to distribute land generating a high expectation on peasants but with 
a low impact due to its high demand and tight budget (Deininger and Binswanger 
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1999; Borras 2003).49 The agreement instead conceived it as an instrument that may be 
useful in specific circumstances to solve cases of lack of sufficient land. Likewise, the 
special credit line for purchase was created by FINAGRO (the National Fund for the 
Financing of the Agricultural Sector) before the agreement, but had had a low demand 
due to its short-term deadlines, high interest rates and strict guarantees requirements. 
By contrast, the CRR conceived the credit line as an additional instrument to the Land 
Fund geared towards small farmers in need of buying extra land to secure their 
livelihood. Furthermore, the agreement also established a provision of creating a 
massive land titling plan, thus combining land distribution (Land Fund, 
comprehensive subsidy and credit line) with land formalization as a means to ensuring 
land access. The plan aimed at titling seven million hectares of small and medium-
sized rural properties, including both occupation of state land (ocupación de baldíos) and 
informal tenure of private lands.  
The CRR, in use of the exceptional scenario the peace agreement offered in terms 
of issue linkage and definition of binding commitments, connected the provisions on 
land access with other land provisions essential for their proper functioning. First, it 
defined a safeguard to avoid future land concentration, guaranteeing that the allocated 
land would be inalienable and non-seizable for a period of seven years. Second, it 
devised a preferential targeting of the agricultural supports comprised in the national 
development plans (technical assistance, credit, marketing, etc.) for the beneficiaries of 
the land access measures to ensure that the land was part of a comprehensive policy to 
overcome rural poverty. Third, it made a direct connection with other relevant 
institutional mechanisms created on the land use provisions, including: the agrarian 
jurisdiction aimed at improving land conflict resolution and ensuring the rule of law in 
the countryside; the multi-purpose cadaster system that, among other things, would 
facilitate the land titling processes and stimulate the productive use of land; and the 
measures on environmental protection to avoid further land allocation in agricultural 
                                                 
49 Between 2010 and 2012, the INCODER (the National Rural Development Institute) allocated 10,248 
hectares through the subsidy, benefiting 1,529 peasant families. The goal was to allocate 37,500 hectares 
and benefit 7,550. The institute received more than 80,000 applications to this subsidy (Moreno 2016, p. 
16). 
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frontier areas and providing alternative livelihoods to current rural dwellers of those 
areas (Gobierno de Colombia and Farc 2016:16–18). 
All of these specific provisions on land access induced concrete policy actions many 
of which were described in Chapter 4. For example, the creation of the Agencia 
Nacional de Tierras (the new land national authority) in December 2015 was the direct 
result of the government’s goal of preparing itself for the CRR’s implementation. The 
agency’s organizational structure was explicitly set up for carrying out the land 
distribution and land titling tasks with a territorial focus (see organizational diagram 
below). The Direction for the Social Ordering of Rural Property (Dirección de Gestión del 
Ordenamiento Social de la Propiedad) was created with the mandate of carrying out the 
land titling process with a territorial focus and through participatory mechanisms. For 
their part, the Legal Direction (Dirección de Gestión Jurídica de la Tierra) and the 
Direction for Land Access (Dirección de Acceso a Tierras) aimed at designing and 
operationalizing the Land Fund on the ground (see in Appendix 5 the organizational 
structure of the Land National Agency) (Agencia Nacional de Tierras 2018).  
Besides the agency, the government also issued Decree Law 902 on May 30, 2017 
formally creating legally all of the instruments of the land access provisions, including 
the Land Fund, the comprehensive subsidy for land purchase, the land titling plan, the 
Beneficiaries Registry and the comprehensive access (Presidencia de la República 
2017b). The drafting of this Decree Law, as part of the overall process of converting the 
agreement’s provisions into policy actions, was extremely difficult and full of 
contradictions, as the next chapter shows. Here though I want to emphasize that the 
government did translate these provisions into policy outputs that were not present 
before and that represented a change in the policy direction towards a distributive 




In this chapter, I analyzed how the negotiating parties included the rural development 
item into the peace agenda during the exploratory phase and how this item became the 
Comprehensive Rural Reform agreement. In doing so, I developed the second causal 
factor of my conceptual framework, namely, the peace exceptionality. Drawing from 
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constructivist approaches on policy change, I argued that Santos’ reformist vision 
described in Chapter 4 informed the government’s position in Havana, which was 
essential for the inclusion of the rural development item in the exploratory phase and 
the drafting of the CRR. The CRR, in turn, further heightened the reformist orientation 
of Santos’ policy, an outcome that was not expected from a critical agrarian political 
economy perspective. Despite the status quo policy trajectory, the transitional context 
opened a space for key decision-makers to push for a progressive policy approach that 
was institutionally and politically viable. The normative linkage between end of 
conflict, lasting peace and rural reform played a crucial role in mobilizing the 
government’s acceptance of such an approach during the negotiating phase, which also 
sought to respond to FARC’s historical agrarian demands. 
Moreover, based on peacemaking literature, I argued that the agreement’s 
robustness was also essential not only in translating the agreed provisions into a clear 
and specific policy roadmap with concrete policy effects, but also in generating enough 
incentives at the negotiating table for both parties to stay on it. The CRR’s robustness 
was important for furthering FARC’s secretariat decision of laying down weapons and 
transitioning to legal political life. The negotiations still had ahead various items that 
were extremely difficult to negotiate, such as the transitional justice system created and 
the disarmament agreement. Yet, FARC’s secretariat had already made up its mind to 
participate legally in politics. Even though, as I show in the next two chapters, the 
implementation of the CRR encountered several internal and external obstacles, 
FARC’s decision to carry out the disarmament process during the first semester of 
2017 was mainly motivated by its urgency of getting involved in the congress elections 
of 2018. There were internal divisions within the insurgency with regards to disarming 
without knowing whether the government was going to fulfill its substantive 
commitments, especially regarding the CRR. Nonetheless, the leadership of those 
giving priority of making the political transition to civilian life won over those that 
remained skeptical about the implementation phase. In fact, the structural forces 
described in Chapter 4 did not disappear in the transitional context and effectively 
resisted efforts to alter the status quo course. No matter how binding the agreement 
was, in the post-agreement period, two competing policy agendas coexisted in Santos’ 
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government. One favoring the rural elite, especially agribusiness, and the other the 




Chapter 6. Weak Government Capacity in Implementing the 





The implementation stage of a peace agreement is a long-term endeavor. Perhaps it is 
premature make an assessment of the effect of the CRR on policymaking only one year 
and a half after the final accord was reached in November 2016 for a process that is 
planned to last at least fifteen years (Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2016:23–24). 
However, considering that the CRR was initially agreed in mid-2013, this five-year 
period (mid-2013 up until mid-2018) of preparation and early implementation at the 
central level, without looking at the varying projects on the ground,50 already indicates 
broad trends regarding the challenges ahead. Like in Central America and South 
Africa, is unlikely that in post-conflict Colombia a significant rural reform may take 
place.  In this chapter, in order to develop the last hypothesized causal factor of the 
conceptual framework (low government capacity), I provide an explanation as to why, 
despite the ambitious provisions set out in the CRR, the implementation of these 
distributive measures encountered serious constraints that made it more limited and 
ambiguous than what it was initially anticipated by the negotiators in Havana. 
Chapter 4 showed how the Santos administration undertook in an unexpected – 
even if limited – way a shift in the direction of rural development policy towards a 
more distributional orientation and away from the status quo trajectory it had followed 
in the previous decades. A policy shift that was definitive in setting the stage for the 
government’s position in Havana on the issue of rural development. In effect, Chapter 
5 showed how this item was introduced into the peace agenda and argued that the 
peace talks opened an exceptional window for change, crystallizing in the CRR a 
progressive discourse on rural reform and drafting specific provisions with direct policy 
                                                 
50 Assessing the agreement’s implementation on the ground is an entire research agenda on its own. 
There are significant variations across regions, issues and sectors, and many of the projects are only on 
the design or early implementation stage. There is a vast scholarship on peacebuilding initiatives at the 
regional and local levels in Colombia, complemented by ongoing research on the implementation of the 
current agreement that I refer to in the conclusions chapter.     
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effects that pushed further the distributive measures in favor of land access, rural public 
goods and supports to family agriculture. Nonetheless, even with the efforts made to 
advance in this new policy agenda, by 2018, many of the most significant measures of 
rural development, as well as of other essential components of the agreement, lagged 
behind. In other words, when combining the various factor at work in my INUS based 
explanation, the observed outcome was more influenced by the status quo trajectory 
and the low government capacity than by the leverage offered by the peace agreement 
to enact rural change.   
In this chapter I argue that the policy change induced by the CRR is rather fragile 
and, at least as of  yet, has not resembled a “paradigm shift” in Peter Hall’s (1993) 
terms. These difficulties and constraints are examined both internally within the 
government (this chapter) and externally through the sociopolitical pressures 
(described in Chapter 7). My argument is based on the premise that, as pointed out in 
Chapter 2, it is theoretically relevant to account for the concrete variables affecting the 
CRR’s implementation at the institutional level. From a structuralist standpoint, 
critical agrarian scholars may contend that, insofar there was no change in the balance 
of class forces during this transitional period, the lack of a real shift in rural 
development policy was nothing but expected. This perspective is indeed useful to gain 
an understanding of the structural forces constraining action and choices, as showed in 
Chapter 4. However, it does not describe – and actually tends to ignore – how and in 
what ways these forces interact with and operate under meso- and micro- conditions and 
processes, such as concrete institutional environments, policy decisions and political 
actors. In this regard, in order to have a more complete explanation of the outcome of 
ambiguous and limited policy change, I pay attention to the role played by domestic 
institutions and social actors in the juncture prior to and after the agreement was 
reached in weakening the government’s capacity to enforce the CRR’s provisions. 
In bridging the structural analysis with an agency-oriented approach, I argue, on 
one hand, that the peace talks did in fact give place to a political scenario with fewer 
restrictions, in which policy actors had more margins of maneuverability than usual 
and where the outcome was more indeterminate and open to short-term interactions, 
choices and political crafting. At the same time, however, even under these exceptional 
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circumstances, Santos’ rural development policymaking was still dependent on and 
bound by pre-existing norms, institutional capabilities and power structures, which 
ended up greatly affecting the leverage for change offered by the transition (Mahoney 
and Snyder 1999:5; Capano 2009:16; see also Knill and Lenschow 2001). 
At the institutional level, I argue that although the transitional context did create 
the incentives and exceptional conditions for developing new procedures geared 
towards implementing the CRR’s provisions, the government did not structurally alter 
the existing policy framework in order to give full-on life to the rural development 
reform. The government agencies did prioritize their budget towards the regions 
selected for the implementation, but the existing instruments and programs to deliver 
services were not changed to reflect the agreement’s principles, for example, in terms of 
its territorial focus and participative approach. Even further, there was actually no 
policy crisis or ideational collapse, often seen as a pre-condition for the emergence of a 
new policy paradigm (Donnelly and Hogan 2012). Instead, the new measures adopted 
were an additive to the existing framework. Regardless of the transitional context, 
institutions in charge of the implementation of the CRR, in particular the Ministry of 
Agriculture, kept up doing things “business as usual”, as the new norm did not become 
dominant. The defenders of the CRR’s vision within the government – mainly the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Victims’ Unit and the Land 
Restitution Unit – did not gain enough ascendance over the policy orientation and thus 
were not able to consolidate the CRR’s large-scale adoption. With other agencies and 
bureaucrats in charge of the implementation different from the ones that participated in 
the negotiation phase, the CRR’s implementation suffered from the lack of a robust 
institutional coordination at the central level during its planning and early 
implementation. In addition, rural development policy remained subject to clientelistic 
transactions required to maintain the loose political coalition and prone to capture by 
the agribusiness elite. 
 
6.2 Weak Government Capacity 
 
Since the negotiations started, the government had stated that no matter how difficult 
the talks were in Havana with FARC, the implementation phase was going to be the 
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real challenge of the peace process (Jaramillo 2013). The implementation entailed 
translating a wide variety of commitments agreed into practice through the enactment 
of bills, administrative decisions, services provision, etc., in a highly coordinated 
manner and in a vast geographic area, where the central government had never had a 
strong presence. The negotiation process involved directly only the government’s 
negotiating team and the FARC’s delegation in Havana, as described in Chapter 5. 
President Santos had command and control of every major decision in Havana. 
Moreover, his negotiating team, although in close touch with all the cabinet members 
depending on the issue area being discussed, had the mandate to agree on provisions 
committing the national government to the execution of tasks on the ground. The 
implementation, on the contrary, due to its complexity and multi-sectoral nature, 
required by definition the active participation of an ample spectrum of actors – central 
government agencies, the military, regional and local authorities, congress, the courts, 
the private sector, civil society organizations and international cooperation agencies, 
among others. Moving from peacemaking in Havana to peacebuilding in Colombia 
implied therefore a strong leadership of the executive not only to confront the ongoing 
political opposition that the peace process had encountered from the outset but also to 
articulate into a single peacebuilding agenda these multiple tasks and actors involved. 
It required as well the government’s ability to take advantage of the political leverage 
offered by the exceptional window opened by the peace talks in order to incorporate 
within the ordinary policy process the ambitious measures set forth in the agreement. 
In other words, it required what it may be called a robust government capacity. 
In the peace implementation literature, various authors have argued that the lack of 
state capacity explains why various peace processes have failed in the post-conflict 
stage (DeRouen et al. 2010; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Peksen, Zetnep, and Drury 2007). Whether expressed in terms of low levels of 
economic development or low taxation capabilities, weak state capacity appears as a 
key variable in civil war recurrence and implementation failure. In this literature, 
however, government capacity is understood in broad terms simply as the “state’s 
ability to accomplish the goals it pursues, possibly in the face of resistance by actors 
within the state” (DeRouen et al. 2010, p. 335). Although it is a useful definition, it 
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needs to be disaggregated it into more specific categories in order to move beyond the 
conventional story, according to which weak states recovering from conflict fail in 
sustaining peace during the implementation phase due to their inability to deliver and 
their dependence on international intervention (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis, quoted in 
DeRouen et al. 2010, p. 335). As pointed out in the case selection section in Chapter 1, 
Colombia, by the time the agreement was reached, was classified by the World Bank 
as a middle-income country with relatively strong state institutions, at least at the 
central level. Hence, the story of why there is been a limited implementation of the 
CRR so far has to do not so much with a generalized absence of the state but with a 
number of more nuanced and complex political and policy processes taking place 
within and outside the government that need to be properly traced. Still, these 
processes may fall under the concept of weak or low government capacity if this term is 
pinned down into variables that allow fulfilling its explanatory potential. The concept 
may apply to understand the implementation process of the different aspects included 
in the agreement (e.g., transitional justice, political participation, measures against 
illegal drugs), insofar as all of them share structural features of the Santos government. 
Yet, I will use it only to describe the government’s limitations in enforcing the 
Comprehensive Rural Reform and thus in influencing on rural development 
distributive policy change.  
Considering the need to account for different scales and sources of intra-
government power dynamics, I identify three interrelated yet distinct factors that depict 
the government’s weak capacity: (1) poor institutional performance in the CRR’s 
preparation and early implementation; (2) a fragmented and clientelistic-based political 
coalition; (3) and an ongoing lobbying by the agribusiness elite. Each of these factors 
refers to a different level of institutional analysis – correspondingly, the bureaucracy, 
the political regime, and interest groups – and thus points to distinct sites of power. 
Combined, as a set of reflectors in a kaleidoscope that when in contact with each other 
give light to a specific pattern, these factors serve to open up the blackbox of 




6.3 The Executive’s Office Ineffective Efforts to Prepare the CRR’s 
Implementation 
 
Drawing lessons from the failed implementation processes in Guatemala and El 
Salvador, the Colombian government readily started to prepare itself for the 
implementation phase of the Havana agreement even before the negotiations ended 
(Guatemalan Advisor of the Post-conflict Direction, Personal Communication, April 
20, 2015). In fact, right away after the CRR’s agreement was reached in May 2013, the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OHCP) appointed an advisor to the 
minister of finance as the coordinator of the planning and preparatory process for the 
implementation of the commitments made by the government in this first agreement. 
With this appointment began what would be a series of discontinued and at the end 
ineffective efforts led by the Executive Office to direct and organize the 
implementation process in an orderly manner. Although the issue area was 
“exceptional” in the sense that it dealt with the implementation of an agreement, its 
implementation followed an ordinary policy decision-making process, and analytically 
should be treated as such, “comprising twists and turns, transformations, abandonment 
and relaunch”, as well as multiple “variations of meaning, forms and alliances” 
(Zittoun 2014, p. 172).     
References to central governments tend to assume they are a single, coherent unit. 
In practice, however, governments are far from reflecting this image of a well-
demarcated entity. Within them, there are multiple rivalries and contending divisions 
and agendas across sub-units, even on delicate issues such as a peace agreement. It is 
crucial to disaggregate Santos’ government into its smaller components (e.g., agencies, 
ministries, departments, offices, bureaus) to account for the interests and motivations 
that coexisted and competed between each other within the Santos’ government during 
the planning and early implementation process of the CRR (Migdal 2001; see also 
Gupta 2012, Ch.2).51 Analyzing these intra-government dynamics, including the 
                                                 
51 Providing an in-depth theoretical and methodological discussion that problematizes the ‘state’ and 
how to study it is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in the description that I develop in this 
section I have been influenced by the literature on the anthropology of the state, particularly by Migdal 
(2001) and Gupta (2012). My own work could is not an institutional ethnography in the strict sense of 
the term. Yet, as I explained in the Introduction, my seven-year experience working as a government 
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decisions of and interactions between technocrats, politicians and decision-makers, is 
of crucial importance to depict the overall difficulties the CRR’s implementation had 
and its limited cumulative effect. In what follows, I describe the various initiatives and 
exceptional measures led by the Executive Office of the President between May 2013 
and March 2018 to prepare the government for the agreement’s implementation. Based 
on interviews I undertook for this research and my own participation at the OHCP,52 
the description below highlights five key aspects that affected the CRR’s preparation: 
(1) a loss of presidential agency in the policy areas entrusted to ministers in charge of 
the implementation process; (2) a change in the leading actors from the negotiation to 
the implementation phase; (3) insufficient institutional resources (money and time) to 
prepare for the CRR’s implementation; (4) mismatch between the negotiation’s timing 
and the sector’s agendas and priorities; and (5) a lack of continuity in the overall 
strategy of planning, follow-up and oversight of the sector’s responsibilities.  
 
The Institutional Framework to Prepare for the Implementation  
Following the appointment of the minister of finance’s advisor as the coordinator of 
the planning tasks, the OHCP began to consider the various financial, legal, 
institutional and operational dimensions that putting the CRR into practice entailed. In 
June 2013, the Consejo de Ministros (or cabinet meeting) discussed a first briefing of all 
of these issues – including an initial budget, a map of tasks and responsible government 
actors and a timeline with short-term, mid-term and long-term goals (Former Advisor 
                                                 
advisor, two in the Ministry of Agriculture and five in the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, 
crucially shaped and informed my empirical and theoretical reflections. The analysis of this section 
merely scratches the surface of the “anthropological” turn on the Colombian state. Recent 
anthropological work undertaken by researchers like Juana Dávila, Kristally Roxani and Gwen 
Burnyeat provide rich institutional ethnographies of Santos administration and the transitional context.  
52 Working at the Thematic Direction at the OHCP, which is part of the Departamento Administrativo de la 
Presidencia de la República (DAPR) or the Administrative Department of the Presidency, I had a direct 
participation on the discussions and decisions taken at the presidential level on the preparatory tasks for 
the agreement’s implementation. As part of the Presidential coordinating team of the preparatory tasks 
for the implementation of the peace agreement between March 2015 and August 2017, I had direct 
interaction with a wide variety of bureaucrats and decision-makers of more than twenty central 
government agencies. My everyday work consisted precisely in organizing meetings and exchanging 
communications with the technical staff and top-level officials of these institutions in relation to the 
agreement’s implementation. I have a personal archive of e-mails, memorandums and briefings taken 
during these years, which have served as empirical information for this analysis besides the interviews 
carried out with officials of these various ministries and offices.  
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of the Ministry of Finance, Personal Communication, May 8, 2018). At that point, the 
negotiations were still reserved and the partial agreements were not publicly available. 
Yet, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the ministries were well aware of the 
agreement’s progress due to the meetings the negotiating team had with them and their 
teams in Bogotá to review and get their approval on the drafting of every provision. 
Still, at that cabinet meeting the OHCP handed out a document which translated the 
CRR’s commitments into policy outputs and outcomes so that each ministry or agency 
was aware of its own role and tasks for which it was responsible (Oficina del Alto 
Comisionado para la Paz 2013).  
In that early period of the preparatory process, the rest of the government was 
receptive to the orientation given by the Havana negotiators and the OHCP. As one 
OHCP advisor put it, “whenever we had a meeting with other agencies, they 
welcomed us warmly as they were curious in finding out how the talks were 
advancing” (Personal communication, Former Advisor of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Peace, September 18 2017). At that time though, when negotiations 
were at an incipient stage and it was not clear if these were going to succeed, the 
preparation process did not advance much. The ministries hence continued with their 
own policy priorities and agendas. Santos’s initial decision of separating the peace 
effort from the rest of the government’s agenda, in case these failed, made sense at the 
beginning. It gave the negotiations a necessary low profile to advance without affecting 
the government’s ordinary policies. However, it also inadvertently isolated the peace 
negotiators and the OHCP from the other ministries (Former Advisor of the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Peace 2017).  
In this context, from May 2013 up until the presidential elections one year later, the 
preparatory process did not make much progress. Facing the lack of an adequate 
institutional environment, by December 2013 the advisor of the Ministry of Finance 
decided not to continue in the coordinating post. “There simply was no political 
backing of this preparatory task. The stakes were not there at the time”, she explained 
(Former Advisor of the Ministry of Finance, Personal Communication, May 8, 2018). 
A comment made by an OHCP’s advisor sheds light on how the timing affected 
advancing this task. 
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Our timing was off. The rule at the negotiating table of ‘nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed’ played against the government’s preparatory process that year. 
We [the government] could have made important progress right after the CRR was 
agreed. At that time, the ministries and functionaries had it fresh in their minds and 
had high expectations about it. But the ministries could not have waited us until the 
final agreement. They had to stay on track with their own budget execution goals 
(Personal communication, Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Peace, May 5, 2018).  
 
This tension between the time of the negotiation in Havana and the time of the 
preparatory work in Bogotá lingered on. Nonetheless, the OHCP with the support of 
María Lorena Gutiérrez, the President’s Secretary General and closest adviser, 
continued working in this preparatory task. In bilateral meetings, they explained the 
matriz de alistamiento (or prepatatory matrix) to cabinet ministers and agencies, which 
indicated their assigned responsibilities. Moreover, Gutiérrez created an inter-sectoral 
committee on peace issues (then formally created in the National Development Plan) 
to make high-level decisions and resolve potential conflicts between commitments 
made in Havana and a minister’s initiative. This committee, however, did not have 
many sessions as one of its key attendants, Sergio Jaramillo, the High Commissioner 
for Peace, was most of the time away in Havana. Still, the committee was instrumental 
in the government’s decision of carrying out the 2014 National Agricultural Census. 
Santos had already decided on its realization, but the Ministry of Finance stopped its 
approval for a long time due fiscal constraints. At the committee, Santos urged his 
minister to execute his decision. In it, the peace negotiators pointed out that making 
the effort to update the 40-year old agricultural statistics would convey a message to 
the public and the FARC on the government’s serious commitment with the CRR’s 
implementation (El Universal 2013a). 
For the presidential campaign of 2014, Santos decided to ramp up the attention 
given to the peace process and assumed the defense of the negotiations as one of the 
campaign’s pillars for his re-election (Noticias RCN 2013; La Nación 2013; Reyes 
2013). After being re-elected in a close victory against Uribe’s candidate and with an 
explicit mandate of continuing with the peace negotiations, early in his second 
administration Santos created the Counselor Ministry of Post-conflict, an office 
ascribed to the Executive’s Office. He appointed as its head the retired Police General 
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Óscar Naranjo, who was along with Military General Jorge Enrique Mora the other 
General commissioned in 2012 as a government negotiator in Havana. Through his 
active career fighting against drug dealers, Naranjo had gained nation-wide credibility 
and acceptance (Noticias RCN 2014). By creating this ministry and immediately 
appointing Naranjo in it, Santos sought to provide additional resources to the planning 
and preparatory process of the implementation, even if the negotiations were far from 
ending.53 In the Post-conflict Direction (PCD), one of the key areas of this new 
Counselor Ministry, was appointed in March 2015 Alexandra Guaqueta, a top-level 
executive with a long trajectory in the private and think tank sectors in armed conflict 
and peace issues who had worked before with Sergio Jaramillo. In principle, the 
passing over of the responsibilities of the planning tasks of the OHCP to the PCD 
should have been an easy process. However, making a distinction between the tasks 
that would continue to be in charge of the OHCP and those that would be led now by 
the PCD was a difficult bureaucratic endeavor that lasted a couple of months. The 
technical staff at the OHCP, who had been involved in the negotiations in Havana, 
knew every detail of the partial agreements reached so far and had been working for 
over two years with the various ministries and agencies in the preparatory and 
planning process. For its part, the PCD’s newly recruited staff, although not previously 
involved in the negotiations, was eager to assume what was now their legal and 
institutional responsibility. Jaramillo and Naranjo settled their differences in a meeting. 
On one hand, they decided that the OHCP would continue to be in charge of the 
alistamiento institutional or institutional preparation with the support of the PCD in the 
follow-up. On the other, the PCD would focus for that initial period on developing the 
Rapid Response Strategy geared towards designing the projects for the first twelve 
months of the implementation. 
During this period, the OCHP developed a methodology for the preparatory 
process that included laying out a roadmap for planning the legal, financial, 
institutional and operational requirements for implementing each of the provisions 
                                                 
53 The structure of this new ministry reflected the President’s Office conception of laying down the 
ground for the implementation process. According to Decree 1649 of September 2014 that established its 
organizational structure, the ministry had a Post-conflict Direction, a Security Direction, a Human 
Rights Direction and the Direction for the Comprehensive Action against Anti-personnel Mines. 
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agreed and began working on it with the various institutions (Oficina del Alto 
Comisionado para la Paz 2015). Overall, the preparation of the CRR required more 
that more than 30 institutions, agencies or offices had to develop 32 “preparatory” 
plans that in turn had detailed sub-products and activities. For example, the creation of 
the Land Fund, a responsibility allocated to the President’s Secretary General, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the National Planning Office included drafting bill, 
designing the institutional structure of the fund, organizing the software and 
deployment of the personnel, among other activities. In July 2015, the OHCP 
presented this preparatory strategy at the minister’s cabinet and each minister received 
the tasks assigned. The president, moreover, sent each ministry a follow-up letter 
instructing them on their tasks. At this stage, the preparatory process made some 
progress. Every minister appointed a deputy minister as politically accountable on the 
progress made on these preparatory tasks and for briefing the president by weekly. A 
team of technical officials was set up in each of the ministries to follow-up on the day-
to-day activities and be in contact with the OHCP and the Executive’s Office. Through 
these teams, the Executive’s Office created a network of mid-level bureaucrats working 
on the agreement’s implementation, which became very useful over time to diffuse the 
peace agreement’s rationale and goals within the government. The Executive’s Office 
set up as well a monitoring system to assess the weekly goals. At the same time this 
process was taking place, the Rural Mission handed its recommendations over to the 
president regarding various policy areas. These served to reinforce the message made 
by the OHCP to the bureaucrats regarding the need to take advantage of the peace 
juncture to design rural policies, programs and projects incorporating new and 
ambitious ideas. 
Despite the progress made on the technical level, the ministries did not pay enough 
attention at the political level to the preparatory process. As I will show next, 
politicking and clientelistic transactions always got in the middle. The technical teams, 
at least in the ministries where these were created, did not receive the necessary 
resources nor time allocation to carry out properly the tasks assigned. On one hand, 
the government’s budget was constrained between 2014 and 2018 due to the 
unexpected downfall of fiscal revenues tied to the declining oil prices and its 
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macroeconomic orthodox policy. On the other, the ministries’ agendas privileged daily 
sectoral tasks over the CRR’s longer-term planning. Any headway made on this front – 
some ministries made more progress than others – was not the result of the presidential 
mandate, but depended instead on the contingent or personal interest of the minister 
appointed or the commitment and ability of the mid-level technocrats to move things 
forward without support of their bosses. As the negotiations did not move as fast as 
expected, central agencies became less and less interested in them and focused on their 
ordinary policymaking. Furthermore, the agreements reached were not included in the 
National Development Plan and therefore were not translated into specific budget lines 
and programs. As one advisor of the peace negotiations put it, “the mystique prevalent 
within the government in the early period of the peace talks was lost once these started 
to become too long” (Former Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Peace 2017). The difficult discussions with FARC in Havana did not allow the 
negotiators spending enough time in Bogotá sharing views of the agreement with the 
rest of the cabinet and engaging with the preparatory process. Jaramillo, for example, 
increasingly delegated this task to his technical staff in Bogotá who had less political 
ascendance over the ministers, who felt disconnected from the Havana’s peace process. 
In November 2015, after General Naranjo decided to leave his post, Santos 
appointed Rafael Pardo as the new Counselor Minister of Post-conflict, a liberal 
politician with a long trajectory in government posts and former minister of labor 
during Santos first administration (Semana 2015). At first, with this appointment there 
not much changed in the preparatory process. However, when the negotiations end 
seemed close, the new Counselor gained more relevance as the head of the 
implementation phase and, in consequence, the OCHP lost importance in influencing 
the preparatory process. In the 1980s, Pardo was involved in the peace process with 
FARC and played a major role in the Programa Nacional de Rehabilitación (National 
Rehabilitation Program or PNR). The PNR was a large development program carried 
out in the regions most affected by the conflict at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s 
that executed infrastructure and income-generating projects with the active 
participation of rural communities. Very close to former president César Gaviria, the 
Liberal Party’s president and at the time a key politician supporting Santos’ political 
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coalition, he was also a representative of the party in the cabinet and in the Executive’s 
Office. Pardo’s appointment was initially well received by conflict and peace experts. 
However, over time, his negligence and lack of political commitment with the 
implementation process became evident within and outside the government. His views 
were different from those of the government’s peace negotiators, especially from those 
of the High Commissioner for Peace, and there was a gradual drift from the 
agreement’s agenda.  
An important development took place during this time in parallel to the preparatory 
process. Gutiérrez, who had been in June of that year appointed as Chief of Cabinet, 
led the institutional reform of the agricultural sector that resulted in December 2015 in 
the creation – via extraordinary decree laws – of three new agencies, the National Land 
Agency (ANT), the Rural Development Agency (ADR) and the Territorial Renovation 
Agency (ART). While the Executive’s Office did not create these agencies to fulfill an 
explicit provision of the CRR, it did conceive them to strengthen the institutional 
framework of the rural sector required for the peacebuilding phase. The organizational 
structure of each of the agencies reflected the distributive measures, mechanisms and 
procedures laid out in Havana, in particular in relation with the territorial focus of 
rural development, its participatory approach, and privileging of public goods 
provisions and support to family agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo 
Rural 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). However, in their public launching the president did not 
link in his speech these agencies to the CRR because, as mentioned before, the 
government could not start the agreement’s implementation while the negotiations 
were still underway. Still, these newly created institiutions sent a clear message to the 
FARC and the public that the government was serious in its preparation to make 
effective the CRR’s commitments.  
The preparatory work continued during the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016. 
After the victims’ issue was agreed in Havana in 15 December 2015, the president 
instructed the ministries to accelerate the planning process, as it seemed that an 
agreement could be reached in the course of 2016. Nonetheless, and despite the weekly 
cabinet meeting arranged for this matter, during this period, due to the Gutiérrez’s 
resignation in April 2016, a lack of resources to support the ministries’ work and a 
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weak follow-up by PCD, the preparatory process did not advance at the speed and 
coordination required. The various preparation plans advanced to varying degrees, not 
only on the CRR’s commitments but also on the other specific items of the agreement. 
During that time, the OHCP, the National Planning Office and the Ministry of 
Finance carried out a robust exercise to estimate the total costs of the agreement’s 
implementation. However, as the end the negotiations got closer, the OHCP’s staff 
concentrated more on its tasks of supporting the negotiators in Havana and explaining 
the agreements in Colombia. This meant handing over the preparatory process to the 
PCD, now led by Gloria Ospina, a bureaucrat who had worked closely with Pardo 
before and although she did not have any experience on post-conflict issues, had been 
appointed as the new PCD’s director 2016 (Artículo20.com 2016). To position 
themselves within the government as the heads of the agreement’s implementation, 
Pardo and Ospina worked with the National Planning Office in a Policy Document 
laying out the institutional and financial framework for the post-conflict. This 
framework included assigning a decision-making role to Inter-Institutional Council for 
Post-conflict, as well as the creation of the Post-conflict Funds and the Contratos Paz, a 
mechanism to bring together national, international, regional, local and private sources 
of funding for peacebuilding projects in specific regions (Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación 2016). The problem of this policy document, from the point of view of the 
OHCP and the Havana negotiators, was that it did not entirely reflect the content of 
the agreements and its implementation mechanisms nor the preparatory process that 
had been done in the previous three years (Personal communication Former Advisor 
of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, September 18, 2017).  
Once the agreement was reached in Havana in August 24, 2016, a new phase of the 
preparatory process began guided by the mechanisms, instruments and priorities 
agreed in the implementation item, one of the last ones to be agreed, and that would 
sustain and guide the implementation process during its early stages. In it, there were 
two essential aspects, one related to the planning of the implementation and the other 
with its legal enforcement. Regarding the first one, the agreement contained the Plan 
Marco de Implementación or Framework Plan for Implementation (PMI, for its initials in 
Spanish), conceived by the negotiators as a 10-year roadmap that had to translate all of 
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the agreement’s provisions into policy outputs with a public investment strategy 
(Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2016, pp. 196–197). Regarding the second one, the 
agreement’s item on implementation also contemplated a set of prioritized bills 
(constitutional reforms, statutory and ordinary laws and decrees) required to legally 
enforce the agreement’s key provision. In order to do so, the government passed a 
constitutional amendment through congress, approved in July 2016, creating a special 
legal procedure or fast track. On one hand, this procedure accelerated the ordinary 
legislative process to discuss and vote laws associated with the agreement’s 
implementation. On the other, it gave the president extraordinary powers for six 
months to issue decree laws related to the agreement (Congreso de la República 2016b; 
Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2016, pp. 200–204). 
In order to prepare both teams, the planning and the legal instruments of the 
implementation, the Executive’s Office shifted the attention of the alistamiento away 
from the sectoral plans. For these purposes, by July 2016 the Executive’s Office created 
two teams: a legal one, led by the President’s Legal Secretary with the support of the 
OHCP, the PCD and the Ministry of Interior; and a programming team, led by the 
National Planning Office, with the support of the OHCP, the PCD and the Ministry of 
Finance. In the former one, every ministry, based on the previous preparatory work, 
proposed to the Executive’s Office the drafts of the legal reforms it needed to enforce 
the agreement in any of its sectoral commitments. In the latter one, the National 
Planning Office developed a methodology to design the PMI with the involvement of 
all the sectors. Although between August and November both the teams made 
important progress, during those months the Executive’s Office also had to focus in 
campaigning for the plebiscite and the renegotiation process that ensued after the No 
vote won, as the next chapter describes. The plebiscite’s negative results affected the 
preparatory process as many of the technical bureaucrats in the ministries lost 
motivation in the tasks they were doing. Some were even reassigned by their bosses to 
other tasks. This meant that with the negative turnout of the plebiscite much of the 
momentum that a certain point the preparatory process had gained was lost, even at 
the technical level of the bureaucracy, thus affecting the government’s capacity to get 
ready for implementing the agreement at its most crucial period.   
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After congress endorsed the renegotiated agreement in November 30, 2016, the 
implementation phase officially started. From that moment on, the Executive’s Office 
efforts on the preparatory work refocused towards the management of the Joint 
Commission for the Promotion, Verification and Follow-Up of the Implementation 
(CSIVI, for its initials in Spanish). The CSIVI, which started to operate in early 
December 2016, was a mechanism created by the two parties in Havana to follow up 
on decisions and controversies that could emerge during the implementation process 
and that began to meet by early December 2016 (Presidencia de la República 2016). 
During the first half of 2017, this joint commission went over the operational aspects of 
the laying down of weapons and the legal solutions associated with FARC combatants’ 
reincorporation (amnesty and transitional justice system). In addition, it reviewed the 
key bills and initiatives in relation to other substantial provisions, especially those of 
the CRR. However, in this implementation phase, now fully led by the PCD and the 
sectoral ministries, the systemic vision of the CRR developed in Havana by the 
government’s negotiators was lost and the sectors advanced with their own 
responsibilities in a fragmented and loosely articulated way. The agricultural sector, for 
example, led at the time by minister Iragorri, despite all the preparatory work done, did 
not have an overall strategy for implementing the CRR, but only isolated initiatives led 
by specific agencies or people within it. Out of all these initiatives, it is worth noting 
the progress made on the bills on land access and Rural Development Programs with a 
Territorial Focus (PDET, for its initials in Spanish) that were drafted by the ANT and 
the ART, respectively, with the support of the Executive’s Office. These were first 
discussed in CSIVI and then issued by the President in May 2017 (Presidencia de la 
República 2017b, 2017c). Moreover, the government also made progress in the design 
of the PMI and in the estimation of the costs of the implementation, which the 
Ministry of Finance included in the Medium Term Fiscal Framework in June 
(Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público 2017). 
Due to the amount of simultaneous tasks involved in the implementation, General 
Naranjo – appointed by Santos as Vice-President in March 2017 – became the overall 
manager of the implementation, overseeing the work of Pardo and the rest of the 
sectors. However, Naranjo’s attention at the time centered on assuring FARC’s laying 
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down of weapons – which took place in June – as well as other immediate tasks, such 
as security conditions, reincorporation, the transitional justice system, and the crop 
substitution program, which had varying results (Kroc Institute 2017). The CRR’s key 
initiatives, except the PDET, which started the local participatory planning processes 
by August 2017, did not receive much of Naranjo’s dedication. The sectors involved 
with the CRR’s implementation continued with their own priorities and goals featuring 
an institutional inertia in which extraordinary measures were not undertaken during 
the transitional context. The ministries did not create special task units to deal with the 
ambitious provisions included in the agreement. Despite the window of opportunity 
offered by the exceptional legal tools, the sector’s bureaucracy delayed the presentation 
of bills and investment programs. Furthermore, during the second half of 2017, after 
FARC laid down its weapons, the CRR’s progress slackened. The government only 
passed through congress the bill on the National System of Agricultural Innovation 
(Congreso de la República 2017). In 2018, amid the presidential electoral campaign, 
the rural development reform lost importance in the government’s agenda despite 
being the centerpiece of the post-conflict phase. The structural problems of the sector’s 
institutional framework inherited from the neoliberal policies since the 1990s described 
in Chapter 4, affected the government’s reaction capacity to prepare itself for the 
implementation. Regardless of the newly created institutions, the agricultural sector 
remained weak. 
As described above, there was a lack of leadership and coordination during the 
early implementation process. Yet, many of the difficulties experienced by the 
government in taking the CRR into practice had to do with the nature of Santos 
political bloc, as it is discussed next. 
 
6.4 Santos’ Dependency on his Loose and Clientelistic-Oriented 
Political Coalition 
 
Even under an exceptional circumstance like a peace process, the likelihood of rural 
distributive reform in a democratic regime depends on the sustained cooperation of a 
wide range of political actors and sufficient administrative capacity. At the 
bureaucratic level, as described in the previous section, despite the efforts made during 
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the preparatory and early implementation period by the Executive’s Office, there was 
not enough support within the Santos government to advance in the implementation of 
the CRR’s provisions. Yet, in order to fully understand the political restrictions 
surrounding the policy process, it is necessary to move beyond the level of the 
bureaucracy and look as well into the government’s political arrangement. According 
to Albertus (2015), in democratic regimes the “opposition of a small number of actors 
can jeopardize [land] reform” (p. 16). To pin down the institutional constraints to rural 
development policymaking that Santos encountered, it is necessary to characterize how 
his political power was built and evolved over time and to identify the mechanisms 
through which this domestic political structure affected the CRR’s implementation. 
My main argument here is that Santos’ political regime, based on a heterogeneous 
multi-party coalition, while granting him a majority in congress necessary to support 
his key policy initiatives (including those linked to the peace process) and enabling him 
to become re-elected in 2014, took a high toll on the CRR’s implementation. The 
parties supporting Santos – mostly guided by their clientelistic appetite and rent-
seeking logic – were far more interested in accessing top cabinet positions and 
bureaucratic power than readily becoming involved in a complex peacebuilding task 
that in the short-term was not going to give them any political return. Santos, 
therefore, paid the price of the backing of these parties, which was never 
unconditional, by handing out key institutions for the implementation of the CRR, like 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the agencies ascribed to it, to party members either 
indifferent to or against the paramount task at hand (Lewin 2016a; Bermúdez 2013a) 
(see Appendix 6 for an analysis of the political affiliation of the agricultural sector’s top 
officials). Santos’ structure of political governance, on one hand, carried him through 
the peace negotiations and, on the other, obstructed the very reforms contained 
therein. Throughout his administration – and especially during the last period of the 
second term when his political capital was rapidly diminishing – Santos prioritized 
political governance over technical expertise and ideational commitment for the 
agreement’s implementation. He was trapped, as Mejía-Guinand, Botero and Solano 
have recently argued (2018), by the very nature of presidential agency loss in coalition 
governments. The result was a rather limited status quo backing for peace. In order to 
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unpack this argument, in what follows I describe first how Santos’ coalition was 
crafted and then I examine its implications for the CRR’s development.  
 
The Origins and Evolution of Santos’ National Unity 
Bargaining, making transactions and reaching compromises across political parties to 
run a government is what any administration in a democratic system (either 
parliamentary or presidential) ordinarily does. What is particular to Colombia’s 
political system – even for the Latin American context – is that, at least since the 
National Front period (1958-1974), the arrangements to form coalition governments 
include excessive compromising elements for the government’s agenda. Parties’ mutual 
veto, proportionality in bureaucratic appointments and a share in public expenditures, 
“tend to go [in Colombia] considerably beyond the forms of cooperation and 
compromise found in all democratic regimes” (Hartlyn 1988, p. 5). In Leal Buitrago 
and Dávila’s (1990, p. 52) terms, clientelism became long ago the key feature of 
Colombia’s system. To be sure though, after the 1991 Constitution and, especially the 
political reforms of 2003 and 2006 (Hoskin and García 2006), Colombia abandoned 
the traditional bipartisanship, so well described in Hartlyn’s study of coalition rule 
during the National Front period (Botero 2018; see also Gutiérrez Sanín 2007; 
González 2011; Rodríguez Raga and Seligson 2010). Nonetheless, the existing multi-
party system did inherit many traits and clientelistic practices prevalent back then. 
Even more so, the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties, perhaps against their 
will and at a high political cost, ended up adapting themselves to the new political 
environment, carrying with them the old ways of doing politics (Hoskin 2011). Santos, 
a politician of the economic and political establishment, well acquainted with these 
rules of the game, became dependent, as presidents before, on this form of governing, 
as he inherited power from Uribe.  
Álvaro Uribe was elected in 2002 in an unprecedented manner as an outsider of the 
political establishment.54 Having as a main pillar of his campaign – besides confronting 
                                                 
54 After declining to participate in the Liberal Party primaries, Álvaro Uribe, who had been senator and 
governor of Antioquia representing that party, launched an independent candidacy by collecting 
signatures from voters to win ballot access with the backing of Primero Colombia (Colombia First) 
movement, an independent political platform constituted as a citizens’ initiative. In the middle of the 
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FARC military after the failure of the Caguán’s process – fighting against corruption 
and clientelism (Gutiérrez Sanín 2004),55 once in power Uribe forged various pacts 
with the traditional political parties (González 2011). Despite his attacks against the 
congress, Uribe realized early on that political parties remained strong. He dealt with 
them through clientelistic transactions, even making alliances with politicians that 
turned out to have close ties to paramilitary groups, to succeed in the approval of the 
government’s top legislative initiatives (including the constitutional amendment to 
become re-elected in 2006) (López 2010; González 2006). At the same time, Uribe’s 
neo-populist form of governing granted him a direct source of popular legitimacy that 
made him less dependent on traditional parties. Uribe constructed a direct relationship 
with the citizenship, hearing their demands at the weekly Consejos Comunitarios 
(Community Councils), allocating direct subsidies to poor families and communicating 
the government’s results himself in the mass media (González 2011; Sánchez Ángel 
2005; García Trujillo 2009; González 2006). His huge popularity led him become to re-
elected in 2006 with 7.3 million votes (62 percent). In his second government, 
however, due to the effects of the political reforms of 2003 and 2006 directed to 
strengthen the multi-party system, Uribe had to create a coalition to form his 
government (Botero and Rodríguez Raga 2011). The Coalición Uribista, as it came to be 
known, was composed of the Partido de la U (U Party), Cambio Radical (Radical 
Change), Convergencia Ciudadana, Alas Equipo Colombia, Colombia Democrática and the 
Conservative Party, would become in 2010 the basis of Santos’ own coalition. 
Uribe’s attempt to run for a third term by changing the constitution for a second 
time was not accepted by the Constitutional Court. Due to this ruling, five months 
before the first round of presidential elections, Uribe designated as his candidate Juan 
Manuel Santos (Velásquez 2015; Pachón and Hoskin 2011). Inheriting Uribe’s vast 
political capital, Santos won the first round of elections held in May 30, 2010 with 46 
percent of the votes. For the second round, pitted against a coalition of independent 
                                                 
campaign, when Uribe’s candidacy increased in the polls, the Conservative Party endorse him. In 2002, 
Uribe won the elections in the first round with 5.8 million votes representing 54 percent of the total 
votes. See Vélez Vieira (2009). 
55 One of the main proposals of Uribe during his 2002 campaign was to carry out a referendum to reduce 
congress and develop a meritocratic civil service system, among other measures against corruption. The 
referendum took place in October 2003, but did not pass due to low turnout. See Gutiérrez Sanín (2004). 
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politicians that formed the Green Party and supported candidate Antanas Mockus, 
Santos sought additional allies. In this period, he crafted what later became the Unidad 
Nacional or National Unity Government, a National Front style coalition composed by 
the U Party, the Conservative Party, the Radical Change Party, and the Liberal Party, 
which decided to join it in June after having been in the opposition during Uribe’s 
second government. Endorsed by the bulk of Colombia’s political class, Santos won 
the second round with a historic turnout of 9 million votes (69 percent). Yet, far less 
charismatic than his predecessor and in need of maintaining the political establishment 
aligned, Santos cemented his political power on the National Unity (Gómez Buendía 
2010). Excluding only the left-wing party Polo Democrático Alternativo, the Green Party 
and other small parties, the National Unity had a majority in congress with 74 percent 
of the seats in Senate and 83 percent in the lower chamber, enabling Santos passing his 
key legislative initiatives. 
The main opposition to the National Unity would come, however, from Uribe 
himself, after he moved away from the newly elected government (Botero 2018). In 
2013, in preparation for the legislative and presidential elections of the following year, 
Uribe, who had lost control over the U Party, formalized his political opposition by 
creating the right-wing Partido Centro Democrático (Democratic Center Party) 
(Velásquez 2015:111; Lewin 2012). The stern opposition mounted by Uribe described 
in the next chapter, pushed Santos to depend even further on the National Unity to 
maintain his support for the peace process, sustain majorities in congress and become 
re-elected in 2014. 
In the legislative elections held in March 2014 prior to the presidential elections, 
Santos’ National Unity coalition obtained again a majority with 65 percent of the seats 
in Senate and 71 percent in the lower chamber. For its part, the newly created 
Democratic Center Party acceded to 18 percent of the seats in Senate and 12 percent in 
the lower chamber. For the presidential elections, benefiting from his opposition 
against the peace process, Uribe surprised in the first round with a victory of his 
candidate Óscar Iván Zuluága, who obtained 29 percent of the total votes, surpassing 
Santos (23 percent). Alarmed by the prospect of defeat, Santos reached out not only to 
the parties of the National Unity and their traditional clientelistic barons in the regions, 
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but also to the left-wing and independent parties in a call for a broad front for peace 
(Ardila 2014). In the second round, Santos beat Zulúaga with 7.8 million (51 percent), 
against 6.9 million (45 percent).  
During his second term, with historic low popularity levels and a sustained 
opposition from the right, Santos increasingly relied on his coalition to govern and 
maintain support for the peace process, although by the end of his mandate – amid a 
new electoral period – he had lost most of his political capital and the National Unity 
became fragmented. This fine balance of keeping the various parties satisfied in 
exchange for their support came at a high cost for the peace process preparation and 
early implementation. I show this next by examining the mechanics of how these 
clientelistic transactions operated and the specific consequences it had on the CRR’s 
implementation.  
  
The Effects of Coalition Rule on the CRR’s preparation and early implementation 
The failed attempt of liberal president Carlos Lleras Restrepo to carry out a 
redistributive agrarian reform in the early 1960s amid the US-led Alliance for Progress 
is well known. Its lack of success had to do not only with the predictable veto exercised 
by the landed elite in congress against any kind of land expropriation, but also with the 
obstruction prompted by politicians directly involved in the government’s coalition. 
This is what Hartlyn described as the “thwarted reformism” of the National Front’s 
clientelistic-based political system (Hartlyn 1988; see also Bagley 1979; Zamosc 1986; 
González 2011). Although the historical context has changed, the anti-reformist 
behavior of Santos’ own coalition is not very different from what happened during that 
period. Back then, as Hartlyn noted (1988, p. 93), the regime’s structure accentuated 
the power of the established, organized interests expressed in the dominant political 
parties, which in turn inhibited any policy initiative that moved away from the status 
quo. The question now is how exactly these obstructions from within the political 
regime took place in the current context and how these may be traced empirically. As 
pointed out by Mejía-Guinard, Botero and Solano (2018), one specific locus of power 
serves to make evident these obstructions and their effects on the CRR’s 
implementation, that is, cabinet and bureaucratic appointments. 
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Counterproductive Bureaucratic Appointments in the Agricultural Sector 
Throughout his two consecutive administrations, Santos made 68 changes to his 
cabinet (composed of 16 ministries). Every replacement of one minister for another 
had a well-premeditated intention depending on the political circumstances. The 
overall purpose though had to do with maintaining the fine balance in the bureaucratic 
share of the different factions composing the National Unity. He also appointed 
ministers considering their technocratic outlook, especially in sensitive areas like 
finance. Yet, in both of his periods he used – as other presidents had done in the past – 
the formation of the cabinet and the designation of the directives in central agencies 
and departments as a way of paying off parties for their political support (in congress 
and elections) in previous occasions or in advance. As Table 6.1 illustrates, the 
distribution of Santos ministries corresponded, more or less, to the weight each of the 
National Unity’s parties had in congress in each of the two periods.   
 
Table 5.1. Cabinet Appointments and Congress Participation of Santos' Coalition 
Party 













U Party 28,6 23,7  21,6 29,7 25,1 26,7 
Liberal 19,9 29,0  20,9 27,0 20,4 28,0 
Conservative 21,8 29,0  17,1 10,8 19,5 20,0 
Radical Change 9,0 7,9  8,6 13,5 8,8 10,7 
Green* 4,1 0,0  3,7 2,7 3,9 1,3 
Polo Democrático* 3,8 0,0  3,3 2,7 3,6 1,3 
No party affiliation** - 10,5  - 13,5 - 12,0 
Note: Author’s construction 
* Joined the government’s coalition in 2014 to support the peace process. 
** Cabinet members appointed due to their professional expertise without party affiliation 
 
As said before, this practice of political bureaucratic appointment is not specific to 
Santos’ administration and not exclusive either to Colombia’s democracy. Yet, it is 
relevant to specify how it played out during the context of the peace talks, in which 
Santos had major stakes. Santos appointed the negotiators and peace commissioner in 
charge of the talks in Havana considering their role in making the process successful 
and, for the most part, kept this negotiating team isolated from the parties’ bureaucratic 
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allotment. This made possible developing and carrying out rigorously a negotiation 
strategy followed through the end. Meanwhile, in areas of government that were also 
instrumental for the preparation and implementation of the peace agreement, Santos 
was more prone to allocate key posts based on political criteria (Wills Otero and Benito 
2012:102) (see Appendix 7 for a description of the political affiliation of Santos’ 
ministries).  
As soon as Santos arrived to power, as it had become the common practice by the 
presidents since Pastrana’s government (1998-2002), the agricultural sector was handed 
over to the Conservative Party (Bermúdez 2013b). Santos’ first minister of agriculture, 
as described in previous chapters, was the conservative politician Juan Camilo 
Restrepo. Although he fulfilled the criteria of his partisan affiliation, he was an atypical 
minister. First, due to his ideational commitments with a rural distributive reform that, 
regardless of his conservatism, led him to endorsing the negotiations in Havana and 
promoting a middle rural class. Secondly, because he rejected the requests made by his 
own party (directives and senators) to appoint politicians in the sector’s institutions as 
a way of paying political favors. The directors of the ministry’s institutions (at the 
INCODER, the Land Restitution Agency, CORPOICA, Banco Agrario, Finagro and 
ICA) appointed by Restrepo were primarily technocrats or independent professionals 
(see Appendix 7). These technocratic-based appointments helped Restrepo advancing 
his policy orientation. At the same time, the Conservative Party’s directives became 
disgruntled with Restrepo. In May 2013, less than two years after he was appointed, 
Restrepo resigned, among other reasons, due to the pressures he received from the 
Conservative Party for his lack of response to the party’s bureaucratic purposes (Diario 
del Huila 2014). 
In the following years, Santos changed the minister of agriculture four times, 
drastically affecting the continuity of the vision and policies that Restrepo had set 
forth, including the CRR’s implementation. After Restrepo left, Francisco Estupiñán, 
also a conservative and former president of the Banco Agrario, became minister. He 
only lasted four months due to his poor management of the agrarian strikes and the 
position he adopted on the scandal regarding the land acquisitions (see next section) 
(El Universal 2013b). After him, in September 2013, Santos appointed Rubén Darío 
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Lizarralde as minister, who was of conservative affiliation and an executive of a major 
agribusiness firm, until the first administration ended. It is important to point out that 
during the second half of 2013, as Santos was preparing his political arsenal for the 
presidential elections of 2014, the appointments made by Santos in the ministry’s 
institutions, including that of minister Lizarralde, had a political calculation (León 
2013a). At that time, the Conservative Party was deciding whether to stay in the 
coalition and support Santos’ key legislative initiatives and the 2014 re-election 
campaign or move out of it and join Uribe’s challenge against him. Seeking to avoid a 
rupture with his conservative allies and in need of their votes to pass in congress the 
bill on the peace referendum discussed at the time, Santos accepted the bureaucratic 
petitions of senators Roberto Gerlein, Efraín Cepeda and Hernán Andrade to access of 
key institutions. Álvaro Navas Patrón, recommended by Gerlein, was appointed as 
Banco Agrario’s president, despite of his lack of experience in the financial or 
agricultural sectors. Luis Humberto Martínez, close to Cepeda, was designated as 
director of ICA, the national agricultural inspection authority. Rey Ariel Borbón 
Ardila, a strong political ally of Hernán Andrade in Huila, became INCODER’s 
director (Bermúdez 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; La Silla Vacía 2013a). With these 
appointments, which in turn implied the arrival of political friends in each of these 
institutions, Santos sacrificed a rigorous preparation of the CRR’s measures and the 
transformation of the sector’s institution for political governance (La Silla Vacía 2014 
a; Bermúdez 2013d).          
In his second administration, Santos further reinforced the political approach to the 
agricultural sector undermining the CRR’s implementation (La Silla Vacía 2015a, 
2014b; Bermúdez 2015). As soon as he was re-elected, he assigned the agricultural 
sector to the U Party and in July 2014 appointed as minister Aurelio Iragorri, who had 
been his former Advisor on Internal Political Affairs, deputy minister and minister of 
interior (El Espectador 2014). Due to their families’ friendship, Santos knew Iragorri 
well since their childhood, as he came from an elite landowning and politically 
influential family and was the son of a former liberal congressmen and grandson of 
former president Guillermo León Valencia (La Silla Vacía 2018). As Advisor on 
Internal Political Affairs, Iragorri was in charge of guaranteeing that the president’s 
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political allies had their share in the national bureaucracy. Then, during his time in the 
Ministry of Interior, he was responsible for managing the processes of informed 
consent with the indigenous peoples and the negotiations with the peasant leaders that 
carried out the massive agrarian strikes in 2013. At the Ministry of Agriculture, one of 
his main tasks was preparing the implementation of the CRR. In the three years he 
stayed as minister, however, he barely paid attention to the peacebuilding agenda, even 
though he was discursively committed to it (Revista Palmas 2016). As soon as he 
arrived to the ministry, he ousted the technical directors that had the trajectory and 
knowledge to translate the CRR into concrete policy measures, and replaced them with 
political appointments (La Silla Vacía 2014c). Despite his lack of progress in such an 
important matter for the peace process, Santos kept him as minister for most of the 
second administration, given the role he played in maintaining good relations with the 
U Party and other parties of the National Unity in congress and, also, in the 
plebiscite’s campaign. Yet, the effects of Iragorri’s prolonged duration as head of the 
ministry were deleterious for the CRR’s implementation. Regardless of his close 
personal ties with Santos, Iragorri did not pay attention to the peace implementation 
mandate and developed instead a political agenda of his own undermining the efforts 
of the CRR’s preparation. 
For the coordination of the CRR’s preparatory tasks given to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, in mid-2015 Iragorri appointed as deputy minister of rural development 
affairs Juan Pablo Díaz-Granados. According to the tasks assigned to the ministry by 
the OHCP, Díaz-Granados was in charge of leading the development of the CRR’s 
provisions on technical assistance, financing, marketing supports, rural housing, 
irrigation, and family agriculture. In a ministry cabinet held in October 2015, Iragorri 
instructed all of the ministry’s departments and ascribed institutions to carry out these 
preparatory tasks under the leadership of Díaz-Granados. In that same meeting, 
however, he also presented his flagship policy Colombia Siembra (Colombia Sows). 
Unrelated to the Havana agreement, this policy was geared towards rapidly boosting 
agricultural production by 1 million hectares. In order to move this initiative forward, 
he pressed the same officials that had assumed tasks regarding the CRR’s preparatory 
process to carry out immediate duties (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 
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2015d). What happened in this meeting illustrates the lack of real political commitment 
of Iragorri with the CRR’s preparation, which was always sidelined against his key 
own policy priorities. Interestingly though, the technical staff he appointed for the 
preparatory tasks did make progress in the issues they were delegated with. The 
technical assistance provisions, prepared by CORPOICA, the national agricultural 
research agency, eventually were translated into the creation of the National System of 
Agricultural Innovation through a bill approved 2017 as part of the fast-track 
(Congreso de la República 2017). The issue of family agriculture evolved as well into a 
policy document drafted by Díaz-Granados’ team and then into a ministry’s resolution 
issued in 2017 (Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2017c). Similarly, the 
provisions to strengthen the irrigation policy, assumed by the Agricultural Planning 
Unit (UPRA, for its initials in Spanish), were developed into a policy document and 
turned into a bill that was passed into congress in 2017 (although it was not approved) 
(Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 2016, 2017e). Yet, the progress on these 
issues depended more on the commitment and interest of the individual officials in 
charge than on the political oversight of the minister. Without a top-down mandate, 
the CRR’s preparatory work within the ministry was assumed simply as another 
ordinary task and not as part of the government’s major policy agenda (Official of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 2015). 
Moreover, minister Iragorri never adopted the CRR’s comprehensive vision on 
rural development. Instead, he perceived it as a framing foreign to him, directly linked 
to his antecessor, Juan Camilo Restrepo, and to the peace negotiator Sergio Jaramillo, 
and thus wanted to distance himself from it. Also skeptical of the technical 
recommendations given by the expert’s Rural Mission, Iragorri saw himself as a 
“hands-on” minister. Rather than offering his views on rural development strategy, he 
wanted to solve concrete problems on the ground. His lack of knowledge of the 
agricultural sector, in addition to his clientelistic way of doing politics, led him to 
marginalize the preparatory work of the CRR that demanded a complex and highly 
detailed planning on legal, organizational, programming and financial aspects. 
According to people within the ministry, it was almost as if there had been a change in 
government in 2014, because Iragorri did not give continuity to the policy measures 
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laid out by Restrepo in the 2010-2014 period, in terms of land access, public goods 
provision and supports to family agriculture. By March 2017, when the 
implementation had to be already underway, the minister presented at the CSIVI the 
progress made so far on the preparation work. In that meeting it became very clear that 
besides some policy documents and the agencies created in December 2015, there was 
no organized systematic plan to undertake the CRR’s ambitious measures. Besides the 
bills presented in the fast track, in the two years of the implementation up until mid-
2018, the ministry did not put into effect any major project related to the CRR. Other 
political-based appointments in the sector also influenced this slackness. 
As explained earlier, in December 2015 the Executive’s Office created three new 
institutions in the agricultural sector. Two of them, the Land National Agency (ANT) 
and the Rural Development Agency (ADR) replaced the National Rural Development 
Institute (INCODER), which was considered to be inefficient and corrupt (Ortíz Soto 
2009; Ruiz 2016). The third one, the Agency for the Renovation of Territory (ART), 
was created to coordinate the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus 
(PDET), one of the key measures agreed in the CRR. In April 2016, Santos appointed 
Mariana Escobar as director of the ART, Miguel Samper at the ANT and Carlos 
Eduardo Géchem at the ADR. While Mariana’s appointment was based on her 
technical expertise, the other two – both sons of renowned politicians and members of 
the Liberal Party and the U Party, respectively – were designated due to their political 
affiliations as part of the government’s bureaucratic negotiations with the National 
Unity’s parties (La Silla Vacía 2017; La Opinión 2016; Lewin 2016b). Neither of them 
had experience nor knowledge of the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, Santos named 
them in crucial agencies for the CRR’s preparation and implementation. Samper, with 
more experience in government, rapidly created a team of advisors that helped him 
organize the new agency and worked toward the fulfillment of the agreement’s 
provisions on land access, especially through the drafting of the Decree Law 902, 
which I will refer to later on. In the two years of implementation, he achieved 
important results in the land titling process, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Géchem, for 
his part, even though the ADR had major tasks of the CRR’s implementation, such as 
irrigation, marketing supports and funding, did not make much progress. He focused 
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instead on managing the new agency in traditional clientelistic terms, for example, by 
supporting his father, a U Party representative, in becoming re-elected by participating 
in campaign events or appointing people close to him at the agency (Ortiz 2017). 
Created as an operational agency of the Ministry, the ADR was supposed to play a key 
role in the rapid response strategy in peripheral rural areas during the early phase of the 
agreement’s implementation. However, the institution’s routines and practices were 
not adjusted to the urgency of the post-conflict scenario. 
Another political appointment that hindered the CRR’s preparation was that of 
Jorge Enrique Vélez, a politician of Radical Change party, as Superintendent of 
Notary and Registry, the national authority in charge of overseeing the real state and 
land transactions that in 2011 created a Rural Land Direction after the Victims’ Law. 
Although his office was not part of the agricultural sector, Vélez became an important 
policy actor in land issues after the public denunciations his office made available in 
2012 on the illegal allocation of state land (Bermúdez 2013e). Vélez arrived to the 
government as a close political ally of Germán Vargas Lleras, Santos’ Ministry of 
Interior during the first administration and then Vice-President in the second one. 
Despite his lack of alignment with Santos’ peace agenda, Vargas Lleras concentrated 
significant political power within the Santos’ government, due to his crucial role in 
Santos’ 2014 re-election as he mobilized his electoral base in the Caribbean region. 
Once Superintendent, Vélez became a close advisor of Santos on various legal land 
issues, especially regarding the controversy around the land acquisitions of large 
agribusiness firms discussed in the following section. He became so close to the 
president that when Estupiñán resigned as minister in August 2013, Vélez was one of 
Santos candidates to replace him. He proved himself when he stood up for the 
government, during a public hearing organized in June 2013 by the left-wing 
opposition. However, due to his party affiliation, the Conservative Party, which 
bureaucratically “owned” the sector, vetoed his appointment (León 2013b). As 
Superintendent he was able, nonetheless, to amplify his political influence by 
controlling the top advisory posts at INCODER’s Land Direction, appointing in 2014 
two lawyers who were close to him (León 2014).  
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As he gained predominance over the government’s decisions on land policy, Vélez 
exercised throughout 2015 and 2016 his veto power on the technical committee for 
preparing the provisions related to land access and use that the OHCP had set up as 
part of the CRR’s preparatory work (Advisor of the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Peace 2017). Although in public he was a stringent defender of the peace process, 
inside the government he sabotaged the efforts made during the alistamiento to move 
forward with the creation of the Land Fund and the adoption of measures against the 
illegal appropriation of baldíos (López 2016). In early 2017, he resigned as 
Superintendent and became the president of Radical Change to work on Vargas Llera’s 
presidential campaign for 2018 (Lewin 2017). After he left, the OHCP and the Land 
Agency were able to move forward with the preparatory work, most importantly that 
of the drafting of the Decree Law 902. 
The description of how these appointments ended up affecting the CRR’s 
implementation points to the broader paradox of Santos’ government: the coalition is 
what allowed him to politically sustain the peace process, but at the same time that 
coalition has limited the implementation of the CRR’s agreements provisions. The 
pressure exerted by the agribusiness sector further reinforced this tendency towards the 
status quo, as explained below.  
 
6.5 Agribusiness’ Meaningful Access to Land Policy Decision-Making 
 
In a classic work, Samuel Huntington (1968) claimed that under democracy elites tend 
to capture or influence disproportionately the policymaking process to undercut 
redistribution. The lobbying in congress of agricultural elites in Colombia, as said 
earlier, has been well studied in its hindering role of agrarian reforms in the past. 
During the Santos administration, agricultural elites – particularly those tied to large 
agribusiness investments carried out in the late 1990s and 2000s – effectively exerted 
pressure to defend their interests in the discussions of the public land policy. Unlike 
cattle ranchers, agribusiness did not oppose the peace talks. They actually supported it, 
as Chapter 5 showed. Yet, they also sought to protect their economic interests and to 
obtain legal assurances regarding the post-conflict scenario. In order to explain how 
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these pressures actually occurred, I draw on Brockett’s (1991) term “meaningful access 
points”. Although coined in a different context – to examine the conditions for peasant 
mobilization in Central America – it is useful to identify the specific mechanism used 
by the agribusiness sector to influence rural development policy in Santos’ political 
regime, and thus weaken its capacity to enforce the CRR. “Access points”, Brockett 
describes, may be interest-aggregating institutions such as political parties, legislatures, 
bureaucracies or top-level executive decision makers. They are “meaningful”, insofar 
the “access” is “institutionalized and power-wielding” (p. 260). Agribusiness elites, in 
this context, due to their oligarchic position, influenced policy directly by speaking 
with Santos or his appointed ministers (top decision-makers). Two cases serve to 
illustrate their straightforward meaningful access. One is the influence over the 
government-led initiative that, after various failed attempts, resulted in a bill favoring 
their interest of developing large-scale agricultural projects in public lands. The other is 
the review committee created by Santos in early 2017 to allow the business sector 
(including agribusiness) to examine and make suggestions to the bills developed by the 
government to implement the agreement’s provisions, including those to enforce the 
land provisions of the CRR.  
 
Agribusiness Access to Decision-Making over Baldíos Policy 
Since Santos came to power in 2010, his administration attempted to pass legislation 
benefiting agribusiness investors and landowners interested in both legalizing previous 
investments and developing future large-scale agricultural projects in public lands, a 
policy measure that was already underway during Uribe’s administration. The existing 
law at the time (Law 160 of 1994), in line with the state’s obligation to provide land to 
the peasantry (according to article 64 of the 1991 Constitution), defined that public 
lands (baldíos adjudicables) were exclusive for eligible peasants – those demonstrating a 
five-year land tenure and a main income derived from their family-based agricultural 
activity. Moreover, it also established that the state could only allocate one Unidad 
Agrícola Familiar (Family Agriculture Unit or UAF), a measure in hectares which 
varies according to the plot’s geographical location estimated to ensure a monthly 
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income of at least two minimum wages.56 Once allocated, the baldío was handed over 
to the peasant family who could sell it afterwards, although to preserve its distributive 
nature a single buyer was not permitted to purchase more than one UAF.  
In mid-2013, various domestic and international investors (including renowned 
global firms like Cargill and Poligrow), which since the mid-2000s had developed 
large-scale mono-crop projects (corn, soybean, palm oil) in agricultural frontier areas 
like the eastern plains (altillanura), were accused by congressmen, NGOs, the public 
ministry and even the government’s National Rural Development Institute (INCODER) 
of bypassing this legal restriction (El Espectador 2017b; Bermúdez 2013f, 2013g; 
Oxfam 2013; Arias 2015; Osorio 2010). Beyond the legal implications for the parties 
involved, the controversy surrounding the “accumulation of UAF”, as the questionable 
land acquisitions came to be known, pointed to a broader debate on how to develop 
economically those frontier areas. Investors, allied with Bogotá-based law firms and 
the Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC, the Colombian Agricultural Business 
Association), argued that the UAF’s regime had become obsolete for developing areas 
requiring large economies of scale. Defenders of peasants’ rights, for their part, insisted 
that public land was for poor rural dwellers due to its role in promoting rural equality. 
Amid this debate, agribusiness investors, in their quest to protect their interests linked 
to the questioned projects and also to future ones, exerted direct pressure on the 
government to change the law on public land allocation. President Santos, close to 
many of the business firms and persons involved in these land deals, including 
Colombia’s largest sugar manufacturer Riopaila Castilla and the Bogotá banking and 
construction holding company Grupo Aval, owned by multi-millionaire Luis Carlos 
Sarmiento, used the government’s staff to explore various legal solutions to this 
conundrum (Otis 2013).   
In a clear contradiction with the agenda set forth by the land restitution policy and 
the peace negotiations in Havana, Santos carried out four different attempts to alter the 
legal measures on public land allocation to favor the agribusiness sector before 
succeeding in 2015. Early on, through the National Development Plan Bill (Law 1450 
                                                 
56 The agency in charge of determining the size of the UAF in each region considers aspects such as soil 
quality, access to markets and technology (INCODER 2009). 
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of 2011), Santos issued three articles (60, 61 and 62) that created the Proyectos Especiales 
Agropecuarios o Forestales (Special Agricultural or Forestry Projects), thus modifying 
Law 160 by allowing agribusiness companies purchasing any number of UAF without 
limit if tied to a large-scale agricultural or forestry project. In 2012, however, the 
Constitutional Court ruled against these measures turning them ineffective (Corte 
Constitucional 2012; Bermúdez 2013h). A year later, in July 2013, after the left-wing 
opposition in congress made public a report about the land deals, only a couple of 
months after the CRR had been agreed in Havana, the government explored again 
various legal options to ease the strict rule on the sale of baldíos (Semana 2013a; 
Semana 2013b). 
The scandal against Cargill became politically prominent as many of its purchases 
between 2010 and 2012 were arranged by the Bogotá law firm Brigard & Urrutia, 
whose former main shareholder and managing partner was Carlos Urrutia, a friend of 
Santos who had been appointed less than a year before as Colombian ambassador to 
the US. This scandal, which eventually led to Urrutia’s resignation, makes very clear 
the direct access points of the agribusiness firms, highlighting the existing network 
between these firms’ staff and the top-government decision-makers, including the 
president (Bermúdez 2013h; La Silla Vacía 2013b). Nestor Humberto Martínez, who 
would later be Santos’ cabinet minister and General Attorney, also participated in the 
government’s drafting of one of the legal solutions as the lawyer of Luis Carlos 
Sarmiento (La Silla Vacía 2013c; Coronell 2013). The bill’s draft, which sought to 
pardon the firms’ purchases received internal critiques by the minister of agriculture, 
Francisco Estupiñán, who had replaced Juan Camilo Restrepo in May, and by Miriam 
Villegas, a person that – as described in Chapter 4 – was close to peasant organizations 
and had been appointed by Santos in 2012 as INCODER’s director. At the end, the 
bill’s final version ended up excluding the legalization of past land acquisitions, against 
the agribusiness firms’ pressure. Nonetheless, even without it, Santos decided not to 
pass it to congress as it was not politically convenient at the time, as it would affect the 
ongoing peace negotiations in Havana with the FARC (Bermúdez and León 2013; La 
Silla Vacía 2013d). Still, in great part due to their critical positions on this matter, 
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minister Estupiñán and director Villegas resigned from their posts (León 2013b; Duzán 
2013).    
The third attempt to modify the law was made in November of 2013 by Rubén 
Darío Lizarralde, who, as a newly appointed minister of agriculture in September 
2013, made adjustments to the bill and presented it to congress without the consent of 
the president. The bill, which proposed eliminating the UAF’s limit and creating 
special business zones in the eastern plains, was deemed by Santos as highly 
controversial at a moment in which he was trying to obtain the left-wing party’s 
support for his re-election in 2014 amid the agrarian strikes. After internal discussions 
in the Palacio de Nariño and a Post-conflict council between the peace negotiators and 
minister Lizarralde, Santos decided not to move forward with the bill (Ardila 2013; 
Lewin 2013a; Lewin 2013b).  
In 2014, after Santos’ re-election, another version of the bill was drafted by María 
Lorena Gutiérrez, Santos’ right-hand, and Jorge Enrique Vélez, who had been 
appointed by Santos as Superintendent of Notary and Registration Office (Bermúdez 
2014). Even though this version discarded the idea of legalizing previous acquisitions 
and focused only in securing future land investments, it received again strong critiques 
by NGOs and left-wing opposition in congress. By April 2015, the bill was pulled off 
from the legislative process (Verdad Abierta 2015). A few weeks later, however, the 
government presented another version of the bill. Even though it was not very different 
from the one before, it ended up succeeding in the internal discussions and the 
legislative debates (La Silla Vacía 2015b). By January 2016, the law creating the Zonas 
de Interés de Desarrollo Rural, Económico y Social (Zones of Interest for Economic and 
Social Rural Development, ZIDRES) was approved (Congreso de la República 2016 
a). 
Throughout 2015, the bill received internal criticisms by the OHCP and the Land 
Restitution Agency, which considered that the creation of this figure of preferential 
zones for large agribusiness firms should come later – and not before – the processes of 
land distribution, formalization and restitution to peasants. President Santos, who had 
already accepted not including the provisions regarding the previous accumulation of 
UAF, left aside this time the peace agreement’s arguments and considered that bill 
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gave a positive message for the agribusiness sector that had stalled its massive 
investments in the last three years due to the lack of clear rules. The SAC defended this 
law in the public hearing held by the Constitutional Court in September 2016, which 
approved it a few months later (El Espectador 2016a; Dinero 2016).  
Although the approved bill did not leave the agribusiness firms involved in illegal 
land purchases completely satisfied, throughout the four-year policy process to approve 
it was clear how they exercised their influence through the direct access point via the 
top-decision makers to defend their status quo policy orientation. Interestingly, the 
peace process itself impeded the smooth translation of their interests in policymaking, 
as it introduced an alternative distributive agenda within the government itself that in 
various occasions became prioritized. Still, the agribusiness economic power, on top of 
the personal and professional connections of the major agribusiness firms to the 
government’s decision makers and their strategic political positioning – inherited from 
their past ascendancy over policy-making – made this sector a key actor in rural 
development policy. By protecting their own interests, the CRR’s agenda was hindered 
and the status quo policy trajectory was reinforced.  
 
Agribusiness Pressure on the Fast-Track Bills in Action 
As mentioned before, in order to prepare the legal reforms required to implement the 
peace agreement’s provisions, the President’s Office created in July 2016 a legal team 
led by the Legal Secretary, along with the PCD, the OHCP and the Ministry of 
Interior. Based on the work of this team, once the Final Agreement was reached and 
endorsed in November 30, 2016, the government began to pass the laws through 
congress and to issue them through presidential decree. The drafts, as already 
described, were prepared by each sector (agriculture, education, justice, etc.) with the 
support of the presidential legal team and then presented at the Joint Follow-Up 
Commission (CSIVI), where they were reviewed together by the government and 
FARC in light of the agreement’s provisions. Depending on the relevance of the issue, 
the government consulted some of these bills with relevant interest groups before 
passing them through congress or issuing them by decree. The business sector 
bypassing this decision had from the outset a preferential access to all the bills them 
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through a review committee Santos created in early 2017 with the Consejo Gremial 
Nacional (the National Business Council or CGN), the most important third-level 
business association in Colombia encompassing agricultural, trading, services and 
industrial business associations.57 Since the peace negotiations started, Santos 
maintained well informed the business sector of the progress made at the negotiating 
table and through the peace negotiators carried out frequent meetings with the most 
relevant business associations. Amongst them, the CGN publicly endorsed the peace 
process, although in the course of it identified critical issues in which the agreement 
had to be carefully monitored. Highly interested in studying in detail the 
implementation scheme that was being set up, the review committee gave the CGN a 
firsthand opportunity to comment on the fast track bills’ content and make suggestions 
to those of their special interest, such as the ones associated with transitional justice, 
rural development or citizens’ participation. 
This direct, privileged access to the bills’ drafts made the CGN highly influential 
because, in a government-like function, its legal staff participated in the meetings held 
at the Palacio de Nariño and also edited the bills as if they were another public agency. 
The CRR’s bills that the government was preparing on rural cadaster, irrigation, land 
use rights in Forest Reserve Zones, agricultural innovation, agrarian jurisdiction and, 
especially, land policy, were shared in advance with the CGN’s staff who examined 
them in detail. At the advisory level, the CGN channeled its comments through the 
Private Sector Direction (PSD) of the Post-conflict Advisory Office. The PSD’s advisor 
sent back and forth the drafts’ commented versions between the leading sector and the 
                                                 
57 The Consejo Gremial Nacional has 21 affiliates: Asociación Colombiana de Fabricantes de 
Autopartes (ACOLFA), Asociación Colombiana de Medianas y Pequeñas Empresas (ACOPI), 
Asociación Colombiana de Industrias Plásticas (ACOPLASTICOS), Asociación Nacional de Comercio 
Exterior (ANALDEX), Asociación Nacional de Empresas de Servicios Públicos y Comunicaciones 
(ANDESCO), Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI), Asociación Bancaria y de 
Entidades Financieras (ASOBANCARIA), Asociación de Cultivadores de Caña de azúcar de Colombia 
(ASOCAÑA), Asociación Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores (ASOCOLFLORES), Asociación de 
Fiduciarias de Colombia, Asociación Colombiana de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones y 
Cesantías (ASOFONDOS), Cámara Colombiana de la Construcción (CAMACOL), Cámara 
Colombiana de la Infraestructura (CCI), Federación Colombiana de Transportadores de Carga y su 
Logística (COLFECAR), Confederación Colombiana de Cámaras de Comercio (CONFECÁMARAS), 
Asociación Hotelera y Turística de Colombia (COTELCO), Federación de Aseguradores Colombianos 
(FASECOLDA), Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos (FEDEGAN), Federación Nacional de 
Comerciantes (FENALCO), Federación Nacional de Cultivadores de Palma de Aceite (FEDEPALMA) 
and Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia (SAC).  
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CGN, until the CGN felt satisfied with an adjusted version of the bill. The CGN also 
had top-level private meetings with Santos, his ministers or top advisors. The CGN, 
moreover, hired as their team coordinator a top-level executive who had worked with 
Santos as a minister and peace negotiator. This direct influence in policymaking of the 
agreement’s implementation bills was particularly evident in the Decree Law 902 on 
land access the president issued in May 29, 2017.      
Being one of the most relevant issues of the CRR’s legal implementation, the 
drafting of the Decree Law 902 was a highly contentious process with multiple 
discussions within and outside government, in which the agribusiness sector almost 
had a veto power that exceeded by far the influence of any other civil society group in 
the government’s decision. In its first version of November 2016 – drafted by an inter-
institutional team composed by legal advisors of the National Land Agency, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the National Planning Office, the 
Land Restitution Agency and the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace – the bill 
was an ambitious rewriting of the current legal framework (Law 160 of 1994). It sought 
to fulfill at the same time the CRR’s provisions on land access and solving the legal 
loopholes of the baldíos regime. By February 2017, this version had suffered important 
changes, as minister Iragorri, after having met with the agribusiness groups, included 
the articles left out of the ZIDRES Law that sought to legalize past land purchases 
above one UAF. However, this version was subject to significant revisions as a result 
of four developments: (1) discussions at the CSIVI between the government and 
FARC, (2) the recommendations of the academic experts’ group appointed by the 
CSIVI to provide an analysis of these land measures (Universidad de los Andes, 
Universidad EAFIT, and Universidad Externado de Colombia 2017), (3) the public 
hearings held during March by the National Land Agency in various regions of the 
country to socialize that first draft of the bill (El Espectador 2017c; Verdad Abierta 
2017a, 2017b), and (4) a Constitutional Court’s ruling determining the criteria for the 
decree laws that the president could issue through his extraordinary faculties to 
implement the peace agreement (Corte Constitucional 2017).  
In a new version of the bill, the government decided to split it into two: a decree 
law containing only the land access provisions explicitly outlined in the CRR (Land 
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Fund, land subsidy, land credit, titling process, and beneficiaries’ registry) and a 
broader law that needed congress approval as it included substantial changes to the 
baldíos regime. The problem with separating the legal text into two different bills was 
that the agribusiness sectors’ concerns were left unaddressed in the decree law. In order 
to reassure them, president Santos held a meeting with the CNG’s agricultural affiliates 
in early May at the Palacio de Nariño. The gremios’ leaders decided not to sabotage the 
decree law with the condition that the government would include in the larger bill the 
measures required to disentangle the legal dispute around the accumulation of UAF in 
the eastern plains. Having reached a consensus, the government moved forward with 
the final steps before issuing the decree law: a further discussion at the CSIVI and the 
informed consent process with the ethnic minorities. 
When the bill was about to be approved by the indigenous peoples, minister 
Iragorri decided to pull it off the table after the CNG’s legal team questioned some of 
the measures it contained and replaced it for a revised version with the CNG’s 
suggested additions (Caracol Radio 2017). This change led to the suspension of the 
informed consent process by the indigenous leaders, who argued that the government 
violated the procedure by modifying ex post the text in discussion. To resume the 
inform consent, the government had to go back to the previous version and agree to it 
at the CSIVI with the FARC. During this revision, the CGN, in direct communication 
with Iragorri, insisted on including the concession of land use rights to large 
agribusiness firms. This measure, however, was not part of the CRR, making hardly 
possible any reference to it. At the end, the CSIVI approved a new version and the 
informed consent process with the indigenous peoples started all over again. Right 
until the end, a CNG’s legal advisor was present at the informed consent process to 
oversee the bill’s discussion and guarantee that the sector’s interests were not being 
affected. After its issuing, the CNG reiterated to the president the need to pass the 
larger bill with the legal measures that had no room in the decree law. In the second 
half of 2017 and the first half of 2018 a version of the land bill including those 
provisions was submitted by the government to the congress (El Nuevo Siglo 2018; El 





In this chapter I showed how the lack of coherence in the institutions preparing for the 
implementation, the bureaucratic demands of the parties comprising the National 
Unity and the agribusiness’ pressures to maintain a land policy that would benefit them 
ended up undermining the government’s capacity to fulfill the ambitious promises 
contained in the CRR. In order to do so, I drew from the literature on institutional 
constraints that emphasizes the need to analyze the organizational structure of the state 
at the micro and meso level to trace a policy outcome. At the same time, I connected 
in this chapter the status quo trajectory described in Chapter 4 by showing how this 
was translated into lobbying pressures of powerful interest groups, in this case, 
agribusiness. Certain policy shifts indeed took place, but the agencies working on the 
peace agreement remained relatively isolated within the government despite all their 
efforts at making the agreement the government’s grand reformist agenda. The political 
urgencies and specific interests of each ministry and the need to maintain political 
governance and economic powers satisfied were prioritized over the peace accord’s 
commitments. Santos was able to keep the peace process afloat during the 
negotiations, but all of these pressures took a high toll on the CRR’s transformative 
potential during its implementation phase. Regardless of the exceptional circumstances 
provided by the transitional context, which at first seemed to lead an unprecedented 
change, the institutional inertia and policy capture of the pre-existing status quo 
trajectory manifested themselves in the everyday policymaking of the CRR’s 
implementation, deploying their structural veto power against any attempt of long-
lasting reform. The agreement’s robust commitments helped creating binding legal and 
institutional mechanisms that forced the government to advance the CRR into policy 
measures. Nonetheless, the pervasive forces described in this chapter, that materialized 
in daily decisions at the bureaucratic level, favored maintaining the status quo. The 
political restrictions the Santos’ regime faced during this period surpassed by far the 
leverage given by the norms that made possible passing an agreement with a 
distributive orientation. The next chapter will show how besides these internal 
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constraints the domestic sociopolitical pressures also played an essential role in 
undermining the government’s leverage to carry out a structural rural change. 
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Chapter 7. Uribismo’s Effective Framings Weakens the 





The ability of a government to implement a given policy depends not only on its 
internal capacity, but also on a key external one, legitimacy(Migdal 2001, p. xvii). In 
other words, on the citizens’ normative acceptance of the government’s authority. That 
is, on the people’s perceptions of the government’s discourse and action, measured in 
the levels of trust, approval and credibility it possesses to carry out its policy agenda. A 
government may have the legal mandate to develop a policy initiative, such as a peace 
process with an illegal armed group. Yet, an initiative’s legitimacy does not derive 
from its legality, but rather from whether people consider it desirable and adequately 
executed. It is therefore not a legal but a political problem that by nature is contentious 
and subject to constant deliberation. A problem therefore that lends itself to a “politics 
of signification” (Hall, quoted in Benford and Snow 2000, p. 613). 
This problem of legitimacy is all the more acute in transitional contexts, wherein 
there is often a struggle in society to define the narrative of what “peace” means and 
whereby vested interests are defended by those who perceive that their economic 
privilege may be at risk in a post-conflict scenario with distributive implications (Wood 
2001, p. 884). Legitimacy, as Clapp and Fuchs note (2009, pp. 10–11) is thus 
intimately wrapped up in discourse itself, as it depends on the “willingness of message 
recipients to listen and to place at least some trust in the validity of the contents of the 
message”. In transitional contexts, negotiating parties build their own narratives to 
explain, legitimize and justify why they embarked in a peace process. Chapter 5, for 
example, described how the government and the FARC built a normative linkage 
between lasting peace and rural development that suited both of them. Yet, 
simultaneously, contending narratives or counter-framings espoused by non-state 
interest groups also emerged competing with these official frames of reference in 
influencing the public’s opinion (Chong and Druckman 2012).  
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In this chapter, I argue that Santos’ government capacity to enforce the CRR was 
undermined not only by the administration’s internal dynamics I described in Chapter 
6. It was also weakened by the external attack led by the right-wing opposition 
coalesced around the figure of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez. Through the 
creation and diffusion of effective negative framings, which outweighed in resonance 
and salience the government’s narrative, the opposition was able to affect the 
legitimacy of the peace process endeavor. By putting into question the negotiations 
themselves, the agreements reached therein and the parties’ lack of fulfillment of their 
commitments, the Uribe-led opposition heavily damaged the citizen’s credibility on the 
peace process throughout its different stages, since it began in 2012 up until its early 
implementation in 2018. 
Paradoxically, the systemic property of the peace process allowed, on one hand, 
opening a window for rural development policy change by including, as I explained in 
Chapter 5, an ambitious rural reform as part of the broader peace agreement. On the 
other, however, due to the inextricable link of each of the specific issues to the 
agreement on a whole, it also made impossible isolating the rural measures agreed 
from complex political discussions that did not have anything to do with them, such as 
FARC commanders’ political participation or the sanctions regime. The CRR’s 
appropriateness was indeed criticized in of itself, but the condemnations it received 
were mainly for being part of the peace process. 
In this chapter, first I characterize the opposition’s constituency, motivations and 
interests, and then describe the framing process through the peace negotiations and 
early implementation phase. Through this analysis, I reveal how framings appealing to 
moral grounds, such as that of “FARC’s impunity”, actually served the opposition to 
shield particular economic interests and in achieving their political goal of coming back 
to power in 2018. I sustain that Uribe targeted the peace process as a strategy to regain 
political power and defend the rentier economic interests he represented.   
 
7.2 The Peace Talks: The Perfect Punching Bag of the Uribismo 
 
As mentioned before, as soon as president Santos made the announcement of the 
Havana peace talks, Uribe, his former boss, began to distance himself from him. There 
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was, no doubt, an unbridgeable conceptual difference between the two regarding how 
to define the FARC (whether solely as a terrorist organization or also as a political 
actor with whom it was possible to sit down in a negotiating table) and therefore of 
how to put an end to the armed conflict (Orjuela 2015). However, beyond these 
ideational cleavages, which were not as strong as Uribe said them to be,58 his mounting 
opposition against Santos’ peace process aimed at achieving two objectives. One was 
using this opposition to become once again the leader of a nation-wide political force 
capable of competing in local, legislative and presidential elections, as the Centro 
Democrático Party rapid expansion showed in the elections held between 2014 and 
2018 (Botero 2018; Losada and Liendo 2016). In June 2018, the Party’s candidate, 
Iván Duque, won the presidential elections with more than 10 million votes, more than 
doubling the result of Óscar Iván Zuluága in 2014, who obtained 3.8 million votes in 
the run-off against Santos. In 2018, the Centro Democrático Party also became the 
major force in congress with 19 senators and 32 members of the lower chamber. 
 Moreover, by mobilizing a critical discourse against the peace process, Uribe’s 
second goal was to defend a very specific set of economic interests tied to big cattle-
ranching and rural landed elites, including those involved in coercive land 
dispossession (Robles Zabala 2016; Gutiérrez Sanín and Vargas 2017; Montero 
2012).59 Although these sectors had lost economic power compared to the 1960s or 
1970s, they remained politically influential and gained ascendance during Uribe’s 
administrations. In fact, as Richani (2013) points out, Uribe rose to power in 2002 in 
great part thanks to the support of these sectors (see also Richani 2013:chap. 9 and 10; 
                                                 
58 During his government, Uribe attempted to negotiate with FARC on various occasions and was 
willing to concede them demands than the Santos government did not accept in the Havana negotiations 
(Semana 2014a; El Espectador 2016 b; Lara 2012). Moreover, from the outset the strategic goal of the 
Democratic Security policy was to weaken FARC militarily in order to lead them toward a negotiating 
table, as described in Chapter 3. 
59 According to Gutiérrez Sanín and Vargas (2017), big cattle ranchers represented a “surprisingly high 
percentage of the leadership of paramilitary groups […] Almost half of the national leadership arriving at 
the peace negotiations with the government in 2002 were ranchers” (p. 742). These paramilitary groups, 
as it has been widely documented recently, played in turn in the violent land grab that took place 
between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, in various cases coordinated and promoted by legal rural elites, 
such as José Felix Lafaurie, the leader of the Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos (National Cattle-
Ranching Association, FEDEGAN). Lafaurie, very close to Uribe, has been a staunch critic of the CRR 
and the peace agreement in general. He is married to María Fernanda Cabal, elected in congress in 2014 
as part of the Centro Democrático. 
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Verdad Abierta 2014; Grajales 2013; Uribe López 2017; Ballvé 2013; Romero and 
Valencia 2007). A son of a prominent cattle rancher in Antioquia whose father FARC 
kidnapped and later killed in a failed rescue attempt, Uribe’s political project combined 
hatred towards the guerrillas with the staunch defense of the status quo (in its rentier 
rural variant). Feeling represented by this project, an important sector of large 
landowners, cattle ranchers, agribusinesses and narco dealers with strong ties with 
paramilitary groups (that Richani refers to as the “reactionary coalition of class 
forces”) supported Uribe’s presidential candidacy in 2002. Ernesto Báez, a former 
paramilitary commander, speaking of the support his illegal group gave to Uribe in that 
campaign, said they had “overlapping goals” (quoted in Richani 2013, p. 205). 
Through Uribe, these sectors sought to enhance their political and economic power as 
well as to legalize the assets they had accumulated violently and circumvent any justice 
or human rights claims against them.      
When Santos came in to power and began to display his reformist agenda, these 
sectors blocked any policy geared towards restituting, regulating and formalizing 
property rights affecting their status quo. While the government’s peace negotiators 
conceived the peace talks as a way to introduce progressive changes in rural 
development policy, Uribe’s-led opposition used them strategically for strengthening 
and legitimizing their own diminishing power and interests. By raising highly 
controversial and unpopular issues, like FARC’s political participation and transitional 
justice, the peace talks – and the agreements reached therein – became Uribe’s perfect 
“punching bag”. This was all the easier considering that the peace talks themselves 
integrated into the public debate previously disconnected issues, thus helping to trigger 
the unification of fragmented interest groups opposing different aspects of the 
agreement into a relatively cohesive conservative coalition skillfully exploited by Uribe 
during the 2016 plebiscite (Semana 2012). 
The development and evolution of this opposition against the peace talks, and 
particularly against the CRR, may be examined by focusing on four major junctures in 
the 2012-2018 period. The first one started with Santos’ public announcement of the 
beginning of the peace talks in August 2012 and ended right after with the joint 
statement made at the end of June 2013 by the government and FARC regarding the 
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first partial agreement reached on the item of comprehensive agrarian policy. The 
second one occurred during the first half of 2014 when congress and presidential 
elections took place. The third refers to the time of the plebiscite campaign, which 
started in August 2016 and the renegotiation process that ensued in October and 
November 2016. Finally, the last juncture was that of the implementation phase during 
Santos’ last year of government and the 2018 congressional and presidential elections. 
Drawing on the framework proposed by Sell and Prakash (Sell and Prakash 
2004:148) to analyze how normative frames are promoted, deployed and grafted onto 
current debates to serve certain interests, I identify for each of these junctures the 
framing strategy, tactics, political opportunities and organizational structure (including 
key actors within it) of the opposition.60 Through this methodology, I show how as 
“signifying agents”, Uribe’s-led opposition engaged in the production and maintenance 
of meanings regarding the peace agreement for their own constituents, antagonists, as 
well bystanders and observers (Benford and Snow 2000). While there were relevant 
political dynamics at each moment, it is important to see these junctures in light of the 
broader political process that was unfolding, that is, Uribe’s spoiling and delegitimizing 
of peace as a form of attaining political power and maintaining the status quo 
(Newman and Richmond 2006; Nasi and Hurtado 2018). The table below summarizes 
the key elements I examine in each of the junctures. 
 
Table 7.1. Framing Process of Uribe’s-Led Opposition against the Peace Talks 
 Announcement 
of peace talks 













(December 2016 - 
2018) 













impunity (no jail 
time); gender 
ideology 




to destroy the 
agreement; 
FARC’s no laying 
down of weapons 
and ongoing 
                                                 
60 Benford and Snow (2000) provide a review of the sociological literature on framing, recognizing that 
the concept draws from psychology, particularly cognitive psychology, linguistics and discourse 
analysis, communication and media studies, and political science and policy studies.  
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Announcement of the Peace Process  
Right after the public phase of the peace talks began in August 2012, Uribe began to 
construct his overall normative framing against the peace process, and to put together 
the tactics and organizational structure that would support his opposition up until 
2018. Before he created the Centro Democrático Party in early 2013, Uribe’s main 
political tool to criticize the peace process was the social media Tweeter (Suárez 2013; 
López Urrea, Páez Valdéz, and Cuéllar Rodríguez 2016; Vélez 2014). This venue 
facilitated Uribe’s way of doing politics in a “post-truth era” which, in a similar way to 
US President Donald Trump, questioned traditional media outlets and lend itself to 
diffusing fake news, pseudo-facts and fringe theories geared towards polarizing and 
creating a constant state of uncertainty (Nasi and Hurtado 2018; Levitin 2017; Rabin-
Havt and America 2016; The Economist 2018). During this time, due to the 
confidential nature of the talks, the government negotiators’ in Havana maintained a 
low profile. By contrast, the FARC’s members pronounced statements in Havana 
every morning, expressing their political views even if unrelated to the actual 
discussions at the negotiating table. Uribe capitalized on this information asymmetry 
by filling the space with a critical and distorted narrative of the dialogues that appealed 
to normative claims pointing to their illegitimacy and inconveniency. Grafting his own 
agenda onto major societal concerns, Uribe effectively obscured the economic interests 
he was defending by exploiting the public’s generalized animosity against FARC as 
well as Santos’ lack of popularity. 
A first overarching framing that he developed after the negotiating table was 
launched in Oslo in October 2012, and that would be recurrent in his overall critique of 
peace process, was that it was unacceptable to “negotiate with terrorists” (Caracol 
Radio 2012). This framing did not tackle the content of the negotiations but their 
rationale. As said earlier, for Uribe the guerrilla group was not a political actor. The 
FARC were only a terrorist group threatening Colombia’s democracy. The framing he 
developed encapsulated very well the rage felt by the majority of Colombians against 
the FARC, especially after the failure of the Caguán’s peace process in 2001. The 
extortions, kidnappings, town occupations, bombings, among other means of violence 
220 
used by this group, were fresh in people’s minds; by 2012, the positive perception of 
FARC was still under 4 percent, unchanged since the year 2000 (Gallup Colombia 
2018). What this framing concealed, however, was that all previous administrations 
since Betancur in the 1980s, including Uribe’s, had sought a political dialogue with the 
guerrillas precisely with the aim of putting an end to the armed confrontation. 
Nonetheless, Uribe cleverly pounded this framing over the following years making use 
of his charismatic, eloquent and colloquial way of speaking he mastered during his 
presidency (Richard 2008; Sandoval 2011; Pardo Arboleda and Galvis Árias 2017; 
Arrieta 2009; Dugas 2003; Nasi and Hurtado 2018).61 
In his first speech after the Oslo event, delivered at the last U Party assembly he 
attended before moving out and creating his own party, Uribe also mentioned two 
other key general framings: the fear that the Havana peace talks would “turn Colombia 
into a castrochavista model” and that the negotiations would result in “FARC’s 
impunity”. Both of them proved as well quite effective in mobilizing people’s 
perceptions and feelings against the peace process early on. Regarding the first, Uribe 
coined this term to associate the Cuban and Venezuelan failed socialist models 
(economic crisis, authoritarian rule) with the peace negotiations and FARC’s proposals 
in them (Colombia.com 2012). As Venezuela’s political and economic situation kept 
deteriorating into near collapse during the period of the talks, it became an increasingly 
relevant issue for Colombians – not least because of the massive migration the country 
received due to the humanitarian crisis – and its specter all the more realistic 
(International Crisis Group 2018a). FARC, indeed, had strong connections with 
Chávez’ regime before the negotiations, as described in Chapter 3 (including illegal 
drug businesses), and a similar Bolivarian political project that they were proud to 
announce every time they could during the negotiations. Moreover, Venezuela was 
designated as one of the facilitator countries in the Negotiating Table (along with 
Chile). With these elements in mind, Uribe built a simple but persuasive narrative 
equaling the peace talks to the instauration of a socialist regime in Colombia that 
                                                 
61 There is a relevant literature on Uribe’s political communication strategy during his presidency. Using 
critical discourse analysis this literature has contributed significantly to understanding the emotional and 
normative basis of Uribe’s popularity. See, for example, (Richard 2008; Sandoval 2011; Pardo Arboleda 
and Galvis Árias 2017; Arrieta 2009; Cárdenas-Támara 2012) 
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completely misrepresented the actual agreements, which were far away from such kind 
of measures. 
The other key general framing was that of “FARC’s impunity”. Well before the 
negotiations addressed the issue of justice, Uribe began to convey the idea that the 
peace talks would not lead to a strong punishment of FARC’s commanders for the 
grave crimes they had committed, and that the country would end up seeing these 
“terrorists” free and doing politics without any restrictions. These declarations sought 
to capitalize the critiques posed against the government-led “Legal Framework for 
Peace”, a constitutional amendment approved by congress in July 2012 (Congreso de 
la República 2012). Prior to beginning the public phase of the negotiations, the 
government pushed this Legal Framework through congress with the idea of preparing 
the ground for the eventual peace talks and giving them legal stability. In practice, it 
meant recognizing the various actors in the armed conflict (guerrilla, paramilitary 
groups, state forces) and the need of coming up with transitional justice mechanisms to 
address the massive human rights violations committed by all of the actors involved in 
the conflict. For Uribe, this was unacceptable because it equated the FARC with the 
state forces as “actors” in a conflict, and because it led to recognizing the possibility of 
FARC’s political status (Maya 2012).  
Alongside these framings against the peace process, Uribe, directly or through close 
advisors like Rafael Guarín, who was former deputy minister of defense, combined 
criticisms against Santos’ government, highlighting especially the country’s 
“deteriorating security”. In his public interventions and tweets, Uribe kept reminding 
the public opinion of how his government recuperated the tranquility of Colombians 
by strengthening the armed forces and weakening the guerrilla groups. He contrasted 
these results with Santos’ slackening, arguing that the peace talks had meant paying 
less attention to the ongoing violence and a demoralization of the army (Quevedo and 
García Segura 2012; González Espinosa 2012; El Espectador 2013; Murphy 2012). 
Although security indicators actually improved during Santos’ first years, the citizens’ 
perception on insecurity increased from 48 percent to 77 percent between July 2010 
and June 2013, evidencing the effect of Uribe’s narrative on the public’s opinion 
(Gallup Colombia 2018:16; El País 2012). 
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Announcement of the CRR 
As it is evident from the above description, the discussion on the rural development 
item in Colombia became enmeshed in the broader debate about the peace process in 
general right from the onset of the negotiations. Uribe exploited throughout the peace 
talks the connections that the negotiating agenda itself made to raise his own concerns 
across a variety of issues. Still, he and his close allies also came up with specific 
framings to delegitimize the talks on this particular item, especially after the 
announcement of the partial agreement on the CRR in May 2013. As pointed out by a 
top government advisor interviewed, the fact that the CRR did not result out of a broad 
political consensus across sectors assisted the opposition’s claim of lack of the 
agreement’s legitimacy (Personal communication Former Advisor of Ministry of 
Agriculture 2017, April 13, 2017). Its content was the outcome of a settlement between 
negotiating elites in Havana and therefore had from its outset a democratic deficit 
derived from the design of the peace talks themselves. There were indeed, as described 
in Chapter 5, mechanisms through which civil society participated in the negotiating 
phase with proposals and inputs. Yet, the negotiations were not, and could not have 
been, as the Caguán failed experienced showed, a widely democratic process. They 
were carried out between the government’s and the FARC’s negotiators. An ample 
consensus on the problems faced by the countryside was in place, as showed in the 
previous chapter, synthesized in expert reports, government bills and civil society 
policy recommendations. Nonetheless, there was not a consensus on the solutions to 
these problems, for example, on how to distribute land and what do with the baldíos. In 
this respect, the measures consigned in the CRR’s document, no matter how 
elementary they were, crossed the line of what was acceptable for right-wing political 
sectors. 
The reception of the CRR’s announcement was positive across important segments 
of Colombian society. Most of political parties, business associations, NGOs, rural 
organizations, the academia, the media, the international community, reacted 
enthusiastically to this first partial agreement (González Posso 2013; Ávila 2013; León 
and Bermúdez 2013; La Crónica del Quindío 2013). However, the right-wing 
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opposition led by Uribe, in close alliance with the cattle ranching sector in charge of 
José Félix Lafaurie, were critical of it and exploited its democratic deficit, at a time in 
which the text of the agreements was not made available due to the confidentiality rule 
(El Universal 2013c; El Tiempo 2013). Most importantly, they often used FARC’s 
radical declarations – and not the agreement itself – as a way of creating fear in the 
citizens’ perception of the measures agreed.  
The most contentious issues of the CRR according to the opposition were those 
referring to the land access measures. In a letter sent by Lafaurie to Humberto de La 
Calle, the government’s chief negotiator, dated on June 26, 2013, in reaction to the 
Joint Report published on June 21 by the government and FARC, which described in 
more detail what the rural development item agreed, he explained his arguments 
(Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2013; Lafaurie 2013). For Lafaurie, the Land Fund 
defined in the CRR to distribute land was problematic because it enshrined as one of 
its key sources the state recovery of unexploited land through the administrative 
ownership cessation procedure. Adopting the same argument cattle ranchers used to 
oppose the land reform in the 1960s, Lafaurie stated his concern that the agreement did 
not establish the specific criteria or rules of how this procedure would actually assess 
the proper social and ecological function of the land. This lack of clarity would give 
place to a discretionary application of this procedure on behalf of government 
bureaucrats thus opening a “Pandora Box” against land proprietors and threating the 
constitutional right of property ownership. The “expropriatory spirit” of the Land 
Fund, he argued, was too lenient with FARC’s historic pretentions on carrying out a 
massive land overhaul and put at risk the economic stability and future growth of the 
countryside. The fact that this procedure had an existing, long-dated constitutional and 
legal basis was not a sufficient guarantee for Lafaurie, who also did not recognize that 
the agreement also established an agrarian jurisdiction to protect the due legal process 
in any administrative measure. Regardless of the actual content of the agreement, the 
Uribe-led opposition used this normative framing of the “massive land expropriation” 
throughout the peace talks – usually together with that of the castrochavismo – to 
question the CRR and scare middle and large farmers. These framings though were in 
great part fuelled by FARC’s radical statements in Havana, mainly geared towards 
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their rank-and-file members that were still in the jungles or in jail. The Land Fund 
proposed by the guerrilla group was to be composed of twenty million hectares that 
would come mainly from expropriations of unproductive land (FARC-EP 2014:27). 
Although the agreement actually reached was far from reflecting FARC’s pretentions, 
the opposition used them as “evidence” to indicate the risks of such an agreement. 
Another framing the uribismo advanced in this period against the CRR had to do 
with the Peasant Reserve Zones (PRZ) (Nassar 2013). As explained in Chapter 5, the 
agreement on the PRZ recognized that these were an existing figure created in Law 
160 of 1994 to support peasant communities inhabiting agricultural frontier areas, and 
committed the government to execute the development plans for the zones that were 
already in place and to continue studying the requests for creating new zones 
(Gobierno de Colombia and FARC 2016:sec. RRI). Disregarding what the agreement 
actually said, the opposition exploited fruitfully FARC’s public proposals in Havana of 
turning these zones into a new political administrative entity that would have the same 
character of an indigenous territory (resguardo) (including veto powers) and of 
extending them in an area of nine million hectares (FARC-EP 2014). Equaling 
FARC’s proposals to the agreement and capitalizing on the third annual assembly of 
the National Peasant Reserve Zones Association (ANZORC, for its initials in Spanish) 
during the first months of 2013, Lafaurie and other critics incited amongst public 
opinion the fear that FARC would take over vast rural areas, creating “independent 
republics” within the state (Bermúdez 2013i). With this framing, the opposition 
appealed to a deeply rooted mistrust against the PRZ that was present in Colombia’s 
conservative sectors since FARC’s origins in the southwest in the 1960s (Karl 2017).  
The government responded to all of these framings explaining at different venues 
what the rationale behind the CRR and addressed all the concerns raised by the 
opposition. However, during that same year, the national agrarian strike that unfolded 
in 2013 (described in Chapter 5), weakened the government officials’ interest in 
defending the measures of rural citizens’ participation in planning and decision-making 
processes contemplated in Havana. The strike lasted for several weeks and it developed 
with a logic of confrontation and negotiation with the government that wore out the 
ministries and government advisors appointed by the president. Many of these officials 
225 
were involved afterwards in the CRR’s preparatory tasks, but they assumed them with 
little enthusiasm or incentives after their “traumatic” experience negotiating with the 
agrarian movement (personal communication advisor of President’s Office). Moreover, 
at a time in which the peace negotiations were not yet the main priority of the 
government, the defense of the CRR was not as adamant as the critiques made by the 
opposition. After Juan Camilo Restrepo’s resignation, the only ones talking about it 
were the negotiators, thus leaving too much space for FARC’s radical proposals and 
Uribe’s framings to coopt the public’s perceptions on it.  
 
Pushback against Rural Reform in the 2014 Elections 
Santos only assumed the peace agenda as his main government’s flag by the end of 
2013 when the campaign for the 2014 presidential elections started. Before that, his 
administration maintained two competing discourses, one on the benefits of the peace 
dialogues and the other, in case these were not successful, of a military confrontation. 
This latter discourse, espoused by the Ministry of Defense, also sought to maintain a 
hardline narrative that would counteract Uribe’s opposition against Santos’ security 
policy. However, as the peace process made progress – by November 2013, an 
agreement on political participation, the second item of the negotiations was reached – 
Santos constructed his campaign around the need to conform a broad political front to 
support the ongoing peace talks. By this point, besides the left-wing party Polo 
Democrátivo Alternativo, Uribe, at the other side of the political spectrum, had become 
the government’s main opposition, and was getting prepared for the legislative and 
presidential elections by building the newly created Centro Democrático party’s local 
and regional platforms. In this electoral period, he kept criticizing fiercely the peace 
process and Santos’ overall performance (Nasi 2014). On the latter, he focused now 
not only on the security, but also developed as well a complimentary framing around 
the deterioration of the economic and social situation, raising the concerns of the 
growing urban middle class on unemployment, health, transportation and corruption, 
which were in the public’s mind more important than the peace agenda (Lewin 2014; 
Semana 2014b).  
226 
One of the strategies used by Uribe to strengthen his political bloc was to mobilize 
the unsatisfied farmers who had continued protesting due to the declining prices and to 
support the sector of the rural tenants who felt threatened by the land restitution policy. 
In alliance with the conservative Inspector General, Alejandro Ordóñez, and 
Fedegán’s president, José Félix Lafaurie, Uribe helped organized various events and 
rallies that sought to capitalize politically the growing discontent of the landowners 
who were in a legal battle with the Land Restitution Unit regarding their links to 
coercive land possession (Solarte 2016; Barrantes 2014). Alongside the notions of 
castrochavismo and land expropriation, Uribe exploited this anti-restitution sentiment to 
generate a rejection of the CRR agreed in Havana claiming that all of these issues were 
putting at risk the private property. 
Taking into account that the Centro Democrático was just a recently created party 
that was not part of the government’s coalition, its turnout in the legislative elections of 
March 2014 was surprisingly high. With more than two millions votes and 38 
congressional representatives, the Centro Democrático became the second most voted 
party (after the U Party) and gained significant relevance during the 2014-2018 period. 
Uribe now had not only Twiter but also a large political force in the legislative branch 
from where to continue with its opposition to the government. Moreover, Uribe’s 
candidate, Oscar Iván Zuluága won the first round of the presidential elections with 29 
percent of the total votes based on his campaign against the peace process. For the run-
off, as explained in the previous section, Santos built a large coalition based on the 
support of the peace process to win over Zuluága.      
 
The Plebiscite and the Renegotiation: Amending the Comprehensive Rural Reform 
After Santos was re-elected, the peace talks continued their course. As the negotiations 
entered into the most difficult topics (narcotrafficking, transitional justice, laying down 
of weapons, FARC’s political participation, endorsement mechanism and legal binding 
mechanisms), Uribe’s opposition grew in intensity and extension as it covered more 
grounds and constructed more alliances. The turning point of the political balance of 
forces between the government and the opposition was the plebiscite that took place in 
October 2016 to approve the final agreement reached a couple of months earlier. 
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Conceived by the negotiators as a mechanism through which the citizenship would 
have a direct saying on the settlement drafted by the delegations in Havana and that 
would activate all the implementation mechanisms agreed, the plebiscite became the 
perfect scenario for the opposition’s deployment of its “politics of significance”. An 
agreement of more than three hundred pages that included highly detailed and 
complex issues like the creation of the transitional justice system contrasted with the 
simple and straightforward framings that the opposition had diffused consistently since 
2012 on “impunity” and castrochavismo. Although more inclined to frame its critiques 
on moral grounds, during this campaign, the Uribe-led opposition also revealed 
explicitly its rentier economic interests, criticizing the update of the rural cadaster 
included in the CRR with the argument that it would have an impact on the land tax 
(Semana 2016b). Over the course of the campaign, the government did a poor job in 
mobilizing the Yes vote. Meanwhile, the No camp leaders combined specific critiques 
to certain items of the agreement (e.g. fiscal impossibility of implementing the CRR or 
the disorder the participatory processes would generate for decision-making), with 
ongoing criticisms of the country’s economic and social situation and emotional 
appeals that did not have to do with the agreement at all. The best example of the latter 
was that of the “gender ideology” issue, which served to mobilize the Christian 
conservative sectors against the agreement. By arguing that the agreement’s inclusion 
of a gender focus would have an impact on the rights of families to decide how to 
educate their children and on the definition of family overall, the opposition was able 
to graft onto the plebiscite a broader societal debate. At the end, all of these framings 
proved fruitful as the No vote won with a margin of 0.5 percent and less than 50,000 
votes. The week after the election, the manager of the No campaign, in similar terms to 
what occurred with Brexit, vividly stated that “they wanted people to vote with rage” 
and that they had decided intentionally to “stop explaining our arguments against the 
agreement and focus via social media on the message of indignation” (El País 2016). 
As Basset recently showed, the No vote mostly concentrated in middle class urban 
sectors (2018). Unlike El Salvador or South Africa, there were no major economic or 
political power relations at stake with the agreement. The armed conflict had become 
marginal and people in the cities did not experience directly anymore. Economic 
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conditions including foreign investment had already improved years before, so for 
many people the benefits of peace were not as tangible, whereas the moral arguments 
against the FARC were very strong. Only in rural municipalities where people still felt 
the ongoing effects of violence, the Yes vote won by a significant difference, but the 
proportion of this rural vote vis-à-vis the urban vote was marginal. Urban dwellers 
were more concerned about FARC’s impunity or the unfair subsidies the combatants 
were going to receive for their reincorporation process – which was another of the 
framings the No campaign used to trigger a negative reaction – than with the actual 
possibility of ending a conflict and beginning a peacebuilding phase. 
A concrete political result of the plebiscite was that Uribe strengthened his 
opposition against Santos and the peace talks by new actors that had also supported 
the No vote and conformed a broad No leaders’ coalition, which was instrumental for 
the negotiations of the new agreement and the following 2018 elections. Former 
conservative president Andrés Pastrana and conservative politician Martha Lucía 
Ramírez, who rallied against the agreement’s approval for different reasons, joined this 
coalition, as well as the No religious sector, composed by a Christian sector and a 
Catholic sector led by the former Inspector General Alejandro Ordóñez. The FARC’s 
Victims National Association, who had been very vocal against the insufficient 
sanctions established against FARC’s commanders, also joined it, as well as group of 
right-wing lawyers, such as Rafael Nieto and Jaime Castro. In the renegotiation that 
ensued, the government sat down with this group of No leaders to address their main 
concerns and then discuss them with the FARC in Havana. Although a new agreement 
was reached and then endorsed by the congress by the end of November of 2016, the 
No leaders considered that it had not addressed their major concerns – sanctions 
regime and FARC’s political participation – and did not accept it as legitimate. Since 
then, the illegitimacy of the agreement’s approval lingered on affecting its 
implementation. Still, during the renegotiation process the uribistas revealed their 
economic interests, strongly rejecting the measures on the rural cadaster and the 
increase of the land tax included in the agreement.  
 
Post-Plebiscite: Lack of Legitimacy and Poor Implementation 
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After the endorsement of the new agreement, Uribe’s-led opposition continued its 
staunch critique against the agreement and of its implementation. Its main venue was 
the congress by sabotaging the passing of the constitutional amendments and bills 
through the fast track mechanism created to provide a legal framework of the 
implementation. Santos’ National Unity worked well for the first major laws but in the 
second half of 2017, as the elections got closer, the legislators drifted and the coalition’s 
support to the key government’s peace legislative initiatives fragmented.  FARC laid 
down its weapons by June 2017 in a very orderly manner with the oversight of a 
special UN mission approved by the UN Security Council. However, the No leaders’ 
coalition questioned this process claiming that FARC had not handed over its entire 
military arsenal and that it continued its links with the drug dealing business. The 
government, with time constraints and less political capital prioritized certain laws 
over other and relegated the major bills of the CRR to a second level. Of all the bills 
that it had drafted to implement the normative components of the CRR (rural 
financing, irrigation, cadaster, technical assistance, land, Forest Reserve Zones, 
implementation plan) only the one creating the Agricultural Innovation System passed 
successfully through congress. With an unfavorable political context, even if the 
international community supported the peace process, most of Santos’ ministers did 
not sacrifice their political capital for the sake of the agreement’s implementation and 
the government’s institutions in favor of a robust peacebuilding phase were not many.  
In the 2018 congressional elections, the Centro Democrático increased its number 
of seats, becoming the party with the most seats (19 in senate and 32 in the lower 
chamber). Besides the growth of its power in congress, Uribe exploited the No leaders’ 
coalition to build an electoral bloc for the presidential elections. In March, he reached 
an agreement with Martha Lucía Ramírez, Andrés Pastrana and Alejandro Ordóñez to 
select a single candidate out of all of them. The winner of this primary was Iván 
Duque, Uribe’s designated candidate, who had been a Centro Democrático’s senator 
during the 2014-2018 period and a major player during the agreement’s renegotiation 
process. Supported by this broad base coalition, and maintaining a discourse against 
the agreement – based on the growing security problems with FARC’s dissidents and 
organized crime and the increasing coca crops – Duque won the presidential elections 
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in June with 54 percent of the votes. Most of the politicians of the parties that 
supported Santos’ National Unity, in a pragmatic calculation, accommodated 
themselves to the new political scenario, and moved towards Duque’s campaign 
regardless of his critical position against the peace agreement (Ardila 2018). The slow 
implementation of the justice tribunal, in addition to the scandal that one of FARC’s 
key negotiators in Havana had incurred in a cocaine export deal to the US after the 
agreement had been reached, gave further discursive ammunition to Duque’s 
campaign, which sought at the time to talk less about the agreement’s implementation. 
Five years after its announcement, in May 2018 the CRR was not anymore in anyone’s 
mind and had lost political relevance. Not even the candidates supporting the 
agreement had it as its main political flag. The opposition had productively 
delegitimized the government, which in turn had lost political governance over the 




Complementing the argument espoused in Chapter 6, this chapter described how 
Uribe’s opposition also undermined the government’s implementation of the CRR 
through effective framings against the peace process. It did so drawing on the 
constructivist literature on normative frames that points out the role collective 
understandings have in shaping political outcomes. More specifically, I traced the 
various framing strategies used by Uribe’s-led opposition to put into question the peace 
process overall and the rural development reform in particular. Through this 
description, the chapter brought to the fore how ideational narratives based on moral 
grounds unrelated to the CRR served to reject implementing substantive provisions 
that affected the status quo of rural landed elites. The status quo policy trajectory that 
was in place during Uribe’s governments was to an extent interrupted by Santos’ 
reformist vision and the Havana peace talks, which opened a different path tilted in 
favor of the peasantry and the rural poor. As the CRR’s implementation period began, 
however, the internal and external constraints it suffered outweighed the exceptional 
capacity the government had to implement its transformative provisions. In mid-2018, 
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a sweeping rural reform did not seem close, especially after Uribe’s candidate won the 
presidential elections. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 
8.1 Main Arguments and Contributions 
 
Are negotiated transitions from civil war to peace favorable for enacting distributive 
rural change? If so, in what ways and through what mechanisms? What role do global 
economic forces and norms play, if any? What role do domestic politics, class 
dynamics, policy processes and institutional trajectories? In order to answer these 
questions, this thesis examined the determinants of rural development policy change in 
the context of the recent Colombian peace talks, bringing together into a single analysis 
three distinct sets of literature that rarely speak to each other – agrarian political 
economy, peacemaking and peace implementation research, and institutional and 
policy change. In doing so, the thesis explained through an INUS-based framework, on 
one hand, that the Havana peace agreement reached in 2016 by the Colombian 
government and the FARC did open a window of opportunity for carrying out a rural 
reform geared towards improving land access, public goods provision and agricultural 
supports to peasants. On the other, it also argued that several political and economic 
factors restricted the translation of this reform into substantive policy action. Two 
years after the implementation began and five since the agreement on the rural 
development item was reached, the prospects for rural policy change remain uncertain. 
In a nutshell, transitions matter but political and economic constraints tend matter 
more. To what extent, then, does the Colombian experience challenge conventional 
wisdom about negotiated pathways to rural development and in particular the role of 
macropolitical change as driver of rural reform? 
The experience confirms that peace settlements tend to offer an exceptional 
democratic circumstance to address rural inequality issues at the heart of armed 
conflicts. However, it also downplays the significance of popular mobilization from 
below in creating and sustaining the conditions for distributive rural change, which 
was crucial in countries like El Salvador and South Africa. Instead, it highlights how 
norms defined by key decision makers at the negotiating table can impact policy shift 
even in the absence of widespread social unrest. In the case of Colombia, rural pressure 
helped ratcheting up the scope of the rural reform agreed, but only when the political 
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conditions were ripe for these distributive measures in the first place. Nonetheless, this 
norm induced shift also evidenced its limitations. After the peace negotiations ended, 
the government’s incentives to tackle structural inequality as part of the 
implementation phase diminished.  
Colombia’s experience also confirms the long-noted idea that pre-existing global 
and domestic economic forces thwarted attempts to rural reform. In a globalized 
context of increasingly reduced national policy space, it is not unsurprising to see that, 
even amid a transitional context, rural elites (both traditional cattle ranchers and 
export-oriented agribusiness) were able to secure their interests and obstruct the 
agreement’s provisions to improve land distribution. This is most clearly illustrated by 
the access points agribusiness firms’ lawyers had to influence land policy at president 
Santos’ Executive Office during the implementation period of the Comprehensive 
Rural Reform. It is also evident in the way in which Uribe mobilized the rural 
traditional elites (mainly associated with extensive cattle ranching) against basic claims 
for land restitution, titling and cadaster updating. At the same time though, the thesis 
also indicated how alternative norms at the global level on land access, family 
agriculture and food sovereignty, among others, opened policy space domestically to 
push forward a distributive policy agenda favoring the peasantry. In other words, it 
showed how ideational and material forces operated in favor and against rural policy 
shift either strengthening or constraining the leverage of domestic political actors. 
These observations add up to a key methodological lesson. Researchers seeking to 
assess the impact of a peace agreement on a substantive issue area like rural 
development policy need to make serious efforts to understand how central 
governments function from within and inside out. It is particularly important to avoid 
generalizations. Paying attention to meso and micro institutional and political 
dynamics in detail is crucial to understand what is at stake in the implementation of 
developmental provisions of a peace agreement with distributive implications. Today it 
is known that Colombia’s performance has been weak in the early phase of the 
implementation. The central government did, after all, encountered serious internal 
and external obstacles to live up to the expectations created by the agreement itself. But 
it is risky to draw a priori conclusions on this fact unless there is evidence that these 
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limitations were, indeed, faced by the actors responsible for the implementation during 
events. State incapacity should not be interpreted as a prima facie indication of lack of 
policy change. This may lead commentators to make wrong assumptions as to why 
governments decide to address structural issues in a peace process and then reneged of 
its commitments (e.g. Chagas-Bastos 2018). Governments are, in fact, conflict-ridden 
entities, full of internal rivalries and competing agendas that need to be teased out 
empirically. Policy outcomes must be therefore understood as the messy result of 
political dynamics rather than clean-cut outgrowths of a president’s agenda. In the case 
of rural policymaking in Colombia, I looked at Santos’ bureaucracy, political 
arrangements, and interest groups to examine the contradictions faced by the 
government in the CRR’s implementation period. 
My pursuit of explanation based on a close study of the interaction between rural 
development policy and the transitional context also has a theoretical implication. It 
challenges the structuralist view according to which policy change is fundamentally 
driven by macro-level variables. In practice, structures, even if they limit the range of 
possible actions, operate and must be made visible through concrete political actors, 
who adapt to the changing political circumstances and make strategic use of the 
resources available to them. The opposition led by Álvaro Uribe against the peace 
process had an underlying economic component – the defense of the rural elite’s status 
quo – but it developed through effective framings that went way beyond it and 
addressed moral issues like justice, as they were politically tailored to the specific 
scenario of Havana’s peace agreement. 
Throughout the dissertation I have approached the trajectory of rural development 
policy in Colombia as a product of the Havana peace agreements and domestic 
political dynamics, influenced as well by global economic trends and norms. I believe 
the conceptual framework I developed may be useful to explore other relevant 
experiences of countries that have gone through a peace settlement with rural 
development provisions. I also think that the research is important for scholars and 
policymakers interested globally in discussing the relationship between the transitional 
nature and effects of peace agreements, including its exceptional legal and political 
mechanisms for implementation, and development trajectories.  
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8.2 Future Research Avenues 
 
As I mentioned in the Research boundaries section in the introductory chapter, I am 
also aware that the thesis leaves various questions unanswered and opens new research 
avenues that may be fruitful to pursue in the near future. 
Above all, I think it is relevant to analyze the CRR’s local implementation and its 
effects on the ground. In order to do this, it is important to draw from existing research 
on Colombia’s political economy regional differentiation in relation to the processes of 
armed conflict, state-building and agrarian development (González 2014; González, 
Bolívar, and Vázquez 2003; Rettberg et al. 2018). There is also ample work on the 
diverse local social orders and their implications for peacemaking created by the forms 
of control developed by illegal armed actors (Arjona 2016). Moreover, the emerging 
quantitative and qualitative research on the effects and challenges of the peace 
agreement’s implementation on the ground, particularly on rural development issues, 
will be fundamental for this kind of inquiry (Guarín, Tovar, and Amaya 2018; 
Jaramillo Marín, Castro-Herrera, and Ortíz Gallego 2018; Binningsbø et al. 2017; 
Binningsbø et al. 2018; Miklian and Medina Bickel 2018; Vargas and Hurtado de 
Mendoza 2017; Criado de Diego 2018). In-depth regional and local studies of the 
CRR’s implementation need to address as well the gender, age, class and ethnic 
differences across rural populations in Colombia. The CRR has specific provision on 
gender equality and guarantees for ethnic minorities that are worth studying on their 
own.  
Besides completing the analysis of the CRRs’ implementation with local-level 
analysis, it is relevant as well in the future to develop the framework proposed here in a 
systematic comparative perspective. Based on the factors examined, it is worth 
considering a careful inquiry into the trajectories of the agrarian agreements introduced 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, South Africa and Nepal. Wood’s work (2001) is a good 
start for undertaking this comparison, which may shed a light on Colombia’s political 
difficulties to enact rural change.  
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I also think it is relevant to carry out further research in examining the rural elites’ 
attitude towards the peace talks and particularly towards the CRR. There is a need of 
more detailed empirical information that may help explaining the differences amongst 
agribusinesses and cattle ranchers with regards to how they perceived the benefits and 
costs of the rural reform. Within each group they were divided, and it is not clear what 
are the factors explaining these differences. While some agricultural business 
associations and cattle ranchers’ associations were in favor of the peace process and of 
the CRR, others were against it and some were simply ignorant or indifferent of its 
implications. For example, regarding extensive cattle-ranchers recent research has 
shown (Gutiérrez and Vargas, 2017) how some of these rural elites supported 
paramilitary groups in certain regions and opposed land restitution. Yet, there were 
also small- and medium-scale cattle ranchers that supported the peace process 
elsewhere, such as those associated to the Federación de Ganaderos del Caquetá, a 
separate association from FEDEGAN that brings together cattle-ranchers from 
Caquetá, a region that was highly affected by the armed confrontation between FARC 
and the military forces. Within the agribusiness there are were also similar gaps that 
need to be properly account for.  
 
8.3 Final Thoughts 
 
As students of political issues, it is relevant to be aware of the need to see current 
events in the light of history to avoid rushing into big conclusions about an ongoing 
phenomenon. That is why the arguments I put forward in this thesis are far from being 
definitive; at best, they serve to explore key questions and to open a long-term research 
agenda. I hope that in ten years’ time, I am better to analyze what this critical juncture 
has meant. I am finishing the dissertation in media res (in the middle of events), at a 
very critical point, only two years and a half after the peace agreement was signed and 
the implementation phase is just starting, and right before a new government formed 
by the political sectors that opposed the agreement take power. I do not have the 
advantage of seeing retrospectively the whole trajectory of events. There are a lot of 
issues I am not sure how they are going to end up. Even within the span of this few 
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years, since the moment I presented the proposal in March 2015 up until now in mid-
2018, only in three years, my skepticism has just increased as reality has shown how 
the inertia and structural factors are stronger than the change attempted. 
Currently, the agreement’s overall implementation is at risk. Besides growing 
security threats – including the increasing assassination of community leaders – that 
put in danger the positive effects of the end of the armed confrontation with FARC 
(Osorio Granados 2018), Iván Duque, Uribe’s candidate that became elected as 
president in June 2018, campaigned against the peace process and has promised to 
modify substantial aspects of crucial items off the agreement like the transitional justice 
system. More importantly, what is at stake right now is the collective understanding of 
whether the end of the armed conflict with FARC should give place to a transitional 
period including structural socioeconomic transformations. Paradoxically, in 
democratic contexts like Colombia’s, in which the violence has been marginalized to 
peripheral areas and has not directly experienced by most of the urban population in 
recent years, it is harder for a society to accept the need for transitional mechanisms 
(Aoláin and Campbell 2005). For many urban dwellers, the notion of entering a 
transition period is still not conceivable. In this mindset, FARC was a terrorist group 
threatening Colombia’s economic and political system, but there was no need to 
modify the course followed. The risk now is that the substantive developmental 
measures included in the Havana agreement, especially those geared towards tackling 
widespread inequality, will not gain enough relevance. A probable near future scenario 
is that the provisions on land distribution will fall out from the government’s agenda 
and become marginalized in the public opinion. As a country, Colombia will miss 
again another opportunity to resolve its long-standing problems and may put at risk 
achieving sustainable peace. As in previous occasions, a group of ex combatants may 
be replaced by another generation of young people that will take up arms, this time not 
with any particular political motivation but simply with an economic one, as the 
current events on rearmament and reconfiguration of the coca business since FARC 
disappeared have shown (International Crisis Group 2018b). Nonetheless, there is also 
room to think that now that FARC ceased to be an armed group, Colombian 
democracy may become more vibrant and open for different political agendas as the 
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recent presidential elections showed. Moreover, the increasing mobilization of civil 
society in rural areas and their participation in the structures and mechanisms created 
by the CRR also leads to believe that citizen demands for distribution and economic 
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Appendix 1. Percentage Share of GDP by Activity in Colombia, 1970-
2017 
 
Activity 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2017 
Agriculture 25,09% 19,36% 16,24% 8,31% 6,33% 6,31% 
Mining 1,95% 2,29% 9,32% 5,93% 8,67% 4,87% 
Industry   20,66% 23,27% 19,95% 13,93% 13,99% 11,90% 
Public services  1,06% 1,31% 2,52% 3,27% 3,28% 3,06% 
Construction  3,97% 4,72% 4,95% 4,18% 5,34% 6,82% 
Commerce and tourism 12,49% 13,27% 14,14% 12,91% 15,63% 17,51% 
Transport and communications   8,69% 8,90% 9,11% 6,27% 3,42% 2,77% 
Financial services, real state services 
and business services  
13,80% 13,71% 11,15% 20,63% 19,21% 20,82% 
Other activities 12,30% 13,17% 12,64% 24,58% 24,13% 25,94% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s construction based on data of DANE and Banco de la República. 
Notes: i) I used the different available data at DANE on annual GDP. I used the 1975 database for the 1970-
1993 period; the one of 1994 for the period 1994-2000; that of 2005 for 2000-2004; and the 2015 database for 
the 2005-2017 period. When there were differences between databases, I used the most recent figures. ii) The 
2015 database disaggregates the financial services in three categories. In order to make this period comparable 
with the previous ones, I added these three categories into a single one for the period 2005-2017. iii) In the 
category “Other activities” I included: social, personal and community services; activities of public 




Appendix 2.Trajectory of FARC’s Agrarian Discourse 
 




Confiscation of the landowner property. Free access to 
land for peasants  
1966 2nd Conference 
Constitution of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) 
"New stage of struggle and unity with all the 
revolutionaries of our country, with all the workers, 
peasants, students and intellectuals, with all our people, 
to promote the struggle of the great masses towards the 
popular insurrection and to take the power for the 
people" 
 
1969 3rd Conference 
Confiscation of the large estate property. Free access to 
land. Confiscation of all lands occupied by North 
American companies. Nationalization of the oil industry, 
gold, silver and platinum 
 
1982 7th Conference  
All properties or concessions of foreign companies, oil, 
mining, banana or timber companies are abolished. 
 
All properties over 1500 ha are abolished  
 
1984 
La Uribe peace 
talks 
"to vigorously promote the application of an Agrarian 
Reform policy in recognition of the fact that land 
problems are present in the current social conflicts, and 
the other actions of state agencies should aim to expand 
permanently the services to the peasantry in order to 
improve the quality of life and the normal production of 
food and raw materials for the industry ... " 
 
1992 
VII Summit of 
the Coordinadora 
 
"Redistribution of land should be made where the 
latifundio prevails. Build the road infrastructure and 
provide the necessary transport in rural areas in the 
country, set up low credits for agriculture and livestock, 
crop insurance, provide materials and modern 
technology to all who generate wealth in our fields and 
ensure the commercialization of their products. 
 
1993 8th Conference 
"Agrarian Policy that democratizes credit, technical 
assistance and marketing. Total stimulus to industry and 
to agricultural production. State protectionism against 
the unequal international competition”. 
 
“Each region will have its own development plan jointly 
constructed with community organizations, eliminating 
the latifundio where it subsists, redistributing the land, 
defining an agricultural frontier that rationalizes the 
277 
Year Event/Document Main claims 
colonization and protects our reserves from devastation. 
Permanent support for national and international 
marketing. " 
1999 




change for the 
New Colombia 
 
Recovery of unproductive land and drug trafficking 
properties. 




end of the year 
message 
December, 2010 
 Return the lands usurped in all these years to their true 
owners, colonos and peasants 
Restitute lands to indigenous communities and give 
lands that belong to black communities 
Eliminate the latifundia 
"A modern land law with a strategic vision, which sows 
peace, must inexorably include economic and 
technological aids, facilities for marketing, roads, but 
above all, it necessarily has to harmonize in it the social, 
territorial, cultural, environmental and the spatial, in all 
its considerations and prospections”. 
2011 
Statement of the 
Secretariado of 
the Central High 
Command   
Land for peasants 





Comprehensive agrarian development policy 
 
 





Appendix 3. Evolution of Rural Development Institutions in Colombia 
 
Institution Acronym Year Field of action 
Ministry of  Agriculture and rural 
development (Ministerio de 
agricultura y desarrollo rural) 
 
MADR 
1913-present Formulation, coordination and 
evaluation of  agricultural and rural 
policies 
Colombian Agricultural Institute 
(Instituto Colombiano 
Agropecuario) 
ICA 1962-present Prevention, monitoring and control 
of  sanitary, biological and 
chemical risks 
Agrarian Bank of  Colombia (Banco 
Agrario de Colombia) 
BANAGRA
RIO 
1999-present Financing for the agricultural and 
rural sector 
Fund for Agricultural Financing 
(Fondo para el Financiamiento del 
sector agropecuario) 
FINAGRO 1990-present Financial institution that channels 
resources for agricultural projects 
Colombian Corporation for 
Agricultural Research (Corporación 
Colombiana de Investigación 
Agropecuaria) 
CORPOICA 1993-present Development and transfer of  
scientific knowledge and 
technological solutions for the 
agricultural sector 
Colombia International Corporation 
(Corporación Colombia 
Internacional) 
CCI 1992-present Support, promotion and 
development of  modern, non-
traditional agriculture 
Colombia Mercantile Exchange 
(Bolsa Mercantil de Colombia) 
BMC 1979-present Public arena for the negotiation of  
commodities 
 
National Institute of  Fishery and 
Aquaculture (Instituto Nacional de 
Pesca y acuicultura) 
INPA 1990-2003 Research, administration, 
promotion and control of  the 
fishery and aquaculture activities 
National Institute for Land 
Adequacy (Instituto Nacional de 
Adecuación de Tierras) 
INAT 1993/94-2003 Promotion, financing and co 
financing of  land adequacy 
programs and projects 
Co-financing fund for social 
investment (Fondo de 
Cofinanciación para la Inversión 
Social) 
DRI 1985-2003 Co financing of  integrated rural 
development programs and 
projects 
Colombian Institute for Agrarian 
Reform (Instituto Colombiano de la 
Reforma Agraria) 
INCORA 1961-2003 Articulation of  the agrarian and 
rural development policy and 
promotion of  progressive access to 
land ownership by agrarian 
workers 
Colombian Rural Development 
Agency (Instituto Colombiano de 
Desarrollo Rural) 
INCODER 2003-2015 Implementation of  agricultural and 
rural policies and facilitation of  the 
access to productive assets 
National Unit for Rural Land 
(Unidad Nacional de Tierras 
Rurales) 
UNAT 2007-2009 Planning and administration of  




Institution Acronym Year Field of action 
Special Administrative Unit for 
Managing restitution of  forcibly 
Dispossessed land (Unidad 
Administrativa especial de gestión de 
restitución de tierras Despojadas) 
URT 2011-present Administrative management of  
land restitution for victims of  
abandonment and dispossession 
Administrative Special Unit, 
National Authority for Fishery and 
Aquaculture (Unidad Administrativa 
especial autoridad Nacional de 
Acuicultura y Pesca) 
AUNAP 2011-present Implementation of  fishery and 
aquaculture policies 
Agricultural Planning Unit (Unidad 
de Planificación de Tierras Rurales, 
Adecuación de tierras y usos 
agropecuarios) 
UPRA 2011-present Technical guidance of  territory 
management policy 
Rural Development Agency 
(Agencia de desarrollo rural) 
ADR 2015-present Implementation of  the agricultural 
and rural development policy with 
territorial approach 
Land National Agency (Agencia 
Nacional de Tierras) 
ANT 2015-present Implementation of  policies 
regarding land property, access to 
land, legal security and compliance 
of  the social function of  property 
 
Agency for the Renovation of  the 
Territory (Agencia de Renovación 
del Territorio) 
ART 2015-present Coordination of  institutions in 
rural areas affected by the conflict, 
execution of  plans and projects for 
territorial renewal 
Source: Misión para la Transformación del Campo (2015), Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural 
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Appendix 4. Budget Allocation in Rural Development Policy, 2003-2017 
 
in $USD million (constant COP of 2003)   
 Uribe Santos 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Land access 0,009 1,222 0,475 0,998 3,768 3,241 6,387 3,361 10,728 21,335 57,622 52,567 47,321 34,629 67,607 
Distribution 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,269 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 15,603 
Restitution 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,219 4,459 20,554 30,995 24,473 23,985 25,439 
Titling 0,009 1,222 0,475 0,998 3,768 2,972 6,387 3,361 10,508 16,876 37,068 21,572 22,848 10,643 26,566 
                
Agricultural supports 45,717 61,483 75,966 96,336 107,952 109,472 84,211 123,206 337,115 421,257 469,949 481,438 392,880 216,758 148,505 
Technical assistance 1,804 5,678 6,307 12,873 13,676 16,804 15,964 19,804 27,510 26,512 29,366 19,633 78,284 50,710 14,567 
Marketing 29,887 13,478 47,795 50,163 45,459 37,762 36,232 37,049 18,842 32,332 29,797 194,170 55,856 23,510 20,847 
Direct support to family 
agriculture, rural 
women, youth or 
displaced   0,000 0,000 4,337 1,939 9,953 5,854 2,811 3,930 0,377 29,143 51,554 60,998 115,241 65,710 40,841 
Credit and direct 
subsidy 11,455 36,786 9,728 25,878 28,760 37,195 19,979 52,090 79,757 97,877 34,909 17,139 106,863 57,874 39,512 
Entrepeneurship 2,085 5,167 7,007 4,544 9,346 11,027 8,478 9,504 20,966 26,439 32,332 23,104 8,601 14,719 32,043 
Food security 0,000 0,000 0,369 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Competitiveness and 
productivity promotion 0,487 0,374 0,424 0,939 0,758 0,831 0,746 0,829 189,663 208,953 291,991 166,394 28,034 4,236 0,694 
                
Public goods 28,357 31,716 44,350 62,619 82,360 99,264 114,379 121,715 100,121 76,220 109,561 143,990 102,863 55,768 90,438 
Agricultural information 3,542 3,230 2,028 3,307 4,788 4,796 5,566 6,108 8,050 7,605 6,833 8,382 8,049 4,652 5,202 
Agricultural innovation 1,648 1,542 0,651 0,629 0,360 0,743 0,679 0,942 1,696 1,765 1,726 58,523 1,424 0,695 0,564 
Inspection services 7,624 7,518 8,831 17,158 19,497 21,138 16,722 20,737 31,075 37,999 52,762 37,267 31,721 16,896 26,637 
Irrigation 14,807 19,188 32,692 41,210 57,715 72,587 91,411 93,928 59,300 27,931 46,521 31,653 42,309 10,158 19,539 
Studies and planning 0,667 0,238 0,148 0,315 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,359 0,000 0,000 0,502 5,386 0,822 
Others 0,069 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,023 11,635 0,000 
281 
in $USD million (constant COP of 2003)   
 Uribe Santos 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Development Programs 
with Territorial Focus 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,561 1,719 8,165 18,836 6,345 37,674 
                
Total Rural 
Development 74,083 94,421 120,791 159,953 194,080 211,977 204,977 248,282 447,964 518,811 637,133 677,995 543,063 307,155 306,550 
Total Sectoral 
investment 87,528 125,055 143,482 214,880 369,492 428,993 402,253 440,077 527,037 652,791 790,539 956,800 726,229 383,905 457,452 
% of RD in Total 84,64% 75,50% 84,19% 74,44% 52,53% 49,41% 50,96% 56,42% 85,00% 79,48% 80,59% 70,86% 74,78% 80,01% 67,01% 
Source: Own calculations based on Departamento Nacional de Planeación, in million $USD (constant COP of 2003). 















Appendix 6. Political Affiliation of Santos’ Appointed Ministers (2010-2018) 
 
Ministry Appointed minister Period Political Affiliation 
Interior Germán Vargas Lleras Aug 2010 - May 2012 Cambio Radical 
Federico Rengifo Buga May 2012 - Sept 2012 Partido de la U 
Fernando Carrillo Sept 2012 - Sept 2013 Partido Liberal 
Aurelio Iragorri Sept 2013 - Aug 2014 Partido de la U 
Juan Fernando Cristo Aug 2014 - May 2017 Partido Liberal 
Guillermo Rivera Jun 2017 - Jun 2018 Partido Liberal 
Defense Rodrigo Rivera Aug 2010 - Aug 2011 Partido Liberal 
Juan Carlos Pinzón Sept 2011 - Jun 2015 Partido de la U 
Luis Carlos Villegas Jun 2015 - Jun 2018 Partido Liberal 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
Juan Camilo Restrepo Aug 2010 - May 2013 Partido Conservador 
Francisco Estupiñán Jun 2013 - Sept 2013 Partido Conservador 
Rubén Darío Lizarralde Sept 2013 - Aug 2014 Partido Conservador 
Aurelio Iragorri Aug 2014 - Oct 2017 Partido de la U 
Juan Guillermo Zuluága Oct 2017 - Jun 2018 Partido de la U 
Trade, Industry and 
Tourism 
Sergio Díaz Granados Aug 2010 - Oct 2013 Partido de la U 
Santiago Rojas Oct 2013 - Aug 2014 Partido de la U 
Cecilia Álvarez-Correa Aug 2014 - May 2016 Partido de la U 
María Claudia Lacouture May 2016 - Aug 2017 Partido de la U 
María Lorena Gutiérrez Aug 2017 - Jun 2018 Independent 
Finance Juan Carlos Echeverry Aug 2010 - Sept 2012 Partido Conservador 
Mauricio Cárdenas Sept 2012 -Jun 2018 Partido Conservador 
Justice Juan Carlos Esguerra Jun 2011 - Jul 2012 Partido Liberal 
Ruth Stella Correa Jul 2012 - Sept 2013 Partido Liberal 
Alfonso Gómez Méndez Sept 2013 - Aug 2014 Partido Liberal 
Yesid Reyes Aug 2014 - Apr 2016 Partido Liberal 
Jorge Eduardo Londoño Apr 2016 - Mar 2017 Partido Alianza Verde 
Enrique Gil Botero Mar 2017 - Jun 2018 Partido Conservador 
Culture Mariana Garcés Aug 2010 - Jun 2018 Independiente 
Health Mauricio Santamaría Aug 2010 - Jan 2012 Independiente 
Beatriz Londoño Jan 2012 - Sept 2012 Partido Conservador 
Alejandro Gaviria Sept 2012 - Jun 2018 Partido Liberal 
Mining and Energy Carlos Rodado Noriega Aug 2010 - Sept 2011 Partido Conservador 
Mauricio Cárdenas Sept 2011 - Sept 2012 Partido Conservador 
Federico Rengifo Sept 2012 - Sept 2013 Partido de la U 
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Ministry Appointed minister Period Political Affiliation 
Amilkar Acosta Sept 2013 - Aug 2014 Partido Liberal 
Tomás González Estrada Aug 2014 - Mar 2016 Partido Conservador 
María Lorena Gutiérrez Mar 2016 - Apr 2016 Independent 
Germán Arce May 2016 - Jun 2018 Partido Conservador 
Transport Germán Cardona Aug 2010 - May 2012 Partido de la U 
Miguel Peñalosa May 2012 - Sept 2012 Partido de la U 
Cecilia Álvarez Sept 2012 - Aug 2014 Partido de la U 
Natalia Abello Aug 2014 - Apr 2016 Cambio Radical 
Jorge Eduardo Rojas May 2016 - Aug 2017 Partido de la U 
Germán Cardona Aug 2017 - Jun 2018 Partido de la U 
Labor Rafael Pardo Oct 2011 - Jun 2014 Partido Liberal 
José Noé Ríos Jun 2014 - Aug 2014 Partido Liberal 
Luis Eduardo Garzón Aug 2014 - Apr 2016 Independiente 
Clara López Apr 2016 - May 2017 Polo Democrático Alternativo 




Diego Molano Veja Aug 2010 - May 2015 Partido Liberal 
David Luna May 2015- Apr 2018 Partido Liberal 
Juan Sebastián Rozo Apr 2018 - Jun 2018 Independiente 
Housing, City and 
Territory 
Beatriz Uribe Botero Aug 2010 - Apr 2012 Partido Conservador 
Germán Vargas Lleras May 2012 - May 2013 Cambio Radical 
Luis Felipe Henao May 2013 - Apr 2016 Cambio Radical 
Elsa Noguera Apr 2016- Aug 2017 Cambio Radical 
Jaime Pumarejo Aug 2017- Oct 2017 Cambio Radical 
Germán Cardona Oct 2017 - Nov 2017 Partido de la U 




Frank Pearl Sept 2011 - Sept 2012 Independent 
Juan Gabriel Uribe Sept 2012 - Sept 2013 Partido Conservador 
Luz Helena Sarmiento Sept 2013 - Aug 2014 Partido Conservador 
Gabriel Vallejo Aug 2014 - Apr 2016 Partido de la U 
Luis Gilberto Murillo May 2016 - Jun 2018 Cambio Radical 
Foreign Affairs María Ángela Holguín Aug 2010 - Jun 2018 Partido Liberal 
Education María Fernanda Campo Aug 2010 - Aug 2014 Independent 
Gina Parody Aug 2014 - Oct 2016 Partido de la U 
Yaneth Giha Nov 2016 - Jun 20818 Partido de la U 
Source: Author’s construction based on press releases (El Tiempo 2017; Lewin 2017; La Opinión 2016; 
Guzmán Pinilla 2017; La Opinión 2018) 
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Appendix 7. Political Affiliation of the Agricultural Sector’s Top 
Officials 
 







Juan Camilo Restrepo 2010-2013 Partido Conservador 
Francisco Estupiñan 2013 Partido Conservador 
Rubén Darío Lizarralde 2013-2014 Partido Conservador 
Aurelio Iragorri 2014-2017 Partido de la U 
Juan Guillermo Zuluaga 2017- Partido de la U 
Deputy Minister 
of Agriculture 
Ricardo Sánchez 2010-2013  











Juan Pablo Díaz Granados 2015-2017 Partido Liberal 










Juan Pablo Pineda 2015-2017 Partido de la U 
Samuel Zambrano Canizales 2017-  
Incoder Director Juan Manuel Ospina 2010-2012 Partido Conservador 
Miriam Villegas 2012-2013  
Rey Borbón 2013-2015 Partido Conservador 
Banco Agrario Director Francisco Estupiñán 2010-2013 Partido Conservador 
Francisco Solano 2013 Partido Conservador 
Álvaro Navas Patrón 2013-2014 Partido Conservador 
Francisco Solano 2014-201 Partido Conservador 
Luis Enrique Dussan 2016- Partido Liberal 
Finagro Director Luis Eduardo Gómez 2011-2015  
Luis Enrique Dussan 2015-2016 Partido Liberal 
Carlos Ramiro Chavarro 2016-2018 Partido Conservador 
Delia del Socorro Cedeño(e) 2018  
Corpoica Director Arturo Vega Varón 2005-2011  




Director Miguel Samper 2015- Partido Liberal 
Agencia de 
Desarrollo Rural 
Director Carlos Eduardo Gechem 2016-2017 Partido de la U 




Director Ricardo Sabogal 2012-  
Agencia para la 
Renovación del 
Territorio 
Director Mariana Escobar 2016-  
 
Superintendenci











Jairo Alonso Mesa Guerra 2017- Partido Cambio 
Radical 
Note: Author’s construction 
* This institution does not belong administratively to the agricultural sector, but is fundamental in 
land policy. 
 
 
 
